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FOREWORD 
With 2012 approaching and the Kyoto Protocol reaching its end, the world community is 
now struggling to identify a way forward post-Kyoto. 
No one can doubt that mitigating the worst threats of climate change, and adapting to the 
change that it is now too late to prevent, will be massive challenges for generations to come. 
Reducing emissions by 2050 to just a fraction of2000 levels, in a world where population and 
the appetite for consumption continue to grow, is probably the most monumental public 
policy challenge in history. 
While Kyoto has engaged governments and citizens alike with the issue of climate 
change, it has been less powerful in actually reducing emissions. The post-Kyoto 
arrangements must recognize the urgency of action. The world needs a fair, practical and 
sustainable way forward. 
For this to happen, we need a lively and honest debate, where the best insights and 
expertise come to the fore. I commend Matthew Clarke for this contribution to the debate. 
Matthew's proposals will not please everyone, and the debate has a long way to go. But what 
he has achieved, I think, is to not just to bring together the science and the economics of 
climate change, but to put the human dimension and ethics at the heart of his thinking. 
Meeting the ethical challenge demands a radical change of heart. We are challenged to 
think beyond national and personal interests, to truly see that rights and obligations are 
universal. We are challenged to ask who will pay the price of rescuing the world from 
disaster. 
Those of us who consume most are confronted with a responsibility to recognize the 
truth, and to rethink our lifestyles. Political and business leaders need vision and courage in 
working towards a plan that will deliver a future that is just as well as sustainable. 
Coming generations will not thank us if we allow timidity and selfishness to hold us back 
in meeting this challenge. My hope is that this book will help move the climate change debate 
towards the purposeful and humane action that it demands. 
Tim Costello 
Melbourne, Australia 
PREFACE 
Those who are wealthy have some degree of control over their climate. When it is hot, 
they can cool themselves down with air conditioners. Likewise, when it is cold, they can 
warm themselves with heaters. The wealthier the person, the more sophisticated the heating 
or cooling employed. A poor person has little such climate control. When it is hot, they are 
hot. When it is cold, they are cold. Without accessing any other information or asking any 
questions, the ability someone has to control their own personal environment is a ready and 
reasonable way of assessing their level of economic development. 
It is ironic then that as all nations become increasingly wealthy that the ability to control 
climate is quickly disappearing. Climate change is occurring and the affects are already 
evident. Weather patterns are changing, animal migration is occurring at different times, polar 
ice caps are shrinking and access to secure water supplies for some is diminishing. Global 
wealth is no longer sufficient for being assured of climate control. 
In a sense, therefore, all nations and all individuals are becoming more poor-like. Further, 
this lack of climate control will be exacerbated if we continue to develop as we have in the 
past. The global community must now act in unity to address climate change. The Kyoto 
Protocol was the first significant international instrument that addressed climate change. 
However, this protocol ceases to exist in 2012 and negotiations have already begun to design 
the next international climate change protocol. 
This new book sets out what this new protocol might be. The purpose of the book is 
therefore to contribute to the current negotiations and offer an alternative to the consensus 
that appears to be emerging: a consensus that will see very little departure from the principles 
that underpinned the Kyoto Protocol - limited targets for a limited number of nations. The 
reactive approach - see what happens, limit damages, and learn from experience - is 
unworkable. Rather we must take a proactive approach. This thought-provoking book 
proposes a proactive approach to the design of the next international climate change protocol. 
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Chapter 1 
THE CHALLENGE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Climate change is perhaps the most contentious issue of our time. Debate surrounding 
climate change can be found in scientific, economic, social, environmental and ethical 
literature, as the well as the popular media 1, In 2007, Al Gore, former Vice-President of the 
United States of America and climate change advocate, together with the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the international body charged with the task of 
coordinating and leading the global response to climate change, became joint recipients ofth~ 
Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts to build up and disseminate greater knowledge about man-
made climate change, and to lay the foundations for the measures that are needed to 
counteract such change. The importance of climate change cannot be understated, as future 
human existence is dependant upon understanding its causes and the resultant impacts on 
human and non-human species of its outcomes. 
The emerging reality of anthropogenic changes to the Earth's climate, due to emissions of 
greenhouse gases resulting from activities, is now widely acknowledged and accepted2. The 
policy consequences of this recognition - evident in the Kyoto Protocol and the intensifying 
debates surrounding the next post-Kyoto phase beyond 2012 - will directly impact in our 
2 
see different studies, including: IPCC (2007) 'Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report', IPCC Fourth 
Assessment Report, IPCC, Geneva; Pittock, B. (ed.) (2003), Climate Change: An Australian Guide to the 
Science and Potential Impact, Australian Greenhouse Office, Canberra; Nordhaus, W. (1994), Managing the 
Global Commons: The Economics of Climate Change, MIT Press, London; Islam, S., Gigas, 1. and Sheehan, 
P. (1998), 'Cost-Benefit Analysis of Climate Change: Towards an Operational Decision Making Rule for 
Climate Change Policy', Indian Journal of Applied Economics, Vol. 7(3), pp. 217-226; World Bank (2000), 
Cities, Seas and Storms - Managing Change in Pacific Island Economies, World Bank, Washington DC.; 
Broome, 1. (1992) 'Counting the Cost of Global Warming', White House Press, Cambridge; Muller, B. 
(2002), Equity in Climate Change: The Great Divide, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Oxford; and 
Strauss, A. (2003), 'The Legal Option: Suing the United States in International Forums for Global Warming 
Emissions', Environmental Law Reporter, Vol. 33, pp. 10185-10191. 
see different IPCC reports, including: M. Parry, O. Canziani, J. Palutikof, P. van der Linden, and C. Hanson 
(eds) (2007), Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group 
11 to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge; and B. Metz, O. Davidson, P. Bosch, R. Dave, and L. Meyer (eds) (2007), Climate Change 
2007: Mitigation. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
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daily existence. Human activity has changed our climate, and so responding to climate change 
now necessitates changing human activity. 
The international community has recognized that climate change requires a coordinated 
global response. In 1990, commitments to stabilize greenhouse gas emissions were made 
under the guise of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC). In 1997, targets to reduce greenhouse gas emissions were established (known as 
the Kyoto Protocol) for certain countries by the period 2010-12. Currently, negotiations are 
underway to design the next international instrument to address climate change. The specific 
emission targets and the countries to which these targets will apply, as well as the supporting 
policies to assist in their achievement, are not yet known. It is therefore the purpose of this 
book to contribute to these post-Kyoto negotiations. The major thesis of this book is that 
designing the next international climate change protocol requires an ethical starting point in 
which all nations must respond to climate change and certain countries or populations do not 
elevate their own claims to emit greater levels of greenhouse gas over others. 
It is not the intention of this book to (re )argue the scientific case for climate change. It is 
assumed that the evidence for climate change is indisputable. Certainly the overwhelming 
weight of the international scientific community can be found in the various reports of the 
IPCC and other scientific literature that are being increasingly urgent in their call for global 
action. It is also assumed that climate change has occurred and will continue to occur into the 
future and that it is no longer possible to return to past climatic conditions. Having stated this 
sta1;ting point though, it is useful to introduce this book on the next international climate 
change protocol with a brief review of the evidence of climate change observed over the past 
century and set out the present knowledge on the dimensions of this problem. 
This chapter has eight sections. This first section has introduced the chapter. Section Two 
provides a brief explanation of climate change and the greenhouse effect. Section Three 
highlights the multifaceted nature of climate change before Section Four discusses 
technological change and industrial structure. Section Five discusses the most recent levels of 
greenhouse gas emissions. Section Six introduces the basic tenets of what the next 
international climate change protocol should contain before the remainder of this book is set 
out in Section Seven. 
2. WHAT IS CLIMATE CHANGE 
With or without religious belief, human existence on earth can appear quite precarious. 
Located around 150 million kilometers from the sun, spinning (at the equator) at 
approximately 1670 kilometers per hour, having 71 percent of its surface covered by salt-
water, and estimated to be over 4.5 billion years old, the earth is the only planet known to 
have life. It is home to 1.4 million known species (including one species known as homo 
sapiens) and more than another estimated 20 million unknown species. The earth is warmed 
by the sun's radiated energy but this warmth is dependent upon the earth's atmosphere 
(comprising 78 percent nitrogen, 21 percent oxygen and 1 percent of a mixture of carbon 
dioxide, water vapour and ozone). Without this atmosphere, the average temperature on earth 
would be -18DC. Most of the sun's energy that reaches earth is either absorbed by the oceans 
and land masses or radiated back into the atmosphere in the form of heat or infrared radiation. 
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Various atmospheric gases, such as water vapor and carbon dioxide capture some of this heat 
and reradiate it back to earth. This is called the greenhouse effect. This greenhouse effect 
results in the earth being around 33°C warmer than it otherwise would be. Thus, the earth's 
climate is dramatically changed due to this effect. Without such the greenhouse effect, life on 
earth (for both human and non-human species) as presently experienced would not exist. 
Current concerns about climate change however, result from an over functioning 
greenhouse effect. Increased concentrations of greenhouse gases (such as carbon dioxide, 
methane, nitrous oxide, oxides of nitrogen, carbon monoxide, and non-methane volatile 
organic compounds) within the earth's atmosphere, result in higher levels of trapped infrared 
radiation. This radiation warms the lower atmosphere and thus changes present climate 
patterns. 
There is now little doubt that since the industrial revolution, anthropogenic (or human) 
activities, such as agriculture, deforestation and the use of fossil fuels for energy, have 
significantly altered the earth's atmosphere by increasing the concentration level of 
greenhouse gases3• According to the Fourth Assessment Reports to the IPCC published in 
2007, most energy for anthropogenic needs is derived through burning fossil fuels. The main 
byproduct of burning fossil fuels is carbon dioxide. Carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil 
fuels accounts for around 57 percent of total greenhouse gas emissions. Carbon Dioxide 
emissions from deforestation account for another 17 percent of total greenhouse gas 
emissions. Carbon dioxide accounts for over 80 percent of all greenhouse gas emissions. 
Carbon dioxide concentrations are now 36 percent higher than pre-industrial levels (379 ppm 
compared to 278 ppm in 1750). Increased emissions of other greenhouse gases have also 
occurred. Methane accounts for over 14 percent of total greenhouse gas emissions and 
methane concentrations levels in the atmosphere have increased by over 153 percent (1774 
ppb compared to 700 ppb in 1750). Nitrous oxide accounts for nearly 8 percent of total 
greenhouse gas emissions and concentrations levels have increased by approximately 17 
percent (321 ppm to 275 ppm in 1750). 
Table 1.1. Summary of changes in greenhouse gas emissions 
Gas 
CO2 (carbon 
dioxide) 
CH4 (methane) 
N20 (nitrous 
oxide) 
Source: IPee 2007. 
Change 
36% increase since 
1750 
Annual increase of 
0.4% over past two 
decades 
153 % increase since 
1750 
Recent plateau of 
emissions 
17% increase since 
1750 
1750 
concentration 
level 
278 ppm 
700 ppb 
275 ppm 
Present 
concentration level 
379 ppm 
1,774 ppb 
321 ppm 
IPCC (2007) 'Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report' ,IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, IPCC, Geneva. 
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Knowledge of the problem and dangers of climate change have long existed within the 
scientific literature. Svente Arrhenius first raised the relationship between carbon dioxide and 
global warming in 1896 and Roger Reville proved carbon dioxide concentrations were 
increasing in the 1930s. There is no little doubt that climate change is occurring and occurring 
precisely because of human activities. Indeed, the IPCC report with very high confidence that 
these effects of human activities have resulted in global warming4. 
3. CONFRONTING CLIMATE CHANGE 
The challenges of climate change are multi-faceted. Climate change is in essence a 
scientific phenomenon. The primary driver -of climate change has been economic growth 
through the process of industrialisation and specifically the burning of fossil fuels to generate 
energy. The consequences of climate change are social, ecological and economic. Responses 
to climate changes require technical skills but must be ethical in their impact and coverage. 
Analysis of climate change must remain cognizant of each of these different domains. 
The interaction between these different domains increases the complexities of analysing 
the effects of climate change and predicting future outcomes. Climate change, be it 
movements in mean average temperatures, sea level rises, changes in precipitation levels, or 
droughts and floods, requires adaptation to ensure survival. Climate change directly affects 
food and water resources, eco-systems and biodiversity, human settlements and human health. 
These changes thus impact on socio-economic development paths resulting in changed 
outcomes in levels of economic growth, technological advances, population growth and 
issues of governance. The interaction continues as economic growth, technology, population 
and governance are all drivers in greenhouse gas emissions and concentrations5. 
Systems or species least able to adapt to climate change will be most vulnerable to its 
consequences. Human systems that are most sensitive to climate change include water 
resources, agriculture, coastal zones, human settlements, insurance and other financial 
systems and human health. Developing countries will therefore be the most sensitive to 
change as they have fewer resources to protect themselves and often already are located in 
precarious geographical locations (the annual floods in Bangladesh is an example of this). 
Non-human species are particularly vulnerable as migration of ecosystems or biomass as 
discrete units is unlikely. Instead, at affected sites, species composition and dominance will 
change. Due to feedback relationships, the ultimate effects of these changes are impossible to 
fully predict or model. 
Certainly, the longer global warming persists, the greater the magnitude of this change 
and the higher the risk of catastrophic changes in climate change. 
4 
5 
IPCC (2007) 'Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report', IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, IPCC, Geneva. 
lEA (2002), CO] Emissions from Fuel Combustion, lEA, Paris. 
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Source: Adapted from IPCC 2001. 
Figure 1.1. Conceptual framework of Climate Change. 
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The final affects and impacts of climate change depend on the sensitivity, adaptive 
capapcity and vulnerability of particular systems6 • The sensitivity of a system is the degree 
that it is affected by, either positively or negatively, by climate-related occurrences. Climate-
related occurrences include all the elements of climate change, such as temperature change, 
movements in sea levels, and changes in precipitation levels or droughts and floods. These 
affects may be direct (reductions in crop yields due to longer growing seasons), or indirect 
(reduction in tourisms due to increased extreme weather events). A system's adaptive 
capacity is its ability to adjust to climate change, to moderate resultant damage, seize 
advantages, or accept the negative consequences of climate change. For human systems, 
adaptive capacity is directly related to the financial resources available. Wealthier 
communities have higher adaptive capacities as they can use these resources to mitigate 
climate change effects. Poorer countries without such available resources cannot mitigate 
these effects as effectively and thus have less adaptive capacity. 
The term vulnerability is the degree of susceptibility a system has to changing 
circumstances. In essence, vulnerability is a function of systems sensitivity and adaptive 
capacity7. A vulnerable system will have high sensitivity and low adaptive capacity, whilst a 
system with low sensitivity and high adaptive capacity will have low vulnerability to climate 
change. 
Developing countries have fewer resources available to them to adapt to climate change. 
This results in higher levels of vulnerabilities for these countries. In Africa, the need to adapt 
is very high in the vulnerable agricultural and water resource sectors. In Asia, the need to 
adapt is high in the vulnerable agricultural and terrestrial ecosystems sectors. In Latin 
America, the need to adapt is high in the vulnerable agricultural and water resource sectors. In 
6 
7 
IPCC (2001), Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis, IPee, Geneva. 
IPee (2001), Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis, IPee, Geneva. 
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small island developing states, the need to adapt is very high in the vulnerable water resource 
and coastal zone sectors8• 
Our existing knowledge of how the climate operates is still incomplete though. Changes 
in climate occur as a result of both internal variability within the climate system and external 
factors. Future work must be undertaken on understanding historical non-anthropogenic 
climate change to understand current and predicted changes in the context of natural and 
historical variations. However, it is likely that most of the global warming observed in the 
past fifty years can be directly attributed to human activities. 
In the past, global temperatures have shifted by up to 5°C between glacial and inter-
glacial periods with enormous climate change effects occurring. However, this shift was 
gradual. The current experience of climate change and global warming is occurring in a 
compressed timeframe. Such a rapid change -in unprecedented and it is this speed of change 
that threatens human existence. Since 1906, the 100-year linear trend of global surface 
average temperature has increased by average 0.74°C (within the range of 0.56 to 0.92°C). 
Eleven of the twelve years between 1995 and 2006 have been amongst the warmest years 
since formal instrumental records were kept in 1850. In addition, the temperature of the lower 
layer of the atmosphere (the troposphere) has also increased at a comparable rate9• Increases 
in temperature are accelerating with most of this increase occurring in the latter half of the 
past centuryl0. 
This rise in temperature has already affected a range of physical and biological systems in 
many parts of the world. Examples of observed changes includell : 
8 
9 
10 
II 
• shrinkage of glaciers; 
• thawing of permafrost; 
• later freezing and earlier break-up of ice on rivers and lakes; 
• lengthening of mid- to high-latitude growing seasons; 
• poleward and altitudinal shifts of plant and animal ranges; 
• declines of some plant and animal popUlations: and 
• earlier flowering of trees. 
UNFCCC (2003), Compilation and Synthesis of Third National Communications, UNFCCC, Geneva. 
Abatzoglou, J., Dimento, J., Doughman, P. and Nespor, S. (2007), 'Climate Change Effects: Global abd Local 
Views', in F. DiMento and P. Doughman (eds) Climate Change: What it Means for Our Children, and Our 
Grandchildren, MIT Press, Cambridge MA. 
IPCC (2007) 'Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report', IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, IPCC, Geneva. 
see different IPCC reports, including: S. Solomon, D. Qin, M. Manning, Z. Chen, M. Marquis, K. Averyt, M. 
Tignor, and H. and Miller (eds) (2007), Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of 
Working Group 1 to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; M. Parry, O. Canziani, J. Palutikof, P. van der Linden, and C. 
Hanson (eds) (2007), Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working 
Group 11 to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge; and B. Metz, O. Davidson, P. Bosch, R. Dave, and L. Meyer (eds) (2007), 
Climate Change 2007: Mitigation. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
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4. TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE 
Since the industrial revolution, the driver primary of much of human activity has been 
economic expansion. As economies expand, so to does the burning of fossil fuel to provide 
the overwhelming majority of energy, the construction of residential and commercial 
buildings and the deforestation all of which emit greenhouse gases. Without doubt, the 
growth of modern economies has brought about the growth of greenhouse gas emissions. 
However, recent change~ in the world economy may impact on forces driving changes in 
the global environment. A new world economy has emerged over the last decade as 
globalization and advances in information and communication technology (lCT) have 
converged. This 'knowledge economy' is significantly different to the 'old economy', as 
knowledge has replaced traditional productivity inputs, such as labour and natural resources, 
as the primary ingredient for economic growth. As a result, two factors that may now heavily 
influence the level of climate change are technological change and the changing structure of 
national economies resulting from the rise of the knowledge economy. 
Technological change may impact on emissions in many ways - such as by reducing the 
resource or energy intensity of industries by reducing the level of emissions per unit of 
production. The economic structure of developed countries is undergoing fundamental 
change, with an increasing role of knowledge in all sectors of the economy. Developing 
countries will inevitably be strongly influenced by this trend in due course. The shift to a 
knowledge based economy, sometimes referred to as a 'weightless economy', may therefore 
have major implications for greenhouse gas emissions and hence for climate change12 . 
The speed of structural change in the world economy has been widely noted, and it has 
become common to refer to the new set of activities, structures and arrangements emerging 
through that process of change as a knowledge-based economy 13 • The convergence of 
globalization and knowledge intensity in economic activities in the 1990s has resulted in an 
economy now characterized by 'knowledge' as the major factor in production and 
comparative advantage. The central tenet of the knowledge economy is the significance of 
knowledge to the global economic process. Codified knowledge can now be quickly and 
cheaply delivered to where it is needed, be transformed as required and be made effective in 
machines and other production and service delivery processes. The degree of incorporation of 
knowledge into global economic activity is so significant, that it has caused structural and 
qualitative changes in how the world economy operates. 
The central technological facts leading to the knowledge economy derive from the 
revolution in information technology, while the central policy fact is the global trend to the 
deregulation of the flow of goods, capital, technology and services, and of national processes 
of production and distribution. These two factors have had mutually reinforcing effects on 
shaping the new global economy. 
12 
13 
Chichilnisky, G. (1998), 'The Knowledge Revolution', The Iournal of International Trade and Economic 
Development, 7(1): 39-54. 
see various reports, including: Grewal, B. and Kumnick, M. (eds) (2002), Engaging the New World Order: 
Responses to the Knowledge Economy, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne; OECD (1996), Employment 
and Growth in the Knowledge-Based Economy, OECD, Paris; and Sheehan, P., Pappas, N., Tikhomirova, G. 
and Sinclair, P. 1995, Australia and the Knowledge Economy: An Assessment of Enhanced Economic Growth 
Through Science and Technology, Centre for Strategic Economic Studies, Victoria University, Melbourne .. 
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There is no clear indication of what the net effect of the rise of the knowledge economy 
on overall energy demand will be14 . There are five possible effects that the rise of the 
knowledge economy, incorporating technological progress, will have on energy demand. 
These are: income effects; price effects; production effects; efficiency gains effects; and fuel 
mix effects. These effects are further discussed in Chapter 6. 
Due to the development of the knowledge economy, the production of greenhouse gases 
per unit of GOP in the developed countries could be expected to fall, and this fall could be 
expected to accelerate as the structural changes associated with the rise of the knowledge 
economy become more pronounced. The historical trend of falling greenhouse gas emissions 
per unit ofGDP has indeed been observed globally since 1980, but there has been no absolute 
decline in carbon dioxide emissions (see figure 1.2). 
30000 -,- -------------------------..,- 1.2 
25000 
20000 1),8 
10000 OA 
WOD 0.2 
o 0 
~ ~" ~, .#:"., "'\.,,, .#.rJ'.#" ,cI' ~\tf>'O,./' .;~q.~ ~, ,,#~ 
I_Worlr.i Carbon Dlomeemissions (millions nf metric toP..:nes) ...... Carhon Dioxide; t GOP ratio I 
Source: Data from EIA 2007 and WB 2007. 
Figure 1.2. Comparison of Global C02/GDP intensity ratio and Absolute C02 Emissions, 1980-
2005. 
Given this historical trend of falling greenhouse gas emissions per unit of GDP, the key 
issues for the developed countries are the role of various factors in this trend, and in particular 
the likely future joint impact of changes in technology and of economic structure on 
emissions. As noted above, technological change has been widely studied but the question of 
changing economic structure has been largely ignored. Thus the question of the impact of 
continuing structural change associated with the rise of the knowledge economy is of central 
importance, and is one that has not yet been the subject of serious study. Further work is 
clearly necessary with a particular focus on how this might be incorporated into the next 
international climate change protocol for both developed and developing countries. 
14 
see studies by Katsumoto, S. (2002), 'ICT Applications for Reducing GHG Emissions in Asia and the Pacific' , 
paper presented at Impact of Information and Communications Technologies on the Energy System 
Conference, lEA, Paris, 21-22 February; and Laitner, 1. (2002), 'Capturing Emerging Trends about the 
Information Economy in Current Forecasts', paper presented at Impact of Information and Communications 
Technologies on the Energy System Conference, lEA, Paris, 21-22 February. 
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Theoretical considerations of this impact fall into two broad camps, optimistic and 
pessimistic. The optimistic view is that the knowledge economic will allow greater economic 
output with less physical input. The pessimistic view is that whilst the knowledge economy 
may result in overall increased economic output, absolute greenhouse gas emissions will not 
reduce nor will there be a significant reduction in environmental inputs required for economic 
production 15. 
Changes in industrial structure occurring in this new economy that are under way in 
developed countries, and which will in due course impinge on developing countries, may also 
have a significant impact on long-term climate change projections. If this hypothesis were 
shown to be true, the implications for international policy would be significant. Even if the 
hypothesis is proven to be false, it will be important to have this major uncertainty resolved, 
so that the ongoing economic and greenhouse gas emissions projections provide a sounder 
basis for policy. 
5. RECENT GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 
As discussed above, climate change is caused by an increasing intensity of the natural 
greenhouse effect through the increased concentration of greenhouse gas found in the earth's 
atmosphere. The international community has responded to the threat of climate change by 
making two commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Negotiations for a third 
protocol commenced in December 2007 in Bali, Indonesia with a final resolution not 
expected until 2009 or 2010. 
The first commitment was set out in the Parties to the Convention agreement (of the 
UNFCCC) in 1990. In this commitment, Annex 1 countries (developed countries and 
economies in transition; Annex II countries are developed countries only - see table 2) were 
to adopt policies and measures to return greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the year 
2000. The purpose of this agreement was the stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations 
in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with 
the climate system. 
The second commitment set out in 1996, described as the Kyoto Protocol, was also for 
Annex I countries. Under this commitment, certain Annex 1 countries were to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions by between five to eight percent, New Zealand, the Russian 
Federation and Ukraine were to maintain their 1990 levels, whilst Norway, Australia and 
Iceland were permitted to increase their greenhouse gas emissions by one, eight and ten 
percent of 1990 levels respectively. The targets are to be achieved during the period 2008 to 
2012. 
Parties to the Convention submit annual reports on their greenhouse gas emission using a 
common reporting format (CRF). This format, or National Greenhouse Gas Inventory 
(NGGI), provides a framework for both inter-country and inter-temporal comparison of 
greenhouse gas emissions. National estimates of greenhouse gas emissions have been 
15 for optimistic view see Chichilnisky, G. (1998), 'The Knowledge Revolution', The Journal of International 
Trade and Economic Development, 7(1): 39-54; and for pessimistic view see Ehrlich, P., Wolff, G., Daily, G., 
Hughes, J., Daily, S., Dalton, M. and Goulder, L. (1999), 'Knowledge and the Environment', Ecological 
Economics, 30: 267-284. 
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reported annually since 1990 under the auspices of the IPCC and the direction of the UNFCC. 
Reporting is compulsory for Annex 1 countries (primarily OECD members) and voluntary for 
non-Annex countries. 
Table 1.2. List of Annex I, II and EIT Countries 
Annex 1 
Australia 
Austria 
Belarus 
Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Canada 
Czechoslovakia 
Denmark 
European Union 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Italy 
Japan 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxemburg 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Russian Federation 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Turkey 
Ukraine 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Annex II 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Canada 
Denmark 
European Union 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Italy 
Japan 
Luxemburg 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Economies in Transition 
Belarus 
Bulgaria 
Czechoslovakia 
Estonia 
Hungary 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Poland 
Romania 
Russian Federation 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Ukraine 
Atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide have increased by 36 percent since 1750. 
It is likely that these current elevated levels of carbon dioxide concentration have not been 
exceeded in the past 20 million years. Further, the current rate of increase in carbon dioxide 
concentration is unprecedented during at least the past 20,000 years. Over this period, 
atmospheric concentration levels of carbon dioxide have been increasing on average 0.4 
percent per year, though the year to year average increase in the 1990s varied between 0.2 
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percent and 0.8 percent. Around 26 percent of the carbon dioxide emissions over the past 20 
years can be directly attributed to the use of fossil fuels to produce energy, another 13 percent 
is attributable to transport, 19 percent is caused by industry, while nearly eight percent are 
brought about by the construction of residential and commercial buildings. The agricultural 
sector (including deforestation and waste and waste water) accounts for around 34 percent of 
total carbon dioxide emissions 16 
During the 1990s, highly developed countries managed to stabilized total greenhouse gas 
emissions. In fact for Annex 1 countries, a ten percent decrease in total emissions for 1999 
was reported compared to 1990 emission levels. This average however hides a number of 
significant increases in a number of developed countries. Greenhouse gas emissions rose five 
percent in Japan, 11 per cent in the United States, 21 percent in Ireland, 33 percent in Spain 
and 40 percent in Canada. These increases were compensated by a total decrease in emissions 
emanating from the European Union of 5 percent (including a 13 percent reduction in the 
United Kingdom). Transitional countries recorded a dramatic reduction in emissions of 47 
percent between 1990-1999 (ranging from 168 percent - inferring negative carbon emissions 
- in Latvia to a 29 percent reduction in the Czech Republic), most of which can be traced back 
to the significant economic downturn that followed the collapse of the former USSR. 
However, this decade of decrease ceased with emissions in 2000-2005 (the most recent 
data available) increasing to a level higher than that recorded in 199017 . Increases in all 
sectors of the society (energy, transport, industry and agriculture) have been recorded. By 
projecting the findings of these most recent reports, it is predicted that greenhouse gas 
emissions emanating from highly developed countries will actually increase by over five 
percent between 2000 and 2012. This would result in a level of greenhouse gas emissions for 
these countries of ten percent over 1990 levels, certainly well above the Kyoto Protocol goal 
of reducing emissions by least 5 percent of this 1990 levels18 • 
Whether this projection is accurate or note is largely dependent upon the economic 
recovery in a number of the economies in transition. As mentioned above, following the 
economic collapse in the 1990s, emissions in these countries fell dramatically. However, 
during the first part of the twenty-first century, a number of these countries began increasing 
their emissions following their own economic recovery. As economic growth is one of the 
leading drivers of greenhouse gas emissions, any economic recession is likely to result in a 
reduction in such emissions. Therefore, the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions of 46 
percent for these economies in transition can be directly attributed to the economic slump 
experienced in this time. As these economies have begun recovering though, so to have the 
levels of greenhouse gas emissions begun increasing again. 
Greenhouse gas emissions must be reduced in the near future if the consequences of 
climate change are to be mitigated to some extent and catastrophic, abrupt and irreversible 
change is to be avoided. 
16 
17 
18 
IPCC (2007) 'Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report', IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, IPCC, Geneva. 
UNFCCC (2007), 'GREENHOUSE GAS total with LULUCF', accessed at http://unfccc.intigreenhouse 
gas_emissions _data/greenhouse gas_data _from _ unfccc/time _series_annex _ ilitems/3 814.php accessed on 
December 3, 2007. 
lEA (2002), C02 Emissionsfrom Fuel Combustion, lEA, Paris. 
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Table 1.3. Total and expected changes in greenhouse gas emissions 
Total Recorded Total Expected Total Expected Total Expected 
Change in Change in Change in Change in 
Greenhouse Greenhouse Greenhouse Greenhouse Gas 
Gas Emissions Gas Emissions Gas Emissions Emissions 
between 1990- between 2000- between 1990- between 1990-
1999 2005 2005 2012 
Annex 1 -9.7% +1.2% -4.5% -4.0% 
Annex 2 +2.8% +1.4% +5.9% +10.0% 
Economies in Transition -46.6% 0% -36.3% -46.6% 
Source: adapted from data from UNFCCC 2007. 
6. LOOKING TO POST-KYOTO 
Notwithstanding the expected failure to achieve the overall reduction target of producing 
five percent fewer emissions than in 1990, it is reasonable to consider that this phase of the 
Kyoto Protocol has been largely successful. The debate around the science of climate change 
has largely been replaced with the debate as to how best to mitigate and adapt to the 
consequences of climate change. The report for the British Government by Sir Nicholas Stern 
in 2006, for example, set out the economic case for responding to climate change and argued 
that immediate action would be cost-effective compared to a delayed response. Indeed, the 
term 'climate change' has entered the common lexicon - not only did Al Gore win the Nobel 
Peace Prize for his campaigning, he also won an Academy Award for his documentary on 
climate change. The Kyoto Protocol has provided a much-needed focus for scientists, policy-
makers, community development practitioners and others seeking to address climate change. 
To put is crudely, the Kyoto Protocol has been a public relations winner. 
Yet, whilst the Kyoto Protocol can be described as success in these terms, it might also be 
now considered largely irrelevant to the future response to emission reduction. Not only has it 
failed to achieve its targets, but one of the world's largest emitters - the United States - failed 
to ratity the Protocol. Indeed, until December 2007, a second significant emitter in terms of 
per capita emissions, Australia, had likewise failed to ratify the Kyoto Protocol but recently 
did so at the post-Kyoto negotiations in Bali, Indonesia following a change of Government -
with the new Government having heavily campaigned on the issue of ratitying Kyoto as a 
major point of difference between itself and its opposition). However, it was not the failure of 
the United States to fail to ratify the Protocol or the lack of success in achieving the set targets 
that has brought about this irrelevancy. In its initial inception, the Protocol excluded the 
developing world from setting emission targets. An international response to climate change 
must include all nations, especially those developing countries that will become the major 
emitters in the coming decades. In failing to incorporate these countries, the Kyoto Protocol 
failed to be a reasonable response. 
The post-Kyoto Protocol can no longer exclude developing countries, such as China and 
India, whom are now amongst the world's largest greenhouse gas emitters. The post-Kyoto 
negotiations must incorporate all nations in response to the global crisis of climate change. 
Further, the debate must be resolved as to the best measure to assess a country's impact 
on climate change. Should a country's impact be assessed by their total emissions or their 
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emission per capita? Other than for the United States, the choice between total or per capita 
emissions levels significantly impacts upon the subsequent analysis. The United States 
produces the most carbon dioxide emissions in the world. Nearly one quarter of the world's 
carbon dioxide emissions emanate from the United States. This is a function of a relatively 
large population, but also the high level of economic activity and heavy reliance on fossil 
fuels for energy. This compares to China producing around 18 percent of total carbon dioxide 
emissions. China's high emission output is a function of its extremely high popUlation, 
increasingly high levels of economic growth and low levels of technological advancement. 
No other country produces over ten percent of the world's carbon dioxide emissions. 
Table 1.4. Top ten countries absolute share of world CO2 emissions (as a percentage) 
Country 
United States 
China 
Russia 
India 
Japan 
Germany 
Canada 
United Kingdom 
Korea 
Italy 
Source: UNSTATS 2007. 
Percentage of absolute world CO2 emissions 
22.20 
18.39 
5.60 
4.93 
4.62 
2.97 
2.35 
2.16 
1.71 
1.65 
The alternative method of analysing a country's contribution and responsibility for 
greenhouse gas emissions is emissions per capita. As discussed above, other than for the 
United States the countries that produce the highest level of absolute carbon dioxide 
emissions do not produce high levels of emissions per capita. In fact, of the ten highest carbon 
dioxide emissions per capita countries, four are primary producing countries (with an 
emphasis on oil producing countries) and the remainder ~ excluding the US ~ have low 
populations. Qater emits almost 70 tonnes of carbon dioxide emissions per capita and the 
United States 20 emits tonnes per capita. 
Table 1.5. Top ten countries per capita shares of world CO2 emissions (metric tonnes) 
Country 
Qatar 
Kuwait 
United Arab Emirates 
Luxembourg 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Brunei 
Bahrain 
Netherlands Antilles 
Aruba 
United States 
Source: UNSTATS 2007. 
Per capita shares of world CO2 emissions (metric tonnes) 
69.22 
37.97 
37.80 
24.93 
24.68 
24.09 
23.89 
22.19 
21.32 
20.38 
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To minimize climate change, greater absolute reductions in greenhouse gas emissions are 
required in the next international climate change protocol than that called for within the 
Kyoto Protocol. Moreover, the allocation of these reductions will be central to the new 
protocol being accepted or rejected by the international community. Fundamental to the 
allocation of these reductions is whether emission levels are considered in absolute terms or 
in per capita terms. 
This book will argue that a new international instrument is required in the post-Kyoto 
period to address climate change that includes significant reductions in greenhouse gas 
emissions, that the allocation of emissions be undertaken on an ethical and equitable basis and 
all nations should participate in this process and be bound to achieve these new targets. The 
position this book advocates will not be politically popular and many countries, both 
developed and developing, will find the proposed approach difficult to accept. However, the 
reality of climate change requires bold changes and new initiatives. It is hoped this book will 
find support amongst those who understand the urgency that climate change demands. This 
book argues that a cap and converge approach is necessary with the basis of target setting 
being on per capita emissions set to limit greenhouse gas concentration levels to that of two 
times pre-industrial levels by 2050. 
7. CONCLUSION AND BOOK OUTLINE 
Using historical observations and scientific analysis, it is clear that the earth's climate has 
changed over the past 100 years, and more obviously over the last 50 years. It is likely that 
the majority of this change has been caused by human activities and specifically the burning 
of fossil fuels to generate energy. Indeed, the weight of scientific consensus holds with very 
high confidence that the impact of human activity since the industrial revolution has been 
global warming 1 9. The consequences of this warming for both humans and non-human 
species are significant. If global temperatures increase more than 1.S-2.5°C between 20 to 30 
percent of species may become extinct and if temperatures increase greater than 3.5°C 
potentially 40 to 70 percent will face extinction. It is not possible to predict the ecological 
consequences of these mass extinctions for humans. Further,. depending on the rate and 
magnitude of this warming, some climatic impacts may be abrupt or irreversible with 
unpredictable outcomes. 
Climate change is currently occurring and it cannot be averted. The international 
community must therefore act immediately to mitigate its effects and minimize its impact. 
This requires significant reductions to greenhouse gas emissions. Current negotiations are 
occurring to design the post-Kyoto Protocol. The outcome of these negotiations will impact 
on all aspects of human activity - including the economy. 
Climate change has been one of the most contentious issues in recent times. Debate 
surrounding climate change exists in scientific, economic, ethical and environmental 
literature, as well as the popular media. Understanding the issue of climate change is 
important, as future human existence is dependent upon understanding the causes of 
outcomes of climate change, and the resultant impacts on human and non-human species. 
This chapter has served to introduce an argument that calls for a next international climate 
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change protocol that incorporates significant reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, new 
emissions targets allocated on an ethical and equitable basis and all nations participating in 
this process and committing to achieving these new targets. 
Chapter 2 sets the scene for this proposed new international climate change protocoL It 
discusses the consequences climate change has for on-going human existence. This will be a 
brief survey of the most recent studies, especially those produced by the IPCC. It may be that 
these consequences will be either positive or negative, and will differ between regions. Some 
regions will enjoy longer growing seasons and more fruitful productivity, increased water 
supplies and increased mid-winter temperatures. Conversely, other regions will experience 
more negative outcomes such as reduced crop yields due to increased temperatures, more 
extreme weather events, increased exposure to vector- and water-borne diseases and increases 
in sea levels. Projecting future climate change is an important task. It allows forward planning 
to respond to predicted changes, but also supports efforts to mitigate current change to 
perhaps reduce potential change. This chapter will also summarize and review the various 
scenarios used to make these predictions. 
The analysis of climate change must incorporate its spatial and temporal nature and so an 
ethical response to climate change is required. This is discussed in Chapter 3. The impact of 
climate change will differ geographically, but also across time. Despite some effects currently 
being felt, the most serious consequences of climate change will be felt in the future. A global 
response is required that considers the ethical dimensions of climate change to both present 
and future generations. This chapter reviews the relevant ethical arguments and discusses the 
relevance of uncertainty around climate change on future actions. This chapter therefore lays 
the justification for international action required beyond the current Kyoto Protocol. 
The present Kyoto Protocol excludes developing countries from reducing their emissions, 
yet China and India for example are amongst the world's largest absolute emitters of 
greenhouse gases. Full incorporation of these nations in the next international climate change 
protocol is required. Chapter 4 focuses on China and is the first of two case study chapters. 
Since economic liberalization in 1979, China's gross domestic product has increased nearly 
seven-fold. Yet, despite this enormous increase, China is still a developing country with GDP 
per capita of less than one-fifth of the OECD average. China is planning to quadruple its 
economy over the next two decades and increase its urbanization rate from 35 percent to 65 
percent. If these goals are achieved, China will reach GDP per capita levels of a middle-
income country. This economic growth requires energy and China's energy consumption has 
already doubled in recent years. China is the second largest emitter of greenhouse gas 
emissions. This chapter will explore China's energy demand and its contribution to climate 
change. 
China is not the only significant greenhouse emitting developing country. As a whole, 
developing countries are responsible for significant greenhouse gas emissions. This is largely 
a factor oflarge populations, low-level technology, and on-going industrialization. In addition 
to China, three other developing countries are of particular interest to climate change analysis 
due to the absolute size of current emissions, potential for future growth in emissions, and 
strategic importance in global trade. These countries are Russia, India and Brazil. The 
Russian Federation is the world's third highest emitter of greenhouse gases, while India is the 
19 IPCC (2007) 'Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report', IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, IPCC, Geneva. 
16 Matthew Clarke 
fifth and Brazil is the eighteenth. Chapter 5 will review the current emISSIOns of these 
countries and examine their economies and potential for limiting emissions in the future. 
The simultaneous rise of globalization and knowledge-intensive economic activities over 
the past decade has resulted in a world economy now characterized by knowledge as the 
major factor in production. The central tenet of the knowledge economy is the significance of 
knowledge to the global economic process. However, there is no clear indicator of what the 
net effect of the knowledge economy will be on overall energy use. Understanding the 
potential of the knowledge economy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions without constraining 
economic growth is important if developing countries are going to continue their rightful path 
to development. Therefore, Chapter 6 will review the potential of the knowledge economy to 
achieve growth without increasing emissions. 
Having reviewed the current scientific knowledge and economic environment the next 
international climate change protocol is discussed in Chapter 7. Climate change is a global 
issue and requires an international response. This chapter therefore proposes a new 
international policy instrument to lower greenhouse emissions. This policy is based on 
emissions caps, uniformity of per capita emissions and knowledge transfer to allow 
developing countries to continue their development path without prejudicing the environment. 
This approach will be inclusive of all nations. While onerous in some respects, the proposed 
approach is realistic, but more importantly, necessarily to mitigate the effects of climate 
change. 
The challenges of climate change are multi-faceted. Climate change is in essence a 
sclentific phenomenon, but the primary driver of climate change has been the process of 
industrialization and specifically the burning of fossil fuels to generate energy to power 
economic expansion. The consequences of climate are, social, ecological and economic. But 
responses to climate change must be ethically based. Addressing climate change must 
therefore incorporate each of these different domains, which itself requires a political focus. 
The Kyoto Protocol ceases to exist in 2012. International negotiations have now begun to 
address climate change beyond this time. A new protocol that will have directly impact upon 
climate change is required. This book describes what the next international climate change 
protocol needs to be. 
Chapter 2 
ASSESSING THE FUTURE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Climate change is already having consequences for human and non-human existence. It is 
now apparent that 'observational evidence from all continents and most oceans shows that 
many natural systems are being affected by regional climate change, particularly temperature 
increases,l. However, it is misleading to characterize all climate change will be negative. For 
example: 1) longer growing seasons will increase crop yields in regions of mid-latitude as 
mean temperatures will increase; 2) timber supplies from appropriately managed forests will 
also increase due to greater productivity in forests; 3) increased precipitation will increase 
water supplies for some water-scarce regions (such as Southeast Asia); and 4) increased mid-
winter temperatures in mid- to high-latitudes will result in reduced low temperature related 
mortality rates and also lead to reduced energy demands for heating2• 
By the same token the negative consequences of climate change are likely to be most 
heavily felt by poorer countries and communities with few resources to mitigate the changes 
or assist in adaptation. Further, the effects of climate change will also alter in line with the 
intensity of climate change. The intensity of climate change impact will be greatest in the 
tropic and sub-tropic regions and least in the mid- to high-latitude regions. As the majority of 
the world's poor live with the tropic and sub-tropic regions, though they will be most 
negatively affected by climate change and have the least economic resources available to 
them to adapt to or mitigate the consequences of this change. In tropical and sub-tropical 
regions, temperature increases will be at the maximum range and will result in reduced crop 
yields. Changing precipitation patterns in sub-tropic regions will decrease water availability 
in already water-scarce regions. There will be an increase in exposure to both vector- and 
water-borne diseases (such as malaria and cholera) and an increase in heat stress mortality. 
Flooding will increase in areas of high populations due to both sea level increases and 
2 
Parry, M., Canziani, 0., Palutikof, J., van der Linden, P., and Hanson, C. (eds) (2007), Climate Change 2007: 
Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group 11 to the Fourth Assessment Report of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 8 
IPCC (2007) 'Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report', IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, IPCC, Geneva. 
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extreme precipitation events. Energy demand will increase for cooling during hotter summer 
months3• 
Yet projecting climate change is predominately an exercise in uncertainty. Uncertainty 
exists because the science of climate modeling is incomplete, consideration of abrupt climate 
change has only recently occurred and the estimates of greenhouse gas emissions can be 
miscalculated. The IPCC has produced the most recent and thorough climate change 
projections with temperatures increasing within a likely range of 1.1 °C to 6.4 °C with the best 
estimates ranging between 1.8°C to 4.0°C and sea levels rising from 1980-1999 levels 
between 0.18 metres to 0.59 metres in 2090-20994• 
Projecting future climate changes, even with such uncertainties, is an important task. 
Predicting future climatic changes has two main effects: 1) it allows forward planning to take 
place to respond to these changes; and 2) it supports efforts to change current behaviours that 
have negative consequences for the future. 
This chapter is set out as follows: Section Two will review various scenario types before 
Section and Section Three discusses projections of climate change. Section Four considers the 
uncertainty surrounding these projections before the chapter is concluded in Section Five. 
2. SCENARIOS AND PREDICTING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 
AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
Despite the advances in all areas of knowledge and science, predicting the future still 
remains impossible. It is possible though to determine and then model different 'futures' or 
scenarios based on current knowledge and expertise. Scenarios are images of the future, or 
alternative futures. Developing and modeling future scenarios has long been undertaken by 
groups as diverse as business to environmentalists to multilateral agencies5• Scenarios provide 
a starting point for examining questions about the uncertain future and can help visualize 
alternative futures in concrete and human terms. As an integration tool in the assessment of 
climate change scenarios also allow a role for intuition, analysis, and synthesis. Scenarios are 
not predictions of the future, but rather are projections of possible different futures. 
Predictions of climate change are predominately made through complex computer 
models. As society, the economy and the environment are complex and ill-understood 
systems, future levels of global greenhouse gas emissions driven by forces, such as 
popUlation growth, socio-economic development and technological progress, make long-term 
predictions virtually impossible. Scenarios are heavily reliant on value judgments. Scenarios 
3 
4 
5 
Solomon, S., Qin, D., Manning, M., Chen, Z., Marquis, M., Averyt, K., Tignor, M. and Miller, H. (eds) 
(2007), Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
Parry, M., Canziani, 0., Palutikof, J., van der Linden, P., and Hanson, C. (eds) (2007), Climate Change 2007: 
Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group 11 to the Fourth Assessment Report of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
see for example: Skumanich, M. and Silbernagel, M. (1997), Foresighting Around the World. Seattle: Battelle 
Seattle Research Center; Meadows, D. H., Meadows., D. L., Randers, J. and Behens, W. W. (1972), The 
Limits to Growth Universe Books, New York; International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2002), 
Emission Scenarios, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
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can either be descriptive or normative. Descriptive scenarios set out the starting point and 
driving forces, but do not seek to make any prescriptions about the final outcome. Normative 
scenarios on the other hand, define the final "ideal" outcome and work backward to identify 
which actions are required to achieve this outcome. Descriptive scenarios are more common 
than normative scenarios, however this book will present a normative scenario for 2050 as the 
basis for the next international climate change protocol. 
To predict future climate change outcomes, quantitative assessment of the sensitivity, 
adaptive capacity and vulnerability of natural and human systems to climate change is 
required. Such assessment must have a particular emphasis on changes in the range of 
climatic variation and the frequency and severity of extreme climate events. Further, 
assessment is also needed of when various systems will be irreversibly affected by climate 
change. This includes an understanding of dynamic responses by ecosystems to multiple 
stresses, including climate change, at global, regional, and finer scales is also required. It is 
important that work on adaptive responses and the estimation of the effectiveness and costs of 
adaptation options, and the identification of difference in opportunities for and obstacles to 
adaptation in different regions, nations and populations. It is also important to fully 
understand the interactions between components of natural and human systems and the 
consequences of different policy decisions. 
Therefore, climate change projections are largely reliant on complex and sophisticated 
computer modeling. Uncertainties within the resultant analysis exist because: 
• predicting and modeling human behaviour, population growth, technological growth 
is difficult; 
• knowledge on the feedback effects dealing with changes in cloud regimes, biological 
effects and ocean-atmospheric interactions is limited; 
• sufficient longitudinal databases upon which to base assumptions do not exist; and 
• climate change is also influenced by other unpredictable factors such as solar 
radiation, volcanic eruptions and chaotic variations within the climate system itself. 
So great are these uncertainties that scientific organisations at the forefront of climate 
change research often choose to insert disclaimers on their work, such as 'the projections are 
based on results from computer models that involve simplifications of real physical processes 
that are not fully understood. Accordingly, no responsibility will be accepted by CSIRO for 
the accuracy of the projections inferred from this brochure or for any person's interpretation, 
deductions, conclusions or actions in reliance of this information,6. This is not to say though 
that these projections should be dismissed. Despite these disclaimers, the results of the 
models must inform the current policy debate and certainly must be the basis for action within 
the next international climate change protocol. 
6 CSIRO (2001), Climate Change Projections for Australia, CSIRO, Melbourne, p. 8. 
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2.1. Descriptive Scenarios 
The IPCC developed its first greenhouse gas emission scenarios between 1990 and 1992 
(refereed to IS92). Until this time, no scenarios provided estimates for the full suite of 
greenhouse gas emissions. Previously, the only global scenarios developed prepared S02 
trajectories. Since the publication of these IS92 scenarios, many of the assumptions 
underlying them have become outdated due to the transition of eastern economies to market 
capitalism and new scientific information on greenhouse gas emissions 7• 
The most recent set of scenarios developed by the IPCC8 have been developed to 
incorporate a wide range of various possible outcomes. Four broad "stories" were constructed 
which reflect certain changes society might move towards in the future. Each story line 
contains reasonable characteristics based -on a literature review of over 400 previously 
developed scenarios collated by the IPCC9• The value of these storylines is their relevance to 
current characteristics of the world's socio-economic and environmental systems and the 
likelihood the future will resemble them in some way. 
The A 1 storyline is characterized by rapid levels of economics growth, low population 
growth, the use of new technology and the convergence between regions in terms of income 
per capita. The A2 storyline is based on a heterogeneous world with varying regional levels of 
popUlation growth, economic growth and technological change. The B 1 storyline is 
characterized by increasing technology developments, shifts in economic structures, low 
population growth, improved equity and global solutions to environmental and social 
problems. The B2 storyline is characterized by moderate popUlation growth, less rapid and 
more regional divergence in technology acceptance and take-up rates and a regional rather 
than global focus on solutions to social and environmental problems. 
These storylines represent how certain social, economic and technological and 
environmental paradigms may be played out over time. Different observers will view the 
outcomes differently. Some outcomes will be viewed positively by some and negatively by 
others. It is for this reason that the IPCC have not nominated a "best" or "most likely" 
scenario. Nor is there an "average" storyline. It is possible that the future may resemble any 
of these four storylines (or none of them). It is also possible that the different storylines will 
result in similar greenhouse gas emissions scenarios despite them being based on very 
dissimilar circumstances. 
7 
8 
9 
The storylines were developed so they incorporated or covered the following: 
• Full suite of greenhouse gas emissions (both direct and indirect) 
• Assessments of climate change in aU regions 
• A wide spectrum of alternative futures 
• Use ofa variety if models 
• The opinions of "outsiders" 
Pepper, W., Barbour, W., and Sankovski, A. and Baatz, B. (1998), 'No-policy Greenhouse Gas Emission 
Scenarios: Revisiting IPCC 1992', in Environmental Science and Policy, Vol. 1, pp. 289-312. 
see International Panel on Climate Change (lPCC) (2001), Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis, IPCC, 
Geneva; and more recently International Panel on Climate Change (lPCC) (2007) 'Climate Change 2007: 
Synthesis Report', IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, IPCC, Geneva. 
see www-cger.nies.go.jp/cger-e/db/ipcc.html 
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• A range of driving forces 
• Transparency 
• Are reproducible 
• Internally consistent 
All storylines are based on value judgments and assumptions. These value judgments and 
assumptions must be realistic though for the resultant scenarios to retain any significance. 
Having developed the four basic storylines these qualitative, descriptions needed to be 
operationalized so quantitative estimates of greenhouse emissions could be calculated. 
'Scenarios can be viewed as a linking tool that integrates qualitative narratives or stories 
about the future and quantitative formulations based on formal modeling' 10. 
Quantitative 
Source: IPCC 2002. 
Figure 2.1. Schematic illustration of alternative scenario formulations, from narrative storylines to 
quantitative formal models. 
It is important to consider how such a range of temperature predictions can occur. 
Computer models estimating greenhouse gas emissions must consider an enormous number 
of interconnecting relationships and feedback loops. Various models describe these 
relationships in various ways. Three main "emission drivers" are population, economic 
growth, inequality ratios of income per capita are considered. In addition, three secondary 
sources exist: final energy intensity, primary energy use, share of coal in primary energy, 
share of zero carbon in primary energy. Each of these driving forces determine the final 
estimation of greenhouse emission in all scenarios. 
Whilst the importance of these driving forces is recognized, it is the critical role of 
relationships and interdependencies between these driving forces that are of particular 
interest. It is the nature of these relationships that drives the future more than the possible 
evolution of an individual driving force by themselvesll . 
To ease the comparability of model results, agreed upon exogenous input assumptions 
were adopted. This is call harmonization. Through harmonization, 'differences in emissions 
10 
11 
International Panel on Climate Change (WCC) (2002), Emissions Scenarios, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, p. 62. 
International Panel on Climate Change (WCC) (2002), Emissions Scenarios, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
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outcomes resulting from differences in model input assumptions (e.g. exogenous population 
growth) can be separated from differences that arise from different internal model 
parameterizations (e.g. of the dynamics of technological change),12. However, when 
modeling these scenarios using different models, it is possible to make assumptions about the 
various driving forces within the general boundaries of the storylines. 'Quantitative storyline 
targets recommended for use in all scenarios within a given family included, in particular, 
population and GDP growth assumptions. Most scenarios developed within a given family 
follow these storyline recommendations, but some scenarios offer alternative interpretations. 
Scenarios within each family vary quite substantially in such characteristics as the 
assumptions about availability of fossil-fuel resources, the rate of energy efficiency 
improvements, the extent of renewable-energy development, and, hence, resultant greenhouse 
gas emissions. This variation reflects the modeling teams' alternative views on the plausible 
global and regional developments and also stems from differences in the underlying modeling 
approaches' 13 • 
2.2. Normative Scenarios 
An alternative approach to using descriptive scenarios is the normative approach. Within 
the normative scenario approach, the process of investigation is effectively reversed. Rather 
than allowing the driving forces and models to detennine the final emission levels, a stated 
end result of greenhouse emissions is pre-determined and the policies required to reach this 
level are then discussed. 
Normative scenarios therefore evaluate how a specific outcome can be reached. 'This 
type of scenario is inherently policy orientated and prescriptive, i.e. it assumes that 
appropriate policy actions can shape a future in the desired image, and is designed to identify 
the policy actions required,14. For example, if it is assumed that at a given point in the future 
(say 2050), it would be desirable to stabilize greenhouse gas concentration levels at 450 ppm, 
the normative scenario uses this as a starting point for moving backwards. Such a normative 
scenario would thus identify the various policies that would be required to achieve this vision. 
'This represents a critical change of perspective. It provides a useful mechanism to focus 
attention on several crucial elements: actions that must be taken and conditions that must be 
created at certain points in time in order to make the scenario achievable. This emphasis is on 
planning to achieve a certain result rather than on preparedness in responding to uncertain 
events. The attitude is more proactive, and policy intervention is a tool of choice. Building a 
normative scenario requires rationalization at the initial stage in order to define desirable 
characteristics of the future state of affairs, and to express them as measurable targets. 
Furthermore, the exercise stimulates formulation of critical questions, the recognition of 
l2 
14 
International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2002), Emissions Scenarios, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, p. 592. 
International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2002), Emissions Scenarios, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, p. 174. 
International Energy Agency (IEA) (2003), Energy to 2050: Scenarios for a Sustainable Future, OCEDIIEA, 
Paris, p. 4. 
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uncertainties, the identification of bottlenecks and priority areas for policy action as well as 
for research and technological development' 15. 
Over the course of this book, a case shall be made in favour of determining the next 
international climate change protocol using a normative scenario. 
3. CLIMATE CHANGE PROJECTIONS 
It is clear, limitations and uncertainty of modeling notwithstanding, that climate change is 
occurring and will have impacts on countries' social, economic and environmental systems. 
'The climate change problem is unique in at least three important ways: it is global in nature, 
it has an unusually long-term character, and both climate change itself and the effects of 
policies to mitigate it remain inadequately understood' 16; The projections below are drawn 
from various IPCC assessment reports17. 
15 
16 
17 
Table 2.1. Example of impacts resulting from 
projected changes in extreme climate events 
Climate Change Outcome 
Warmer and fewer cold days 
and nights and warmer and 
more frequent hot days and 
nights over most land areas 
Increased frequency of warm 
spells or heat waves over most 
land areas 
Likelihood 
Greater than 99% 
probability 
90 - 99% probability 
Impact 
Yields in colder environments 
will increase, but yields in 
warmer environments will 
decrease 
Reduced human morality from 
decreased cold exposure 
Reduced energy demand for 
heating but increased demand for 
cooling 
Reduced air quality in urban 
areas 
Increased danger of bush fires 
Reduced yields in warmer 
regions 
Increased water demand 
Increased water quality problems 
Increased risk of heat-related 
mortality for vulnerable 
(including young, elderly, etc.) 
International Energy Agency (lEA) (2003), Energy to 2050: Scenarios for a Sustainable Future, OCED/IEA, 
Paris, p. 22. 
International Energy Agency (lEA) (2002), Beyond Kyoto: Energy Dynamics and Climate Stabilisation, 
OECD/IEA, p. 12. 
see different IPCC reports, including: S. Solomon, D. Qin, M. Manning, Z. Chen, M. Marquis, K. Averyt, M. 
Tignor, and H. and Miller (eds) (2007), Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of 
Working Group 1 to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; M. Parry, O. Canziani, J. Palutikof, P. van der Linden, and C. 
Hanson (eds) (2007), Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working 
Group 11 to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge; and B. Metz, O. Davidson, P. Bosch, R. Dave, and L. Meyer (eds) (2007), 
Climate Change 2007: Mitigation. Contribution of Working Group 111 to the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
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Table 2.1. (Continued). 
Climate Change Outcome Likelihood 
Increased heavy rain over most 90 - 99% probability 
areas 
Increased drought-prone areas 66 - 90% probability 
Increased intense tropical 66 - 90% probability 
cyclone activity 
Increased incidence of extreme 60 - 90% probability 
high sea levels 
Source: adapted from Parry et al. (2007). 
Impact 
Increased soil erosion and 
damage to crops 
Inability to cultivate land due to 
waterlogged soil 
Decreased quality of surface and 
ground water supply 
Water scarcity may be reduced 
Increased infectious and, 
respiratory and skin diseases 
Flooding in urban areas 
Loss and damage to property 
Lower yields and crop failure 
Increased and degradation 
Increased risk of bush fires 
Increased risk of food and water 
shortages 
Increased risk of water- and food-
borne diseases 
Water shortages in human 
settlements 
Increased risk of population 
movement 
Reduced hydropower generation 
potential 
Damage to crops 
Damage to coral reefs 
Increased power outages 
Increased risk of water- and food-
borne diseases 
Loss of property 
Increased risk of saltwater 
intrusion to irrigation water, 
estuaries and freshwater systems 
Increased risk of drowning 
Crops yields will be affected by climate change but the direction and intensity of these 
effects is dependent upon species and cultivar, soil properties, pests and pathogens, specific 
plant responses to increased carbon dioxide concentrations, and the interactions between 
carbon dioxide, air temperature, water stress, mineral nutrition, air quality and adaptive 
responses. While increased carbon dioxide concentrations stimulate crop growth and yield, it 
is unclear whether this will account for other aspects of climate changes such as water stress 
and higher temperatures. 
The distribution, population size, population density, and behaviour of wildlife has and 
will continue to be directly affected by changes in global or regional climate and indirectly 
through changes in vegetation18 . Cold- and cool-water fishes will lose habitats, but warm-
water fishes will gain habitat. 'Approximately 20 - 30 percent of plant and animal species 
assessed so far are likely to be at increased risk of extinction if increases in global average 
18 International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2001), Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis, IPCC, 
Geneva. 
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temperatures exceed 1.5°C - 2.5°C' 19. Indeed, a temperature increase of just 1°C would be 
enough to threaten some eco-systems that were already existing at the upper limit of their 
temperature threshold2o• 
Marine ecosystems are sensitive to climatic changes. Sea surface temperatures, global sea 
levels, sea-ice cover and changes in salinity, wave conditions and ocean circulation affect fish 
abundance and population dynamics. Climate change will impact on human health directly 
through increased heat stress and increased incidence of vector-, food- and water-borne 
diseases. Human health will be indirectly affected through sea-level increases, flooding and 
other extreme weather events. Human settlements that currently experience other 
environmental problems will be more sensitive to climate change affects such as higher 
temperatures and changed precipitation patterns. 
The likelihood of these events is not fully known, but the chances of occurring increase in 
line with increased greenhouse gas emission concentrations. 
Vulnerability to climate change in Africa is high due to a heavy reliance on rain-fed 
agriculture, frequent droughts and floods and low-income levels. Food security is many parts 
of Africa is low and this will worsen as temperatures rise and precipitation patterns change 
resulting in a reduction in water availability in most southern African countries. It is 
estimated that by 2020, between 75 and 250 million people in Africa will be exposed to water 
stress. In some countries, it is projected that yields from rain-fed crops will fall by up to half, 
further exacerbating food insecurity for many millions of people. Increases in sea-levels will 
negatively affect low lying coastal settlements. In addition, the change is precipitation 
patterns will also have an affect on human health sue to an extension of infectious disease 
vectors. The vulnerability and adaptive capacity of non-human species in Africa is also quite 
low and climate change will lead to the extinction of a significant number of plant and animal 
species. The lost of these species will subsequently impact on rural livelihood, tourism and 
genetic resources. 
Climate change in temperate and tropical Asia has already been experienced in increased 
extreme weather events, such as floods, droughts, forest fires and topical cyclones. While 
north Asian countries might experience increased agricultural productivity due to longer 
growing seasons, the rest of Asia will experience decreased agricultural and aqua-cultural 
productivity due to thermal and water stress, increased sea-levels, floods and droughts and 
more tropical cyclones. Human health will be negatively affected due to higher land 
temperatures leading to heat stress and an increased exposure to infectious vector-borne 
diseases, such as diarrhoeal diseases. Rising sea-levels will directly affect tens of millions 
living in low-lying coastal areas, and threaten ecological sustainability of coral systems and 
mangrove eco-systems. Higher temperatures will increase energy demands for cooling, and 
decrease tourism. In northern Asia, the retreat of the southern permafrost zones would result 
in a change of thermokarst and thermal erosion with negative impact in social infrastructure 
and industries. 
In southern Europe summer run-off, water availability and soil moisture are likely to 
decrease which will widen the agricultural productivity gap between the north and drought-
19 Parry, M., Canziani, 0., Palutikof, J., van der Linden, P., and Hanson, C. (eds) (2007), Climate Change 2007: 
Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group 11 to the Fourth Assessment Report of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 11. 
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prone south. Within arctic Europe, half of the alpine glaciers and large areas of permafrost are 
predicted to disappear by the end of this century. Throughout Europe as whole, human 
settlements, industry, tourism, agriculture and coastal natural habitats will be negatively 
impacted through increased instances of flooding, erosion, flooding and wetland loss. 
Agricultural productivity will increase in northern Europe as the growing season lengthens, 
but productivity will decrease in southern and eastern Europe. Non-human species will be 
threatened through the loss of important habitats such as wetlands and the tundra, with up to 
60 percent of species in some areas facing extinction under high emission scenarios. Tourism 
may also be affected as temperatures and reliability of snow will change. 
Latin America is likely to experience increases in extreme weather events. Floods and 
drought will become more frequent resulting in increased water scarcity. More tropical 
cyclones will increase risks to property, life -and eco-systems. Tropical forests will gradually 
be replaced with savanna in the eastern Amazonia and semi-arid vegetation will be replaced 
by arid-land vegetation. Agricultural productivity will decreases and subsistence farming ins 
some parts of Latin America will be particularly threatened. This will result in the overall 
number of people at risk of hunger increasing. The range of vector-borne diseases, such as 
malaria, dengue fever, and cholera will increase. Increasing sea-levels will threaten human 
settlements, productive activities, infrastructure and mangrove eco-systems. 
If temperature increases are at the lower end of the predicted range, agricultural 
productivity will increase across much of north America. Though, temperature increases at 
th~ higher range of predictions will reduce productivity. Increased droughts in the Canadian 
Prairies and the US Great plains will result in lower productivity. Increased temperatures will 
result in earlier spring peak flows and reductions in summer flows. This will lead to reduced 
lake levels and outflows for the Great Lakes-St Lawrence region. Vulnerability is high for 
unique natural eco-systems, such as prairie wetlands, alpine tundra and cold-water eco-
systems. The Atlantic coast will be negatively affected by increased sea-levels resulting in 
coastal erosion, coastal flooding, and loss of coast wetlands. The range of vector-bore 
diseases is likely to increase as are instances of heat stress mortality and morbidity, especially 
in cities that currently suffer from periodic heatwaves. 
Climate change in Australia will differ spatially as inland and southern areas are likely to 
warm more than northern parts. In addition to temperature increases, precipitation patterns 
will change and the incidence and severity of extreme weather events, such as tropical 
cyclones, will increase. A major effect of climate change in Australia will be the rise of sea-
levels. Human settles, particularly coastal communities are likely to be sensitive to this 
change. Despite Australia's enormous land mass, Australia can be considered a coastal 
country. Eighty percent of the population resides within 50 kilometres of the coast 
concentrated in coastal fringes along the east, south-east and south-west. More recently, one-
quarter of all population growth has occurred within three kilometres of the coast. These 
residential patterns mean that Australia is quite exposed and sensitive to sea-level rises and 
other extreme weather events, such as tropical storms storm surges and river delta flooding. 
Demand for energy for warming will decrease in winter but increase for cooling in summer. 
Total energy demand will therefore not necessarily change over time. What will change 
20 Preston, B. and Jones, R. (2006), Climate Change Impacts on Australia and the Benefits of Early Action to 
Reduce Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions, CSIRO, Melbourne. 
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however is the timing and amounts of peak seasonal demands. This shift may place pressure 
on energy infrastructure. 
The polar regions are particularly vulnerable to climate change. Climate change in the 
polar regions is expected to be amongst the most rapid and visible across the world. The 
Arctic, Antarctic Peninsula and Southern Ocean are likely to experience major ecological 
impacts through climate change. Some changes are already evident and include a decrease in 
the thickness and extent of Arctic sea ice, thawing of permafrost, coastal erosion, changes in 
ice shelves and ice sheets and an altered distribution and abundance of species. Perhaps more 
importantly is the flow-on effect from these impacts. The polar regions are important drivers 
of climate change. Once certain events occur, such as irreversible impacts on sea-level rises, 
ice sheets and global ocean circulation, the flow-one effects might last for centuries regardless 
of future levels of greenhouse gas concentrations. Thus, ifthe polar regions are vulnerable, so 
to is the rest of the world. 
The impacts of climate change therefore fall disproportionately upon poor countries and 
poor people in all countries. This exacerbates inequities in health and access to adequate food, 
clean water, and other resources. As a result of climate change, actual extreme weather events 
have increased by three times since 1960. Vulnerability to these climatic events is a factor of 
geographic location, seasonality and the exposure of population and infrastructure. 
Developing countries suffer a disproportionately high level of economic damage caused by 
climate change. During the 1990s, developing countries suffered US$530 billion of damaged. 
This is twenty times greater than the costs experienced by developed countries on a GDP per 
capita basis21 • 
When designing climate change policies, it is important to note that poverty will make it 
increasingly difficult for most developing countries to adapt to climate change22 • Developing 
countries have less economic resources available to them and therefore have less adaptive 
capacity to mitigate climate change. Such vulnerability means that extreme weather events 
will have significant social and economic effects. Development planning must incorporate 
investment in capacity building and mitigation prior to damage resulting from climate change 
to minimize the negative effect, rather than be used in recovery and rebuilding following such 
destruction23. Developed and developing countries have a responsibility to act preemptively 
in the face of future climate change rather than reactively following extreme weather events. 
4. RELIABILITY OF PREDICTIONS 
The consequences of climate change, particularly at the higher end of projections for 
temperature increases are catastrophic. For example, climate change can have a dramatic and 
swift effect on the world's glaciers. A 4.0°C increase could lead to the melting of many 
glaciers by the end of this century. The result would be a shortage of water for billions of 
21 
22 
23 
Mirza, M. (2006), 'Mainstreaming Climate Change for Extreme Weather Events & Management of Disasters: 
An Engineering Challenge', EIC Climate Change Technology IEEE, May, pp. 1-10. 
International Energy Agency (IEA) (2002), Beyond Kyoto: Energy Dynamics and Climate Stabilisation, 
OECDIIEA, p. 12. 
Mirza, M. (2006), 'Mainstreaming Climate Change for Extreme Weather Events & Management of Disasters: 
An Engineering Challenge', EIC Climate Change Technology IEEE, May, pp. 1-10. 
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people. For example, as the Andean glaciers supply millions of people water during dry 
seasons, countries most at risk include Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia. Increasing temperatures 
will also directly affect tourism in the future. Snowfall in lower mountain ranges will become 
increasingly unpredictable as the average mean temperature increases. It is predicted that 
Australia may not have any viable ski resorts in 2070 as a result on declining snowfalls. In 
other countries, such as Switzerland, up to 50 percent of snowfields may also become 
unviable. 
All these projections however must be tempered with the recognition that three great 
uncertainties underlie all this work. Firstly, knowledge on precisely how climate systems are 
affected by greenhouse gas emission intensities is incomplete. Secondly, climatic change is 
not necessarily linear and may be catastrophic or irreversible. Thirdly, estimates of future 
emissions are based on a series of assumptions, namely population, economic growth and 
technology. While existence of this uncertainty should not exclude full consideration of the 
consequences of climate change, scenarios are simply possibilities amongst an infinite 
number of outcomes. 
4.1. Uncertainty of Linear Versus Abrupt Change 
To date, the overwhelming majority of literature focusing on climate change has assumed 
a .linear approach - that is, climate change will be a gradual and ordered event. This 
assumption leads to a serious underestimation of the possibility of extreme events. 'Current 
trends along with forecasts for the next century indicate that the climate averages and 
variabilities likely will reach levels not seen in instrumental records or in geological history. 
These trends have the potential to push the climate system through a threshold to a new 
climatic state,24. It is important to consider therefore the possibility that climate change may 
be abrupt and non-reversible thus making the preceding discussion (and the literature upon 
which it was drawn) redundant. Abrupt climate change may lead to severe ecological, 
economic and social disruptions. Such abrupt climate changes have historical precedents. 
Changes in temperature of 16°C and doubling of precipitation have occurred in short of time 
. d f . I 25 peno 0 years III some paces . 
Physical, ecological and human systems are imperfectly understood as they are complex, 
nonlinear and dynamic yet scientists frequently model these complex systems in isolation, 
these producing internally stable and predictable outcomes26. As 'current changes in climate 
are producing conditions in these systems that are outside the range of recent historical 
experiences and observation, and it is unclear how the systems will interact with and react to 
the coming climate changes,27, it is reasonable to expect that climate change may be abrupt 
rather than gradual. In a linear model, a doubling of the force will double the response. Yet 
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the climate change system (and all other associated systems) is not linear and so a threshold 
point may exist in which a small change has abrupt and serious consequences. 'Although 
these highly aggregated models are not intended to provide high confidence quantitative 
projections of coupled socio-natural system behaviours, we believe that the bulk of integrated 
assessment models used to date for climate policy analysis - and which do not include any 
such abrupt nonlinear processes - will not be able to alert the policymaking community to the 
importance of abrupt nonlinear behaviours. At the very least, the ranges of estimates of future 
climate damage should be expanded beyond that suggested in conventional analytical tools to 
account for such nonlinear behaviours,28. 
Abrupt climate change occurs when the climate system crosses a threshold triggering a 
movement to a new state and equilibrium. Abrupt climate change occurs faster than the cause 
of the change and is usually irreversible. Indeed, due to the chaotic process within the climate 
system, the cause of abrupt climate change may be undetectably small. 'From this point of 
view, an abrupt climate change is one that takes place so rapidly and unexpectedly that human 
or natural systems have difficulty adapting to it,29. Thus, the concept of abrupt climate change 
is built upon the notion of nonlineraities and multiple equilibria. 
There are three main ways that abrupt climate change can occur. The first is a response to 
a rapidly varying external parameter or forces. Secondly, slow changes in a forces can induce 
the crossing of a threshold, resulting in the transition to an alternative equilibrium. The 
evolution of such a change would be determined by the system dynamics rather than by the 
external time scale of the slow change. Thirdly, transitions can occur spontaneously in chaotic 
systems. Therefore, a mechanism that leads to abrupt climate change has the following 
characteristics: 
1. 'a trigger or chaotic perturbation causing a threshold crossing; 
2. 'an amplifier 0 globalizer which intensifies and spreads the influence of small or 
local changes; and 
3. 'a source of continuing persistence allowing the new climate state to last centuries or 
millennia' 30 . 
Abrupt climate change occurs when a new equilibrium is reached once a threshold is 
crossed. This is called hysteresis. Therefore, once the threshold has been crossed, it is 
unlikely that there will be a return to the original state, even if the original forcing is reversed 
or stopped. 
It is also likely that the more rapid external pressure, the greater will be the level of 
abrupt change and consequences to ecological, human and economic systems. It should also 
be remembered that over the course of its history, the earth's climate has exhibited major 
switches in its mode of operation that are simply not understood. History tells us therefore, 
that abrupt change is possible. 
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Abrupt climate change might occur through changes to the thermohaline circulation 
(THC) of the North Atlantic or changes in land ice sheets. Model simulations, of the THC, 
'show that as an instability is approaches, small deviations in initial or boundary conditions 
can determine whether a transition to a different equilibrium will occur,31. Ice sheets are 
directly linked to abrupt climate change because the melting of Greenland or the West 
Atlantic ice sheet would add directly to global sea level rise and to changes in the THC. 
Ecological systems, such as wetlands, are highly vulnerable to abrupt climate change as 
they are long-lived, are relatively immobile, and have low adaptive capability. This 
vulnerability has been increased through human activities altering ecosystems, reducing 
species numbers, composition and natural migration patterns. 'Many important threshold 
effects occur at the boundaries of systems. Ecotones, the narrow zones where ecological 
communities overlap, are particularly susceptible to abrupt climate change, primarily because 
the species diversity is great and the vegetation is often limited by a sharp climatic 
gradient' 32 . Again, it is important to note that the impacts on humans of the destruction of 
these other ecological systems are largely unknown. 
In increase our understanding of abrupt climate change, it is necessary to continue 
research in the circulation of oceans (particularly deepwater formations), the interaction of 
sea-ice transport process and deepwater formation, land ice behaviour, the hydrological cycle 
(which includes permafrost changes and run-offs), how atmospheric behaviour and changes 
overtime. 
It is important to reiterate that the science surrounding climate and climate change is not 
fully understood and thus any projections made are simply possibilities rather than future 
projections. Within this uncertainty, thought must be given to abrupt climate change. 
However, like gradual (linear) climate change, abrupt (nonlinear) climate change, the 
question arises whether anthropogenic activities will cause abrupt climate change. It is not yet 
possible to answer that question, because the processes that cause abrupt climate change are 
not sufficiently understood. 
The possibility of abrupt climate change directly impacts on the moral imperative to act 
now rather than wait and see (see next chapter) as it must widen the range of potential 
impacts of greenhouse gas emissions that must be considered by policymakers. Due to the 
magnitude and potential consequences of abrupt change careful consideration is warranted. 
The Aristotelian view that nature does not act irregularly is no longer valid. 'Modem 
science has thoroughly shattered this tenet of the Aristotelian school of thought. Long-term 
observations and experimental insights have demonstrated convincingly that smooth, or 
regular, behavior is an exception rather than a rule. Available records of climate variability, 
for example, reveal sudden fluctuations of key variables at all time scales. Large, abrupt 
climate change evident in Greenland ice-core records (known as Dansgaard-Oeschger 
oscillations) and episodic, massive discharges of icebergs into the North Atlantic (known as 
Heinrich events) are obvious examples of irregular behavior as a result of weak external 
forcing. Ecosystems also display discontinuous responses to changing ambient conditions, 
such as changes in disturbances regimes and species extinctions. Irreversible changes in 
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ecosystems are triggered by disturbances, pests, and shifts in species distributions. Irregular 
behavior is accepted as a major aspect of the dynamics of complex systems ,33. Clear evidence 
exists of previous rapid fluctuation in climate during the last glacier and in earlier periods. In 
the Younger Dryas (11,000 years ago) temperatures dropped considerably within only a few 
decades - possibly linked to changes in the stability of the North Atlantic. Present studies 
suggest that similar changes in the North Atlantic are possible over the next 10 years34. 
A central understanding of abrupt change is that it does require abrupt forces. Smooth 
variations of driving forces can cause abrupt change. Yet, the mainstream focus of the climate 
change literature focus on the assumption that change will be a smooth transition from one 
equilibrium (1 x C02) to another equilibrium (2 x CO2). This may be because the 
investigation of linear systems is substantially easier than the investigation of non-linear 
systems and so the inclusion of abrupt change in modeling is limited35. Modeling requires 
simplified assumptions, relationships and historical data whereas the possibly of abrupt 
change undermines the reliability of each ofthese components. 
Of particular interest to policy makers are the ethical concerns associated with the 
possibility of abrupt change. 'A major challenge is to make responsible use of available 
information regarding the likelihood and the consequences of conceivable singular events. 
Responsibility here means the obligation of decision makers to make the "right" decision, 
taking into account the diverse societal values and wide ranges of individual interests that are 
at stake and that may be mutually contradictory. Thus, the standard challenge is to develop 
proper policies under uncertainty (i.e. neither ignorance nor omniscience) to achieve the 
objectives of the UNFCCC and to satisfy affected stakeholders as well as possible. A broad 
and intensive discourse on the ethical aspects of singular responses to climate change is 
rediscovering many of the arguments put forward in traditional moral philosophy and risk 
policy. Ethical and procedural aspects of this type have been examined in various other 
contexts before, where certain concepts (such as human rights) act as a constraint on 
economic activity (emphasizing goals), even when the cost-benefit ratio is unfavorable,36. 
It is necessary at same level to weight up the costs of potential abrupt change and the 
best-known likelihood of that change occurring. Resolving this equation is impossible 
however, due to the inherent uncertainties in both sides of the equation. The IPCC note that 
the: 
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• significant uncertainty whether adaptation will be (and could be) effective in 
reducing negative effects of climate change and enhancing the positive effects; 
• impact of shifts in baseline conditions, such as economic growth and new 
technologies, that could reduce vulnerability have not been adequately considered in 
most impact studies; 
IPCC (2001), Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability, !PCC, Geneva, p. 945. 
see research by Stocker, T. and Schmittner, A. (1997), 'Influence of C02 emission rates on the stability of the 
thermohaline circulation', Nature, Vol. 388, pp. 862-865; Ganopolski, A. & Rahrnstorf, S. (2002), 'Abrupt 
glacial climate changes due to stochastic resonance' Phys. Rev Lett, Vol. 88, pp. 038501-1-038501-4. 
see Root, T. and Schneider, S. (2002), 'Strategic Cyclical Scaling: Bridging Five Orders of Magnitude Scale 
Gaps in Climatic and Ecological Studies', Integrated Assessment, Vol. 3, Nos. 2-3, pp. 188-200 for a 
discussion of this and Mastrandrea, M. and Schneider, S.H.: Integrated Assessment of Abrupt Climatic 
Changes. Climate Policy 1 (2001), pp. 433-449. for a rare empirical application) 
IPCC (2001) Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability, IPCC, Geneva, p. 952. 
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• studies of impact that assess the effects of a stable climate to mcrease our 
understanding of what rates of change may be dangerous is limited 
Table 2.2. Summary of Possible Abrupt Changes 
Change 
Non-linear response of 
THC 
Disintegration of West 
Antarctic Ice Sheet 
Runaway carbon 
dynamics 
Transformation of 
continental monsoons 
Qualitative 
modification of EN SO 
effects 
Rearrangement of 
Biome distribution 
Environmental 
refugees destabilizing 
international order 
Causal Process 
Changes in thermal and freshwater 
resulting in shutdown of THC 
Increase in sea temperature affecting 
below sea W AIS 
Gas hydrate reservoirs may be 
destabilized releasing large amounts 
of methane into atmosphere 
accelerating GHG concentrations 
Asian summer monsoon could 
intensify 
Eastward shift of precipitation and 
variability of ENSO could increase 
Large redistribution of vegetation 
patterns, such a dieback of tropical 
forests 
Scarce resources may increase 
pressures in developing countries 
Impacts 
Temperature change in 
northwestern Europe 
Shutdown of deep ocean 
ecology affecting marine 
life 
Rapid sea level rise will 
exceed adaptive capacity of 
most coastal structures and 
ecosystems 
Rapid, largely 
uncontrollable increases in 
atmospheric carbon 
concentrations 
Severe impact on food 
production and flood and 
drought occurrences 
Changed drought and flood 
patterns. Increased 
storminess over western 
Europe 
Increase in biospheric 
carbon uptake 
Severe social effects 
including conflict between 
countries, ethnic groups and 
civil strife and insurgency 
Source: adapted from IPCC 2001. 
4.2. Uncertainty of Calculating Emissions 
Uncertainty also exists with regards how the emlSSlOns, upon which climate change 
predications are based, are estimated. Analysis and projections of climate change are based 
upon greenhouse gas emissions data. Within the literature it is assumed that emissions data is 
accurate and its estimation is unquestioned. However, emissions data is constructed and much 
. d h . 37 uncertamty surroun s t ese esttmates . 
If uncertainty around the estimates of greenhouse gas emissions exists, then all 
subsequent analysis and projections must consider this uncertainty. As greenhouse gas 
emissions are constructed numbers based on different methodologies across countries, it is 
not appropriate to implicitly assume their accuracy. Yet within the literature, discussion of 
this uncertainty is absent. 
37 Sheehan, P., Jones, R., Jolley, A., Preston, B., Clarke, M., Durack, P., Islam, S., and Whetton, P. 
(forthcoming), 'Climate Change and the New World Economy: Implications for the Nature and Timing of 
Policy Responses', Global Environmental Change, accepted November 2007. 
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Two approaches can be used to estimate greenhouse gas emIsSIons: the reference 
approach and the sectoral approach. The reference approach is a relatively aggregate default 
approach, whereas the sectoral approach is a more detailed bottom up approach. 'In most 
cases, the differences in results will be small. In some instances, however, statistical 
differences in the basic data or unexplained differences between the two approaches may 
cause significant discrepancies,38. Little discussion exists within the vast climate change 
literature on the accurateness of these emissions estimates. Yet projections and analysis on 
this data are made on the assumption of accurateness. It is important therefore to review the 
construction of these estimates across economic sectors, time and countries. 
The reference methodology adopted by the UNFCCC to estimate greenhouse gas 
emissions for country inventories is primarily based upon multiplying various production data 
by specified carbon emission factors. Carbon emission factors are generally based upon 
global averages that are not as accurate as inventories estimated by carbon emission factors 
based upon country averages or site specific data For example, the default reference 
methodology for non-carbon dioxide gases emissions are estimated by applying carbon 
emission factors to fuel statistics, which are organized by sector. In reality, the emissions 
from these gases depend on the fuel type used, combustion technology, operating conditions, 
control technology, and on maintenance and age ofthe equipment. As the Tier 1 methodology 
ignores these refinements greenhouse gas emissions may be overstated and will become 
increasingly overstated as technology reduces carbon emission factors in various sectors and 
fields. 
Whilst the rise of the knowledge economy may impact both the economic structure of a 
nation and the technology used in all production, the most significant impact on greenhouse 
gas emissions would be expected through improving technology that lowers carbon emission 
factors in various economic sectors. However, the current UNFCCC methodology does not 
adequately address such improvements in carbon emission factors through technological 
improvements by relying on global averages (Tier 1) for most CEF estimates. This is 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter Six. 
The majority of greenhouse gas emissions emanate from predominately the Energy sector 
(and to a lesser degree, the Industrial Processes sector) in which technological progress will 
have the strongest impact. By excluding technological progress, the default methodologies 
give rise to great uncertainty surrounding these estimates. 
Therefore, further work is required to review carbon emission factors in light of 
technological improvements and how future technology may further reduce this emission 
factors. Within the wider modeling literature, such improvements are generally represented 
through the autonomous energy efficiency index. Consideration of a similar index may be 
required for more accurate carbon emission factors in the future. 'Accurate emissions 
information is crucial in assessing ... compliance with their Kyoto Protocol commitments. 
Furthermore, trading of emission allowances by Annex I Parties will be based on national 
inventories. Traders will need to have reasonable confidence about the quality of the 
underlying data ... At the same time, it may be unrealistic to expect complete accuracy of 
data, at least in the short term. While seeking to improve data accuracy, it may be necessary 
38 International Energy Agency (lEA) (2002), CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion, 1971-2000, OECDIIEA, 
Paris p. xii. 
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to develop methods to assess the Parties commitments and emission transfers that take into 
account the uncertainties and discrepancies embedded in energy data,39. 
Table 2.3. Reference versus Sectoral Approaches (million tonnes of CO2) 
Reference Sectoral 
1990 2005 05/90 1990 2005 05/90 
(%) (%) 
Australia 260.69 367.75 41.07 259.7 376.78 45.08 
Austria 58.23 77.4 32.92 57.77 77.18 33.60 
Belgium 109.2 111.37 1.99 108.77 111.7 2.69 
Canada 423.49 540.43 27.61 428.78 548.59 27.94 
Denmark 50.51 47.25 -6.45 50.67 47.51 -6.24 
Finland 53.38 57.97 . 8.60 54.97 55.42 0.82 
France 366.5 387.13 5.63 355.36 388.38 9.29 
Iceland 2.00 2.21 10.50 1.90 2.21 16.32 
Ireland 31.41 41.7 32.76 30.92 43.77 41.56 
Italy 381.63 451.2 18.23 398.36 454 13.97 
Japan 1078.24 1249.73 15.90 1057.96 1214.19 14.77 
Luxembourg 10.52 11.35 7.89 10.54 11.35 7.69 
Netherlands 156.85 180.25 14.92 158.06 182.95 15.75 
New Zealand 22.98 32.28 40.47 21.41 34.88 62.91 
Norway 28.75 51.91 80.56 28.71 37.00 28.87 
Portugal 39.93 63.1 58.03 39.61 63.01 59.08 
Spain 211.27 341.56 61.67 207.36 341.75 64.81 
-Sweden 51.62 51.35 -0.52 53.35 50.95 -4.50 
Switzerland 42.5 43.76 2.96 41.3 44.98 8.91 
Turkey 138.14 218.59 58.24 128.6 218.93 70.24 
United Kingdom 566.51 539.85 -4.71 557.63 529.89 -4.97 
United States 4859.45 5862.27 20.64 4850.46 5816.96 19.93 
Source: lEA 2007. 
Countries reported emission levels depend on the calculation approach used. In 2005, 
Iceland was able to claim that it had recorded an increase in greenhouse gas emissions of just 
over ten percent (in line with its Kyoto Protocol targets) compared to 1990 levels using the 
reference approach. However, when the sectoral approach was used the emissions were 
actually over sixteen percent than 1990. Likewise, Finland's emissions were 8.6 percent 
higher in 2005 than 1990 based on the reference approach, but less than one percent greater 
based on sectoral calculations. 
Given the importance that reliable and accurate data has on determining the global 
response to climate change, greater resources must be expended on improving data collection 
and compilation of greenhouse gas emissions. This is particularly true for the full suite of 
greenhouse gas emissions for developing countries. 
39 International Energy Agency (lEA) (2002), C02 Emissions from Fuel Combustion, 1971-2000, OECDIIEA, 
Paris, p. xiiv. 
Assessing the Future 35 
5. CONCLUSION 
Evidence exists that climate change is currently occurring. The year 2007 was one of the 
warmest years on record; with ice-melting at a record pace in the Artie circle allowing the 
passage of ships for the first time through the Canadian Northwest Passage. But at the same 
time, in some parts of the world the reverse was occurring; snow falling in unusual places 
including parts of South America and temperatures being lower than normal resulting in 
Australia recording its coldest June in historlo. However, understanding climate change into 
the future is difficult and not an exact science. But despite the uncertainties around climate 
models and data upon which these models depend, the overwhelming scientific consensus is 
that climate change will intensifY into the future. The international community must respond 
to this with some urgency particularly if abrupt or irreversible change which heightens the 
catastrophic potential of climate change for all is contemplated. 
More-over, whilst no country will be immune to climate change (abrupt or otherwise), 
those most vulnerable live in developing countries, often already existing at the limits of 
survival. Climate change will result in water shortages, reductions in yields, increased 
prevalence of diseases and more extreme climatic events. While adaptation to the new climate 
is necessary, there are compelling reasons that the international community should also be 
seeking to mitigate climate change by significantly lowering greenhouse gas emissions in 
order to keep greenhouse concentration levels to less than two times that of pre-industrial 
times. It is necessary that in the face of this future the international community act 
courageously now in designing the next international climate change protocol. Central to this 
protocol is its ethical basis. It is this consideration that is discussed in the next chapter. 
40 World Metrological Organization (WMO) (2007) Press Release No. 805, 
http://www.wmo.ch/pages/mediacentre/press Je1eases/pr _805 _ en.html, accessed December 14, 2007. 
Chapter 3 
AN ETHICAL RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Analysis of climate change must incorporate its spatial and temporal nature. The impact 
of climate change will differ geographically but also across time. Despite some effect 
currently being felt, the most serious consequences will occur in the future. 
Due to the size and seriousness of climate change, the next international climate change 
protocol must be based on principles of justice and equity. Ethical considerations are 
predicated on there being obligations to present generations (to consider the spatial impacts of 
climate change) and future generations (to consider the temporal impact of climate change )1. 
This chapter sets out why climate change demand an ethical response and why an ethical 
basis must underpin the philosophy behind the next international climate change protocol. 
Section Two will consider why it is ethical for the global community to respond to climate 
change. Section Three discusses why we must act on behalf of future generations, because of 
uncertainty surrounding abrupt climate change, whilst Section Four discusses why we must 
act to ensure equity between current generations. Based upon these ethical considerations a 
per capita approach is formally introduced as the basis of the next international climate 
change protocol in Section Five, before the chapter is concluded in Section Six. 
2. AN ETHICAL BASIS FOR ACTION 
This book is based upon the position that due to the long-term consequences of climate 
change, the current generation has an ethical duty to act now to minimize the consequences 
for future generations. Such obligations though is not universally held. Denials of such 
obligations utilize various arguments. However, these arguments intersect and do not differ 
greatly from one another. The first argument is the argument from ignorance. The basis of 
this position is that we know nothing about the desires, wants, needs or interests of future 
generations. Therefore as we know little about them, it makes no sense to specify any 
obligations to them. The second argument is disappearing beneficiaries. Who is actually born 
in the future depends on our present decisions. If we have two choices, A and B, two possible 
Broome, J. (1992) 'Counting the Cost of Global Wanning', White House Press, Cambridge. 
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future populations will result, a and b. Therefore, if we decide A, population a will come into 
existence and if we decide B, population b will come into existence instead. 'Because 
different policy decisions result in different future generations, there is simply no one future 
generation that would be made better or worse off by either decision,2. The third argument 
against the concept of intergenerational equity is intertemporal location. This position holds 
that obligations to future generations can only be justified for immediately subsequent 
generations (children and grandchildren) but obligations to generations beyond this cannot be 
sustained as we have no moral link or social link to them. 
According to these two extreme views (argument from ignorance and disappearing 
beneficiaries), behaviour of the present generation is therefore morally unconstrained. As 
behaviour is unconstrained, the present generation can act (or fail to act) without regard to the 
consequences of future generations. The basis of this position is that obligations can only 
exist based on temporal or spatial contiguity. The difficulty of maintaining this position is that 
whilst an immediate temporal or spatial contiguity may exist, it cannot be denied that some of 
our actions (possibility surrounding climate change) actually impact on these future 
generations regardless of how distant they are. According to the intertemporal location view 
obligations exist but hold less weight. This is based on the premise that obligations to 
succeeding generations are valid but become less relevant as the distance between the present 
and future lengthens. This qualified position is fraught with difficulties around how discount 
rates might be chosen. When discussing the future, a common tool within economics is the 
sQcial discount rate3• A social discount rate allows future prices or activities to be valued in 
present values thus allowing informed decisions on investment, expenditure or other 
activities. The literature on social discounting is rich4• A consistent position though 
throughout this literature is that it is appropriate to discount commodities but it is not 
appropriate to discount welfare. If we return to some of the early literature we find clear 
statements to justify this position. For example, Ramesy's5 position that discounting is ethical 
indefensible and a practice of a weak imagination is reflected in Pigou's view that 'there is 
wide agreement that the state should protect the interests of the future in some degree against 
the effects of our irrational discounting and of our preference for ourselves over our 
decedents ... It is the clear duty of government, which is the trustee for unborn generations as 
well as for present citizens, to watch over, and if need be, by legislative enactment, to defend, 
the exhaustible natural resources of the country from rash and reckless exploitation,6. 
This view remains constant with the literature. Certainly even a small discount rate will 
tend the rights of some future generation to zero leading to a morally unconstrained position. 
Further, strong arguments can be made against transferring costs of decisions or actions to 
some future generation when that same generation does not receive any benefits of those 
decisions or actions. 
Such arguments against acting in consideration of future generations are not strong 
though. Whilst the exact preferences of future generations are indeed unknown, the general 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
des Jardins, J. (2001), Environmental Ethics: An Introduction to Environmental Philosphy, Wadsworth 
Publishing, Belmont, p. 73. 
see Islam, S. (2001), Optimal Growth Economics, North Holland Publishing Co., Amsterdam for a survey 
around the issues of the social discount rate. 
Broome, 1. (1992) 'Counting the Cost of Global Warming', White House Press, Cambridge. 
Ramsey, R. (1928), 'A Mathematical Theory of Saving', Economic Journal, Vol. 38, pp. 543-559. 
Pigou, A. (1920), The Economics of Welfare, 1st edn, Macmillian, London, p. 29-30. 
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interests upon which these preferences are predicated are known. These general interests are 
not time sensitive. We do know a good deal about future generations. Therefore, we cannot 
claim ignorance to justify a lack of obligation. Further, we recognize the legal liability for 
unintended but foreseeable and avoidable harm that might occur in the future and this can be 
applied to current actions and future consequences. Further, we simply cannot violate the 
basic rights of future generations (whatever they may be) by saying that they should be glad 
to be alive in any case. Whoever the future generations are, they have the right to happiness 
over misery and our actions today must not violate that righe. As 'future generations do not 
have a seat at the table or a capacity to articulate a position,8, the current generation must seek 
an equitable outcome on their behalf. 'It is irresponsible, and contemptuous of the welfare of 
future persons, to deliberately bring into bring persons who will almost certainly be unhappy. 
It is wrong because it results in unnecessary suffering in the future, suffering on the part of 
individuals (future people) who in the timeless perspective are no less real then we are,9. 
Finally, responsibilities for our actions cannot be erased simply because the various effects 
take place in the distant future. It is possible to against the intertemporal location by focusing 
on nuclear waste (which is also analogous to climate change) 10. This is illustrated by 
describing a scenario in which a person places a package containing a highly toxic gas on a 
crowded commuter train, unbeknown to other commuters, and alights from the train at its first 
(of many stops). The package will leak with fatal consequences if the train is involved in an 
accident, or if a passenger accidentally or intentionally interferes with, or mishandles, or 
attempts to steal it. All these events have occurred in the past. Indeed, the action of the person 
placing the package on the train would be condemned even if they hoped it would arrive 
safely and had no other alternative means of sending the package or a safer container were 
possible11 • If we consider the emissions of greenhouses gases in the same way, the continual 
emission of these gases has a cumulative effect on climate change. As discussed in the 
previous chapters, climate change will intensify as concentration levels of greenhouse gases 
increase. Whilst the direct impacts of this will not be felt by the current generation these 
emissions will impact on future generations and so as a result, we have a responsibility to 
. .. .. .. . 
mllllmize our own emisslOns now. 
In summary, intergenerational equity and justice must be considered because we have 
'good reason to believe that people will exist in the future and that they will be similar 
enough to us that we can have a good idea of what their well-being requires. Knowing this 
and knowing that our present actions can influence their future well-being, it is reasonable to 
conclude that future people must be given some ethical consideration by presently living 
humans' 12. 
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Routley, R. and Routley, V. (1982), 'Nuclear Power: Some Ethical and Social Dimesnions', in T. Regan and 
D. Vander Veer (eds) And Justicefor All, Rowman and Allanheld, New Jersey, p. 123. 
Ashton, 1. and Wang, X. (2003), 'Equity and Climate: In Principle and Practice', in Beyond Kyoto: Advancing 
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The overriding complication of climate change, that sets it apart from all other 
contemporary concerns, is uncertainty. Due to the complicated science involved and 
incomplete data and knowledge available, the exact extent of climate change and its 
associated environmental and social consequences are largely unknown. However, it is 
possible that these outcomes will be irreversible and catastrophicl3 . As discussed in the 
previous chapter, current knowledge surrounding the causal relationship between greenhouse 
gas emissions and climate change is thus incomplete. Knowledge on the intensity and 
probability of climate change (including catastrophic events) is also incomplete. 'There are a 
large number of considerable uncertainties along the chain of causality from emissions to 
impacts, and the further down the effects on the chain are, the larger the uncertainty is,!4. 
Therefore, this problem is beyond the traditional experience of economics and the established 
tools and methods of economics, such as -cost-benefit analysis, are unable to handle them 
adequatelyl5. As such, given to the high rate of uncertainty, it is not appropriate to apply a 
simple cost-benefit analysis to the issue of climate change. 'Cost-benefit analysis, when faced 
with uncertainties as big as these, would simply be self-deception' 16. The problem of climate 
change is long-term. Not only have the concentration of greenhouse gas emissions been 
increasing slowly since the Industrial Revolution (though in an accelerated manner more 
recently), the lag time between emissions and climatic effects is great. Conversely so too is 
the lag time between a reduction in emissions and a return to normal climatic patterns. 
Therefore, we cannot be assured that even if we act now we will not avoid the catastrophic 
cpnsequences of climate change. And certainly if we wait any longer to reduce emissions it 
may not be possible for future generations to reverse this change regardless of how they 
reduce emissions. 
3. ETHICS AND UNCERTAINTY 
Debate on the most suitable response to climate change exists along a spectrum of views 
between two broad and opposing positions. Each position cites uncertainty surrounding 
climate change to support their argument. The first position is that uncertainty requires 
inaction as decisions must be based on knowledge, not ignorance. The second position is that 
uncertainty requires action to be taken as a form of insurance. 
The first position is that greenhouse gas abatement must not be undertaken, as current 
knowledge is insufficient to justify investment in (risky) greenhouse gas abatement programs 
that have significant economic costs for society17. It is necessary to note however that more 
recent studies suggest that the cost of mitigation to reduce climate change impact is actually 
less than that cost of future abatement programs in the absence of mitigation interventions. Sir 
Nicholas Stem argued in his report to the British Government argues that mitigation will be 
13 
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16 
17 
IPCC (2007) 'Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report', IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, IPCC, Geneva. 
Aaheim, H.A. and Bretteville, c.: 2001, 'Decision-making frameworks for climate policy under uncertainty', 
CICERO Working Paper 2001:2. Oslo: Center for International Climate and Environmental Research, Oslo, p. 
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Broome, J. (1992) 'Counting the Cost of Global Warming', White House Press, Cambridge. 
Broome, J. (1992) 'Counting the Cost of Global Warming', White House Press, Cambridge, p. 19. 
Nordhaus, W. (1994), Managing the Global Commons: The Economics of Climate Change, MIT Press, 
London. 
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just 1 percent of GOP compared to abatement costs of up to 20 percent of GOp18 (though of 
course this view is contentious and has its critics19• When knowledge is sufficient to 
determine the probability of catastrophic events, optimal abatement programs can then be 
implemented as 'the decision will be better the better the information about probabilities ,20. 
Opponents argue that time lags are associated with climate change triggers and it may be that 
when this acquired knowledge is found, the ability to undertake affective abatement programs 
may be past and redundant. 
This alternative position holds that greenhouse gas abatement must be undertaken to 
secure society against the risk of future hazard. This insurance approach has been 
incorporated both implicitly and explicitly within the literature. The IPCC has endorsed the 
general insurance approach. Certainly a common method of decision making within this 
approach is based on "expected utility". Utility is reliant on a functioning environment and if 
a catastrophic event occurs utility falls to zero. Therefore an optimal level of emissions is 
determined through a trade-off between the risk of the catastrophic event (as determined by a 
poll of experts or through a conventional damage function) and the cost of abatement21 . 
Given that it is possible that anthropological induced global warming could start a chain 
of events that may lead to the extinction of civilization or even humanity inaction is not an 
appropriate response. 'The effect of today's emission on climate will not be seen for many 
years, but by the time such effects are seen, it may well be too late to reverse the effects for 
multiple generations,22. Whilst such a catastrophic event might be a low possibility, it 
certainly compels an immediate global response. 
Uncertainly cannot be used to justify a lack of action. We consider risks when making 
decisions that affect our own generation and therefore we need to consider risks or 
uncertainty when making decisions that affect future generations. If certainty is not needed in 
our decision-making processes, then certainty is not required for decision-making that 
impacts directly upon future generations. In other words, 'if we do not require certainty of 
action to apply moral constraints in contemporary affairs, why should we require a much 
higher standard of certainty in the future? The unwarranted insistence on certainty as a 
necessary condition before moral consideration can be given to the distant future, then, 
amounts to a flagrant double standard ,23. Indeed, not only does uncertainly not remove moral 
constraints on out actions, it rather increases the requirement for intergenerational equity. 
'Their placement (in time) does not disqualify future people from full moral consideration or 
reduce their claims below the claims of present people. That is, we have the same general 
unacquired obligations to future people as to the present: thus there is the same obligation to 
take account of them and their interests in what we do, to be careful in out actions, to take 
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account of the probability (not just the certainty) of our actions causing harm or damage, and 
to see, other things being equal, that we do not act so as to rob them of what is necessary for 
the chance of a good life. Uncertainty and interdeterminacy do not relieve us of these 
bl' . ,24 o IgatlOns. 
Uncertainty therefore means that we must act now and failing to act reduces the overall 
risk. It can be considered insurance. 'Uncertainty about the effects of greenhouse gases is 
therefore a reason for devoting resources to reducing the concentration of these gases, not a 
reason against it,25. This is particularly the case when further ethical considerations are taken 
in terms of assessing equality amongst all humans in the face of climate change. The 
consequences of climate change will be global, but these impacts will differ spatially. Certain 
geographic locations and social structures will result in greater vulnerability and higher risk to 
climatic events than other locations and structures. 
A commonly held view is that the general purpose of economics (and rational behaviour) 
is to achieve optimal outcomes. According to classical economic theory, within an unfettered 
market, characterized by perfect knowledge and laws of supply and demand operating 
without constraint, the allocation of scarce resources will be both efficient and optimal. 
However, within an imperfect market, such as the global economy and one that that is 
concerned with acting to limit climate change, optimal outcomes must be defined differently. 
Within this environment, an optimal outcome is a function of the risk of catastrophe and cost 
of abatement. Within these circumstances, optimality is the least action required for the 
gt:eatest pay-off in terms of reduced probability of catastrophe. Optimal outcomes therefore 
effectively discount the utility of future generations by "betting" against the (uncertain) 
probability of catastrophe occurring in order to minimize abatement costs. This discounting 
(implicit or otherwise) of future generations' utility is inappropriate. Thus, a moral imperative 
(based on intergenerational equity) exists to act when faced with uncertain climate change 
catastrophe and this moral imperative overrides preferences to seek an optimal outcome. 
Due to the nature of catastrophe and its irreversible nature a zero discount rate must be 
applied to protect future generations. Abatement programs must therefore be developed that 
are concerned only with the worst potential outcome, such as an irreversible and abrupt 
catastrophe and any policies that maximize the return under such a possibility. However this 
approach does not equally weight consideration of the probability (albeit unknown) of 
catastrophe with the costs associated with such abatement. Yet, this approach is justified and 
warranted due to the overriding demands of acting morally to future generations. Seeking 
optimal outcomes in circumstances involving catastrophe is inappropriate. Moral concerns 
surrounding intergenerational equity may result in sub-optimal (or maximin) solutions being 
implemented. In circumstances of uncertain catastrophe, ethical considerations outweigh 
economic considerations. The next international climate change protocol must be built on 
sub-optimal outcomes and be driven by ethical and scientific considerations over economic or 
political consideration. These ethical considerations are not just concerned with future 
generations though. Rather, the next international climate change protocol must also be based 
upon intra-generational equity. 
24 Routley, R. and Routley, V. (1982), 'Nuclear Power: Some Ethical and Social Dimesnions', in T. Regan and 
25 D. Vander Veer (eds) And Justice/or All, Rowman and Allanheld, New Jersey. Broome, J. (1992) 'Counting the Cost of Global Warming', White House Press, Cambridge, p. 18. 
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4. INTRA-GENERATIONAL EQUITY 
By force of its uncertainty and accepting that all responses must consider 
intergenerational equity, the international community must develop a global response to 
climate change that is just and effective. Such a response must incorporate reducing emissions 
to slow and retard future climate change, but also incorporate financial responses to 
environmental and social damages caused by climatic change being experienced in the 
present. 
In addition to intergenerational equity, this global response must also be based upon 
principles of intra-generational equity. When determining the global response then, a number 
of equity dilemmas must be resolved. 'The success of the negotiation will hinge in large 
measure on the ability of the partners to come to terms with the equity dilemmas they face,26 
The outcomes of United Nations Climate Change Conference, held in Bali, Indonesia during 
December 2007 to set the 'road-map' for the next international climate change protocol, show 
there is still some distance between developed and developing countries on these issues. The 
Bali Statement expects developed countries to meet binding emission targets (to be specified 
in future negotiations) in a similar way to the Kyoto Protocol, with developing countries only 
expected to adopt non-specified and non-binding mitigation strategies: 
1. Measurable, reportable and verifiable nationally appropriate mitigation commitments 
or actions, including quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives, by all 
developed country Parties, while ensuring the comparability of efforts among them, 
taking into account differences in their national circumstances; 
n. Nationally appropriate mitigation actions by developing country Parties in the 
context of sustainable development, supported and enabled by technology, financing 
and capacity-building, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner27. 
Presumably the United States refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol on the (partial) basis 
that it excluded major developing country emitters, such as China and India, from binding 
emission targets, will remain valid given that this newly negotiated road-map is an merely an 
extension of the Kyoto Protocol. An alternative international climate change protocol based 
on an ethical approach to climate change that involves very stringent binding targets for all 
nations would overcome this issue. Equity issues that must therefore be considered include: 
26 
27 
• responsibility for past and current emissions; 
• capacity to act; 
• equal entitlements to a clean atmosphere; 
• balancing current needs; and 
• opportunity to act. 
Ashton, J. and Wang, X. (2003), 'Equity and Climate: In Principle and Practice', in Beyond Kyoto: Advancing 
the International Effort against Climate Change, Pew Centre on Global Climate Change, Arlington, VA, p. 62. 
UNFCCC (2007), Decision -ICP.13 Bali Action Plan, UNFCCC, Bali. 
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4.1. Responsibility 
The polluter-pays principle is now well accepted within environmental economics. Those 
responsible for a problem are responsible for carrying the burden of fixing the problem or 
compensating those affected. Therefore, 'a fair agreement on climate change would need 
somehow to reflect the relative degrees of responsibility for the problem arising in the first 
place,28. The reality is though that it is extremely hard, if not impossible, to establish the 
precise causal connections between the emissions of one country and the climatic impacts 
suffered by another. Likewise it is extremely difficult in establishing the exact costs of 
making an economy resilient to those impacts. 
Whilst recognizing this difficulty, it is important to remember that that industrialized 
countries account for 85 percent of historical emissions and 65 percent of current emissions. 
Therefore, these countries must accept a -burden of responsibility that will add to their 
individual roles in a global response. As the poor are more likely to suffer the consequences 
of climate change (at least initially) due to their high vulnerability, the view from the South is 
that a higher priority should be placed 'not the potentially unfair allocation of mitigation 
targets but the inevitably unfair distribution of climate change burdens,29. Perhaps counter-
intuitively, reducing emissions is likely to be more difficult for countries with current high 
levels of emissions and with significant investment in current energy producing technologies 
more so than for developing countries whom are in the process of making new investments in 
energy producing technologies. For developed countries with pre-existing economic 
structures based upon coal fired power stations, for instances, it will be quite expensive and 
difficult to quickly dismantle these structures and replace them with less greenhouse gas 
emitting technology such as solar or wind powered power stations. Whereas, for developing 
countries in the high growth phase of development and are continuingly investing in power 
stations and other investments to produce more energy to meet increasing energy demand, it 
is more feasible that (with assistance) that this investment be made in low emission power 
stations thus effectively leapfrogging developed countries in terms of energy efficiency. 
4.2. Equal Entitlements 
A clean (and functioning) environment can be considered the ultimate public good of 
which all humans have equal entitlements. 
No single country or group of countries has the right to despoil the atmosphere to their 
advantage. Yet, like all public goods, it is in most countries' self-interest to seek to free-ride. 
As a public good therefore, full international co-operation is central to a successful response. 
'Unless there is to be international cooperation over the problem, it is pointless to debate 
about what ought to be done,30. Thus, 'equity in any new climate agreement would be judged 
by the extent to which it carries us towards such an equal entitlement world,31. The next 
28 Ashton, J. and Wang, X. (2003), 'Equity and Climate: In Principle and Practice', in Beyond Kyoto: Advancing 
the International Effort against Climate Change, Pew Centre on Global Climate Change, Arlington, VA, p. 65. 29 Muller, B. (2002), Equity in Climate Change: The Great Divide, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Oxford, 
p.4 (original italics). 30 
31 Broome, J. (1992) 'Counting the Cost of Global Warming', White House Press, Cambridge, p. 23. Broome, J. (1992) 'Counting the Cost of Global Warming', White House Press, Cambridge, p. 65. 
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international climate change protocol requires undifferentiated emission entitlements as the 
long term end-point. 
4.3. Capacity 
A country's response to climate change should reflect its capacity to do so. Richer 
countries will be able to respond more quickly to mitigation targets through the development 
and adaptation of new technologies compared to poorer countries32. That is not to say 
however that rapidly growing developing countries, such as China and India, are excluded 
from the uptake of new technologies. Indeed, as has been argued, developing countries in 
rapid growth phases are more likely to adopt new technology then already developed 
countries that have in place recently installed technology with comparatively high 
replacement costs 
Whilst climate change is a global problem requiring a global response, an equitable 
response does not necessarily mean an immediate equal response. 'An equitable approach to 
climate would thus demand more from those most equipped to respond,33. Countries with 
different capabilities and circumstances should have different targets and obligations. 
Immediate symmetric targets do not work for asymmetric conditions - and such responses 
'can be both inefficient and inequitable ,34 • However, both developed and developing 
countries must be required though to seek equitable outcomes in per capita targets in the 
longer term. 
4.4. Balancing Current Needs 
An effective global response to climate change will be onerous, as significant investment 
will be required to implement mitigation and adaptation policies. However, attaining basic 
needs in poor countries must remain a current priority. Thus richer countries must allow 
poorer countries to continue developing and achieving economic growth in order to life 
welfare levels of their poor populace. Technology transfer from more efficient developed 
economies to developing countries is vital to address climate change. If wealthier countries 
assist poor countries to produce energy more cleanly and efficiently, this will enable them to 
grow their economies at a much reduced expense to the environment. Such investment could 
be made through official development assistance programs. Indeed, a strong case can be made 
that technology transfer promotes both the economic development and welfare of recipient 
countries as well as improving the prospects of those countries most at risk from the effects of 
climate change. 
In other words, mitigation targets for the third world should not hinder their ability to 
meet the development needs of their poor populace. Therefore, 'a fair climate change 
agreement would if possible help, and certainly not undermine, the efforts of the poorest 
32 Ashton, 1. and Wang, X. (2003), 'Equity and Climate: In Principle and Practice', in Beyond Kyoto: Advancing 
the International Effort against Climate Change, Pew Centre on Global Climate Change, Arlington, VA. 
33 Broome, 1. (1992) 'Counting the Cost of Global Warming', White House Press, Cambridge, p. 66. 
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countries to meet the basic needs of their people,35. The next international climate change 
protocol must consider greenhouse gas emission reduction targets for all countries but 
concurrently emphasis the need for continuing economic development for developing 
countries as a necessary and complimentary goal. 
4.5. Opportunity 
The current climate change agreement, the Kyoto Protocol, set emission reduction targets 
for wealthy developed countries and excluded poor and transition economies from such 
requirements. However, a number of these countries are among the globe's most significant 
emitters. An equitable agreement would require all (including poor) countries to reduce 
emissions36 . Total carbon dioxide emissions from the consumption and flaring of fossil fuels 
have increased over 30 per cent since 1980. However, emissions in Asia and Oceania 
increased by over 80 per cent during the same period. This is because Asia's GDP growth rate 
has been about double that of the world average for the last four decades. Rapid economic 
growth in Asia has been accompanied by a sharp increase in greenhouse gas emissions. 
Emerging economies like China and India have become increasingly significant emitters as 
they undergo energy-intensive growth. China is now the second largest greenhouse gas 
emitting economy is the world - second only to the United States. India is now the world's 
fifth largest emitter - emitting more greenhouse gases than Germany, the United Kingdom or 
Canada. 
5. AN EQUITABLE GLOBAL RESPONSE-
CONTRACTION AND CONVERGENCE 
An approach that considers these issues will not be antithetical to the international 
community as equity has underscored previous commitments. 'The UNFCCC Principles state 
that climate change protection must have an equitable basis "in accordance with their (the 
Parties) common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capacities" and that 
developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change,37. Having said 
that though, political and economic considerations must not be allowed to take precedence in 
determining the next international climate change protocol should if they do, then it is 
unlikely that the necessary greenhouse gas emission reductions will be set and achieved and 
climate change will worsen and potentially the earth will experience irreversible and abrupt 
catastrophes. 
34 
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Having discussed the urgency of responding to climate change, and highlighted the issues 
that must be considered in terns of both intra- and inter-generational equity, what type of 
global response is possible? In essence, the only ethical approach to the next international 
climate change protocol is to have all countries accept a binding per capita based emission 
target that is set to ensure that greenhouse gas emission concentration levels are less than 
twice that of pre-industrial levels by the middle of this century. A per capita approach is 
required as it accepts that emissions rights in the future are going to become increasingly 
scarce and valuable. It therefore indicates that equity across time and space must be the 
hallmark of allocating these rights. The approach contained within the Kyoto Protocol was to 
based future emissions and rights to emit on past levels of emissions. Therefore, those who 
had higher emissions in 1990 were allowed to continue with relatively high emissions for the 
period 2008 to 2012. Likewise, those countries with relatively lower emissions in 1990, were 
also expected to have relatively lower emissions for the period 2008 to 2012. In designing the 
next international climate change protocol, such an allocation is inequitable. Indeed, the only 
equitable distribution is to state explicitly that each person, regardless of nationality or state 
of development, has the equal right to emit as anyone else. In this regard, what is being 
suggested in this book is neither new nor unique: 'Ultimately, almost any conceivable long-
term solution to the climate problem will embody, at least in crude form, a high degree of 
contraction and convergence,38. Indeed, 'the central idea of contraction and convergence is 
that all countries arrive at the same per capita emission level by a given date ... which gives 
high emitters time to bring their rates down, and lower emitters time to reach an emission 
level corresponding to an acceptable level of economic developmene9• So whilst it is not 
new, it remains an alternative approach that has yet to be considered by the international 
community. There are two reasons why this is likely to be the case. Firstly, a per capita 
approach penalizes wealthy countries. Generally, wealthy countries have high per capita 
emission ratios simply because they consume more energy as a direct consequence of their 
wealth. Spreading emissions on a per capita basis will dramatically reduce their emission 
rights. Secondly, the per capita approach would mandate emission targets on developing 
countries for the first time. Rather than being excluded from binding targets, developing 
countries would be now required to address climate change. 
There are though direct benefits for both groups of countries that should overcome doubts 
associated with this approach. Firstly, the per capita approach shares the burden of reducing 
emissions across all countries, thereby reducing the burden that developed countries may 
have to carry if developing countries are excluded in the post-Kyoto protocol. However, for 
developing countries, inclusion offers greater opportunity for new technology transfer in the 
longer term from developed countries and the potential for exchanging or selling carbon 
rights in the shorter-term. Stringent cuts to emissions must be made if the world is to 
minimize climate change. Co-operation between wealthy and poor countries, expressed 
38 
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through a per capita allocation of emission rights, is in the best interests of all concerned. It is 
also the most ethical way of addressing climate change. 
It is necessary that climate change science determine the setting of emission targets. 
Limiting temperatures increases to between 2.0 to 2.4° C requires greenhouse gas emission 
concentration levels to be stabilized at around 450 ppm carbon dioxide equivalent levels by 
2050, which in turns requires greenhouse gas emission to peak in the coming few years before 
falling to eighty percent of present emission levels by 2050. Achieving this will require 
consistent and annual reductions and this in turn requires new investment in energy efficient 
technology. Both developed and developing countries must invest in this new technology and 
developed countries must be willing to offer financial assistance to developing countries to 
ensure this clean technology transfer. It is also important that the inclusion of all countries be 
highlighted and made explicit at all times. Whilst developed countries have been responsible 
for historical emissions - which have certainly increased concentration levels - developing 
countries are increasingly responsible for current and future emission - which will in turn 
increase greenhouse gas concentration levels in the years ahead. A per capita contraction and 
convergence approach does not seek to apportion blame but rather demands a break with the 
past and draws a new future for the globe. 
6. CONCLUSION 
A new international climate change protocol must be negotiated in the coming two or 
three years to replace the Kyoto Protocol that ends in 2012. Already, negotiations have 
formally begun and it appears that the international community - as evidenced by the road-
map established in Bali, Indonesia in December 2007 - will continue to focus on binding 
targets for developed countries and mitigation objectives for developing countries. More 
specific detail will be negotiated in the coming year. However, it is unlikely that this road-
map will deliver the globe safely to the destination it desperately requires - climate change 
limited to temperature increases of around 2°C. Such an outcome can only be achieved with a 
radically different approach to the Kyoto Protocol. The next international climate change 
protocol must be based on science and equity. Scientific consensus exists on climatic impact 
of certain levels of greenhouse gas concentration levels in the atmosphere. Whilst uncertain, 
there is increasing scientific concern for the potential of abrupt, irreversible and catastrophic 
climate change if certain concentration levels are exceeded. An equitable response addresses 
both this scientific consensus and uncertainty. A per capita contract and convergence 
approach is necessary to limit future climate change and protect future generations from 
abrupt and irreversible catastrophes. Equity is the issue by which the global response to 
climate change will be judged and accepted or rejected by the international community. An 
international agreement will not be effective if it is not seen to be equitable and if it is not 
seen to be equitable, it will not be accepted. This means that unlike the Kyoto Protocol and 
the current road-map for post-Kyoto negotiations, all developed and developing countries, 
including China, India and others, must be included in the next international climate change 
protocol. 
Chapter 4 
CHINA 
1. INTRODUCTION 
China is an extraordinary nation in a number of ways, not least being its recent rapid 
economic development. Since economic liberalization in 1979, China's gross domestic 
product per capita has increased over nine-fold. Yet despite this enormous increase, China 
remains a developing country with GDP per capita of around five per cent of the GECD 
average. Moreover, China is targeting to quadruple its GDP over the next two decades and 
increase the urbanization rate from 35 percent to 65 percent (a more conservative estimate of 
50 percent would still result in 700 million people living in urban centres with greater energy 
consumption than their rural counterparts). If this is achieved, China will reach GDP per 
capita levels of a middle-income country in only a few decades. However, such economic 
development will place great stress on the environment, particularly through the emissions of 
greenhouse gas emissions, resulting from increased economic activity I . 
Indeed, the very direct consequences of China's recent economic achievement are already 
evident. Due to its heavy energy needs driven by its high population growth and its economic 
development, China is the world's second largest emitter of greenhouse gases. In fact, it may 
be that China is already the world's largest greenhouse gas emitter, overtaking the USA. The 
Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency reported in 2006 that China's carbon dioxide 
emissions were eight percent higher than the United States' emissions. This is a significant 
increase as in 2005 China's emissions were two per cent lower than that of the United States 
2. China's contribution to global greenhouse gas emissions accelerated quickly through the 
2 
Dadi, Z. and Levine, M. (2003), China's Sustainable Energy Future, ERI, Beijing. 
As will become evident throughout this chapter and chapter 5, there are numerous estimates of greenhouse gas 
emissions - including estimates solely of C02 as well as estimates of the entire suite of greenhouse gas 
emissions. Different agencies estimate these emissions using different models, so whilst the basic data upon 
which these estimates are made (such as coal consumption, oil consumption, deforestation, etc.) are often 
common, the different models result in different figures. For example, during the decade 1991 to 2000, C02 
estimates for China differed on average nearly five percent, with the lEA 2007 C02 Emissions from Fuel 
Combustion estimates generally being lower than the CDIAC 2007 World C02 Emissions estimates during 
this period. However, whilst the lEA figure was nearly 12 per cent less than the CDIAC estimate in 1996, they 
were in fact eight per cent higher in 2000. These differences further impact upon climate change models that 
are used to determine the likely consequences of increasing greenhouse gas concentration levels. Different 
greenhouse gas estimates result in different greenhouse concentration levels which in turn leads to different 
estimates of climate change. Policy-makers and scientists must therefore consider a wide-range of greenhouse 
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1980s and 1990s due to its size and rapid industrialisation3• China presently emits nearly 20 
percent of the world's total carbon dioxide emissions from the consumption and flaring of 
fossil fuels up from eight per cent in 1980 4• Given the current demand for energy, which is 
driven by economic growth and urbanization, it is likely that this share will increase sharply 
in the future. 
China's total carbon dioxide emissions from the consumption and flaring of fossil fuels, 
for example, have grown in line with its energy consumption over the past two decades (1985 
to 2005) and increased nearly three times during this period. So significant is the consumption 
of energy in China, that the 12 percent increase in carbon dioxide emissions resulting from 
the consumption or flaring of fossil fuels recorded between 2004 and 2005 is itself alone one 
and half times the absolute total carbon dioxide emissions of Brazil (itself a significant 
developing country emitter). China's increase in greenhouse gas emissions is predominately 
due to its reliance on dirty coal and other fossil fuel combustion to produce enough energy to 
meet spiraling demand. Indeed, energy demand has outstripped energy production capacity 
resulting in parts of China suffering severe energy shortages, including regular electricity 
blackouts and restrictions in many rural and urban areas. Further, many millions of Chinese in 
rural areas still remain today without access to electricity 5. 
China's industrial sector accounts for 75 percent of all energy-related carbon dioxide 
emissions. The commercial sector accounted for 11 percent, the transport sector nine percent 
and the residential sector five percent. However, it is expected that the transport sector will 
in~reasingly contribute to greenhouse emissions as China continues to develop. Cars are 
becoming more affordable for a larger section of the population and as restrictions on internal 
travel reduce the demand for mobility significantly increases. Car sales in China are now 
growing by 15 to 20 percent annually. Quite simply, as China develops and becomes "freer", 
demand for mobility and transport increases. This in turn increases demand and consumption 
of oil 6. As a consequence, carbon dioxide emissions from the road transport sector increased 
125 percent and other transport increased 46 percent between 1990 and 2000. 
In terms of global primary energy consumption, China accounted for nearly 40 percent of 
the global increase in between 1996 and 2006 (see table 4.2). China's primary energy 
production increased more than by three-quarters between 1996 and 2006 compared to an 
increased of less than ten percent for developed (or OECD) countries and less than one-
quarter for the whole globe 7. 
The next international climate change protocol must consider China as a significant 
greenhouse gas emitter. This chapter will explore the issues relating to China's greenhouse 
gas emission. It will present and analyze historical emission data as well as report on 
projections of future emissions. A discussion of accuracy of this data will also be undertaken. 
3 
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The purpose of this chapter therefore, is to present an accurate and realistic explanation of the 
role China has had in past greenhouse gas emission and its likely role in future emissions. But 
more importantly the purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate why, despite China's status as 
a developing country, it must be included (along with all other wealthy and poor nations) in 
the next international climate change protocol. Section Two discusses the context of China's 
greenhouse gas emissions. Section Three reviews China's energy use and the impact of this 
on its emissions, whilst Section Four questions the reliability of this data. Section Five 
projects future emissions for China before the chapter is concluded in Section Six. 
2. UNDERSTANDING THE CHINESE CONTEXT 
Developing countries were not required to commit to binding emission targets under the 
Kyoto Protocol. The 'roadmap' that has emerged from the first of the post-Kyoto negotiation 
session that was held in Bali in late 2007 also fails to require developing countries to accepted 
binding emission targets 8. Under these arrangements, China's status as a developing country 
will therefore be given more weight than its status as one of the world's leading emitters of 
greenhouse gas emissions, resulting in it being excluded from binding emission targets. 
Chinese leadership believes that this demarcation between wealthy and poorer nations is 
important and that developing countries should have common but differentiated 
responsibilities towards reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Indeed, the Chinese position is 
that it should not be responsible for reducing global greenhouse gas emissions, but that 
wealthy countries should be held responsible. According to the majority of the Chinese 
leadership 'advanced industrialized countries should restructure and reform their own 
wasteful practices and not simply look to the developing countries as a cheap alternative' 9 in 
outsourcing greenhouse gas emission mitigation activities .. Having said that though, China 
has acknowledged the need to respond to this issue and has instigated a number of initiatives 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Political recognition exists within China that economic 
growth is not sustainable if it occurs at the expense of the eco-system. Whilst speaking at the 
2007 Asia-Pacific Economic Cop-operation forum held in Australia, Chinese President Hu 
Jintao declared that the Chinese government would attach great importance to sustainable 
development and promote the sustainability of China's eco-system. To this end, President Bu 
noted that China has set the targets of bringing down energy consumption per unit of GDP by 
20 percent, cutting the total discharge of major pollutants by 10 percent and increasing forest 
cover from 18 percent to 20 percent between the end of 2005 and 2010. If achieved, the 
consequences for the global emission levels would be large. However, in developing these 
policies in isolation of a new international climate change protocol, these goals may be less 
than adequate. 
China has undertaken some economic reform, population planning, fuel switching, and 
other measures that positively address greenhouse gas emissions. Reductions in population 
growth have reduced China's emission output by 150 million tons per year. By developing 
8 
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various population policies, it is estimated that 300 million less births occurred over the past 
three decades 10. Indeed, many emissions mitigation opportunities are consistent with 
economic development and can be realized through greater international cooperation, and 
direct and indirect domestic climate policy measures. For example, forest cover in China has 
increased from 13 percent to 18 percent since 1986. The importance of forest cover is that it 
acts as a carbon sink. It is estimated that more than 123 million tons of carbon dioxide have 
be absorbed by reforestation over the last fifty years 11. China's policy of fuel switching has 
resulted in increased exploration and development of natural gas resources. New gas supplies 
have been found in central and western China and nearly 30 new gas fields are being 
constructed. Indeed, the policy of fuel switching is quite demanding: all new fuel applications 
in Beijing are now required to be gas rather than coal based. Though, this has led to other 
important trends in China's energy sector, such as a 90 percent and 82 percent increase in oil-
related and natural gas emissions respectively between 1990-2000 12. 
However, it is wrong to suggest that China's economic growth has not had other negative 
environmental consequences. China's grasslands have been reduced by 30-50 percent, and up 
to 90 of the grassland remaining is degraded to some extent. Desertification is also a problem 
as more than 25 percent of China now desert. The rate of desertification has doubled over the 
last 30 years from 1500 km2 to 3500 km2 per annum. Currently, 70 percent of China's urban 
population is exposed to air pollution, 70 percent of seven major water systems are heavily 
polluted, and 400 cities face water shortages 13. 
3. CHINA'S ENERGY USE AND EMISSIONS 
Much of China's energy use is based upon oil consumption. China became oil self-
sufficient in the mid-1960s and an oil exporter in the mid-1980s. However, China's domestic 
energy demand for oil (resulting from its on-going economic growth and development) 
increased so much that by 1993 it had become again a net importer. Just seven years later, 
China became the world's seventh largest importer behind the US, Japan, Germany, France 
and Italy. Between 1996 and 2006 global oil consumption increased 543 million tonnes, from 
3347 million tonnes to 3890 million tonnes. China is now the world's second largest oil 
consumer. The increase in world oil consumption over this period was around 16 per cent, yet 
China's oil consumption more than doubled. It is forecast that by 2030, China will import 600 
million tons of oil (a figure comparable with the US today). 
Of even greater importance in terms of the percentage of primary energy consumption in 
China is coal. China presently accounts for nearly 40 per cent of the world's total 
consumption of coal. Coal consumption increased over 63 per cent between 1996 and 2006 
10 
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compared to the rest of the world (excluding China) of 16 percent. In 2006, coal accounted 
for 70 per cent of primary energy use, down from 75 per cent in 1996. Even the most 
optimistic and sustainable-focused scenarios still has coal responsible for at least 55 per cent 
of energy production in 2020 14. This coal used is dirty and a primary source of China's 
carbon dioxide emissions. Officially coal use for energy fell between 1996 and 2002. This 
may be explained through government closures from 1996 of inefficient small coal pits with 
over 57,000 mines being shutlS • These closures were ordered due to the local environmental 
damage they were causing, not for any desired impact of global greenhouse gas emissions or 
climate change. As stated previously, it is likely that much of China's response to global 
climate change in the short-term will be driven by the more immediate environmental damage 
being experienced in Chinese cities and provinces. Whilst the motivation is not necessarily 
important, this inward focus may result though in policy responses that are less efficient in 
terms of addressing greenhouse gas emissions at a scale required within a new international 
climate change protocol. 
Table 4.1. lEA Estimates of CO2 Emissions (based on fuel combustion) 
Year CO2 emissions Population CO2 emissions 
(millions of metric tonnes) (millions) per capita (metric tonnes) 
1990 2371.52 1135.19 2.08 
1991 2320.34 1150.78 2.01 
1992 2416.28 1164.97 2.07 
1993 2593.68 1178.44 2.20 
1994 2728.24 1191.84 2.28 
1995 2958.31 1204.86 2.45 
1996 3081.98 1217.55 2.53 
1997 3058.34 1230.08 2.48 
1998 3045.49 1241.94 2.45 
1999 3052.18 1253.74 2.43 
2000 3055.46 1262.65 2.41 
2001 3010.56 1271.85 2.36 
2002 3321.42 1280.4 2.59 
2003 3901.92 1288.4 3.02 
2004 4657.30 1296.16 3.59 
2005 5126.84 1304.5 3.93 
Source: lEA 2007 and author's own calculations. 
14 
15 
Dadi, Z. and Levine, M. (2003), China's Sustainable Energy Future, ERI, Beijing. 
Stinton, J. and Fridley, D. (2002), 'A Guide to China's Energy Statistics', The Journal of Energy Literature, 
Vol 8(1). 
Table 4.2. Energy data for China, OECD and World 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 percent 
Change 
from 1996-
2006 
Oil consumption 
(millions oftonnes) 
China 173.8 196.0 197.0 209.6 223.6 227.9 247.4 271.7 318.9 327.8 349.8 101.3 
OECD 2114.4 2146.3 2151.9 2188.7 2199.8 2197.6 2190.9 2223.0 2266.9 2279.7 2259.0 6.83 
World 3347.0 3433.2 3449.0 3517.0 3556.2 3572.6 3606.6 3675.3 3813.7 3861.3 3889.8 16.23 
World (w/o China) 3173.2 3237.2 3252 3307.4 3332.6 3344.7 3359.2 3403.6 3494.8 3533.5 3540 11.56 
Coal consumption 
(million tonnes of 
oil equivalent) 
China 729.4 700.2 651.9 656.2 667.4 681.3 713.8 853.1 978.2 1095.9 1191.3 63.33 
OECD 1077.2 1083.5 1085.0 1073.1 1122.7 1114.5 1121.1 1148.7 1160.7 1169.7 1171.5 8.8 
World 2355.8 2340.3 2285.8 2276.6 2364.3 2384.8 2437.2 2632.8 2805.5 2957.0 3090.1 3l.2 
World (w/o China) 1626.4 1640.1 1633.9 1620.4 1696.9 1703.5 1723.4 1779.7 1827.3 1861.1 1898.8 16.75 
Primary Energy 
consumption 
(million tonnes of 
oil equivalent) 
China 965.1 960.9 916.9 934.1 966.7 1000.0 1057.8 122&.7 1423.5 1566.7 1697.& 76.0 
OECD 5104.0 5154.1 5176.5 5247.8 5359.6 5327.7 5366.4 5421.9 5522.9 5559.9 5553.7 8.8 
World 8857.9 8929.5 8941.5 9071.1 9308.7 936&.6 9548.9 9856.5 10323.4 10624.0 10878.5 22.8 
World (w/o China) 7892.& 7968.6 &024.6 8137 8342 8368.6 849Ll 8627.8 8&99.~ 9057.3 9180.7 16.32 
Source: BP Statistical Review of Word Energy, 2007. 
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Precise estimates of China's greenhouse gas emissions are not easily formulated. 
According to the lEA estimates (see table 4.1), carbon dioxide emissions from the combustion 
of fuel more than doubled between 1990 and 2005, from 2371 million metric tonnes to 5126 
million metric tonnes. Interestingly though, during this period, between 1996 and 2000, 
carbon dioxide emissions actually fell minimally - despite China experiencing more than 17 
percent economic growth during this same period. Emissions from the use of coal remain the 
single largest contributor to emissions. While the relative contribution of coal to over all 
fossil-fuel emissions have fallen from over 98 percent in 1950 to around 70 percent currently. 
Consumption of liquid fuels currently accounts for around 17 percent of total emissions and 
cement production accounts for just under 10 percent. (China supplies over one-third of the 
world's hydraulic cement). Despite China's large population (now over 1.3 billion people), 
the recent rapid increase in emissions has resulted in China's per capita emissions rates 
almost doubling between 1990 and 2005, from 2.08 metric tonnes per person to 3.93 metric 
tonnes per person. World average per capita emissions are slightly higher than this though at 
4.30 metric tonnes per person. 
Part of China's high greenhouse gas emissions can be explained by the relatively high 
emissions intensity ratios (see table 4.3). China produces more greenhouse gas emissions per 
unit of GDP than the average. Presently China produces 0.641 kilos of carbon dioxide 
emissions for every US$PPP of GOP (in constant 2000 prices) compared to the DECD 
average of 0.442 kilos and the world average of 0.505 kilos. However, China is reducing this 
ratio, meaning that it is producing less carbon dioxide emissions for the same amount of 
economic activity. 
Between 1975 and 1989 the emissions intensity fell on average by around 2.3 per cent per 
annum, compared to a world-wide reduction of just 0.52 per cent. China was able to 
accelerate this reduction between 1990 and 2003 during which time the emission intensity 
ratio fell on average by 3.6 per cent per annum, compared to the worldwide reduction of 1.4 
per cent. Interesting, during these two periods, DECO countries slowed their fall in emissions 
intensity perhaps indicating they were approaching a saturation point or a point of 
diminishing returns. However, give the inefficient technology that is widely in use throughout 
China, it is expected that China can continue to reduce its emissions intensity into the future 
through more efficient technology and use of resources. This in turn will mean the link 
between economic growth and greenhouse gas emission will be further weakened. Wealthy 
countries may also view this as an appropriate opportunity to assist with technological 
transfer and the like between the developed and developing worlds to accelerate the reduction 
of this intensity ratio in order to assist in reducing global emissions. 
Table 4.3. Comparisons of China's Intensity Changes 
Emissions Intensity 
(kg ofC02/ $2000 PPP GDP) 
2003 
China 0.641 
OECD 0.442 
Change in Intensity 
Per cent per annum 
1975-89 
-2.32 
-1.87 
1990-03 
-3.6 
-1.05 
World 0.505 -0.52 -1.40 
Source: World Bank (2007) and author's own calculations. 
Change in Rate of Change 
Percent per annum 
1975-89 and 1990-03 
-1.29 
0.83 
-0.88 
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4. DATA RELIABILITY IN CHINA 
Emission data estimates by agencies, such as the lEA, are largely based on primary data 
prepared by national governments. Official consumption data from China shows that coal 
consumption actually fell by 10 per cent between 1996 and 1998 before rising again (see table 
4.2). However, this reduction in consumption (and subsequent fall in greenhouse gas 
emissions) is beginning to be questioned 1. It would be of great importance if increasing 
concerns that these official figures have been systematically understated and misreported for 
some time are proved true. Overall, primary energy consumption is also reported to have 
fallen during this period before rising again. Such fluctuations cast serious doubts over the 
accuracy of these statistics. If figures have previously been underrepOlied, the consequences 
for climate change will be large. China is one of the world's largest producer of carbon 
dioxide emissions, primarily as a result of his heavy reliance on (poor grade brown) coal for 
energy. This data is based upon official figures, subsequently if these official figures are 
understated than so too are the estimated carbon dioxide emissions upon which they are 
based. Given China's recent and rapid increase in energy (and coal) consumption, this is of 
serious concern. This concern therefore raises doubts that emissions growth in China has 
reduced over the past three decades by an estimated 250 million tons of carbon per year, 
about one-third of China's current emissions 2. 
For the full period, 1990 - 2002, actual global emissions fell between 1996 and 1999 due 
to the one-third reduction in China's carbon dioxide emissions during this time. However, 
given the increase in coal consumption and related carbon dioxide emissions from this time, 
global emissions increased again in 200 I and 2002. Given the concern about possible 
underreporting of coal consumption in China not only might the real carbon dioxide 
emissions may be higher, but the fall in emissions in 1998 and 1999 may not have actually 
occurred. 
If under-reporting of coal consumption did occur, it is possible to adjust coal 
consumption figures from 1997 in order to estimate what the real consumption figures may 
be. Three sets of adjustments have been made: 1) low; 2) mid range; and 3) high range. The 
low estimate is based on an average increase of around 5 per cent per annum. This roughly 
reflects the increase in coal consumption reported between 1992 and 1996. The mid-range 
estimate is based on average increases of 12 per cent per annum. This figure reflects recent 
growth in GOP during the corresponding years, which is a primary driver of energy demand. 
The high-range figure is based on average increases of 17 percent per annum. This figure is 
half of the increase in official coal consumption repOlied between 2003 and 2004. Given the 
fluctuations in repolied coal consumption, it is likely that the true figure lies between the mid-
and high-range estimates. 
It is interesting to note that even though the low-range estimate is approximately the same 
in 2006 as the official figures (indeed, it is slightly lower), the accumulated consumption 
2 
see the articles of Stinton, J. (200 I), 'Accuracy and Reliability of China's Energy Statistics', China Economic 
Review, Vol 12: 347-354; Stillton, J. and Fridley, D. (2002), 'A Guide to China's Energy Statistics', The 
Journal of Energy Literature, Vol 8(1); Stinton, 1. and Fridley, D. (2003), 'Comments on Recent Energy 
Statistics from China", Sinosphere, Vol. 6(2): 6-11. 
Pew Center on Global Climate Change (Pew) (2002), Climate Change Mitigation in Developing COlin tries, 
Pew Center on Global Climate Change, Arlington. 
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between the official figures and the low-range estimates do vary during this period with the 
low-range estimates nearly 20 percent higher than official figures . The difference between the 
reported coal consumption and the mid- and high-range estimates are even more significant. 
In 2006, the estimated coal consumption is nearly three times that of the reported figure, 
whilst the cumulative estimate of coal consumption in high range for the period 1992 to 2006 
is almost twice that than the reported figure. 
Table 4.4. Coal Consumption Estimates 
BP 2007 Low Mid High 
(5 per cent pa) (12 per cent pa) (17 per cent pa) 
1992 573 .5 573.5 573 .5 573.5 
1993 610.6 610.6 610.6 610.6 
1994 648.2 648 .2 648.2 648.2 
1995 694.2 694.2 694.2 694.2 
1996 729.4 729.4 729.4 729.4 
1997 700.2 765.9 816.9 853.4 
1998 651.9 804.2 915 .0 998 .5 
1999 656.2 844.4 1024.8 1168.2 
2000 667.4 886.6 1147.7 1366.8 
2001 681.3 930 .9 1285.5 1599.2 
2002 713 .8 977 .5 1439.7 1871.0 
2003 853 .1 1026.3 1612.5 2189.1 
2004 978 .2 1077.7 1806.0 2561.3 
2005 1095.9 1131.5 2022.7 2996.7 
2006 1191.3 1188.1 2265.4 3506.1 
Cumulative 11445.2 12888.9 17592.0 22366.1 
Source: BP 2007 and author' s own estimates (in italics) . 
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Figure 4.1. Trajectories of Coal Consumptions Estimates . 
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It is possible to estimate (with reasonable accuracy) carbon dioxide emISSIOns from 
developing countries by applying emissions factors to the consumption of oil, gas and coal. 
The estimation is based on converting coal consumed million tonnes of oil equivalent to mega 
watt hours using a conversion factor of 11.6 and then estimating carbon dioxide emissions by 
using an emission factor suggested by the IPCC of 330 g CO2/kWh. Whilst a rough estimate, 
this method is reasonably accurate 3. 
The different estimates present a large difference in the possible emissions emitted 
through coal consumption for this period. The accumulated carbon dioxide emission estimates 
range from 49339 (Mt) of carbon dioxide emissions to 85618 (Mt). The accumulated 
emissions for the low-range emission estimates are over 12 per cent higher than the official 
figures, whilst the mid-range emission estimates are over 50 per cent higher, whilst the high-
range emission estimates are almost double. Given that China is responsible for much of the 
global carbon dioxide emissions, this difference will impact on climate change. Allowing 
China to avoid binding emission targets in the next international climate change protocol, as it 
is a developing country is no longer possible. This is particularly the case when China's 
future emissions are considered. 
Table 4.5. Revised CO2 Emission Estimates 
BP 2007 Low Mid High 
(5 per cent pa) (12 per cent pa) (17 per cent pa) 
1992 2195.4 2195.4 2195.4 2195.4 
1993 2337.4 2337.4 2337.4 2337.4 
1994 2481.3 2481.3 2481.3 2481.3 
1995 2657.4 2657.4 2657.4 2657.4 
1996 2792.1 2792.1 2792.1 2792.1 
1997 2680.4 2931.8 3127.2 3266.8 
1998 2495.5 3078.3 3502.5 3822.2 
1999 2511.9 3232.3 3922.8 4471.9 
2000 2554.8 3393.9 4393.5 5232.2 
2001 2608.0 3563.6 4920.7 6121.6 
2002 2732.4 3741.7 5511.2 7162.3 
2003 3265.7 3928.8 6172.5 8379.9 
2004 3744.5 4125.3 6913.2 9804.5 
2005 4195.1 4331.5 7742.8 11471.2 
2006 4560.3 4548.1 8672.0 13421.4 
Cumulative 43812.2 49338.8 67342.0 85617.6 
Source: BP 2007 and author's own estimates (in italics). 
Zittel, W. and Treber, M. (2003), Analysis of BP Statistical Review of World Energy with Respect to C02 
Emissions, Joint Working Paper Germanwatch and LBS, Bonn. 
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Figure 4.2 . Estimate of Cumulative CO2 Emissions (Mt) . 
5. PROJECTING FUTURE EMISSIONS 
While an historical understanding of greenhouse gas emissions is vitally important in 
assessing the degree to which a country (or region) is contributing to total greenhouse gas 
emissions, it is also important to estimate their likely future greenhouse gas emissions as well 
in order to better inform policy responses and climate change models. Future emission levels 
can be projected through the use of models that consider population growth, economic 
growth, economic structure, energy effic iency and technological progress. It is of course 
noted that different models will project different emission levels depending on the actual 
model specifications and small changes in any of these parameters will impact future 
emission predictions. 
One recent estimate4, for example, argues that China's carbon dioxide emissions from 
fossil fuel combustion and cement production will increase nearly five times between 2004 
and 2030. Within this study a number of assumptions where made as to China's changing 
economic, social and technological circumstances. For example, these researchers estimate 
that China's economic growth will continue to grow at high rates, though this will moderate 
over t ime - eight percent growth per annum to 2010,7.5 per cent per annum growth to 2015, 
seven per cent per annum growth between 2015 and 2020, and 6.5 per cent per annum growth 
between 2020 and 2030. The average rate of economic growth over the entire period of 2004 
to 2030 is 7.3 percent (compared to the projection of the lEA of 5.5 percents . Another 
4 
5 
This work by myself and others brought together both economists and climatologists to reconsider the 
emission data from China (and India) in order to determine its affect on projected climate change. It is 
Sheehan, P., Jones, R. , Jolley, A. Preston, B., Clarke, M., Durack, P., Islam S. and Whetton, P. 
(forthcoming), ' Climate Change and the New World Economy: Implications for the Nature and Timing of 
Policy Responses ', Global Environmental Change, accepted November 2007. 
Intemational Energy Agency (IEA) (2006), World Energy Outlook, lEA, Paris. 
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imllortant parameter is the energy elasticity of economic growth. Within this study, estimates 
of China's energy elasticity are higher than other studies, with it being 1.0 through to 20 I 0, 
before falling to around 0.8 for the remaining two decades. It is predicted that the fuel mix in 
China will also change over the projected period within coal reducing its share of the total 
primary energy source from over 70 percent in 2004 to about 37 per cent in 2030. However, 
in absolute terms, this still indicates an increase in coal consumption and thus greenhouse gas 
emissions. Indeed, based on this study, it is estimated that greenhouse gas emissions resulting 
from fuel consumption and cement production will increase globally from 7.5 gigatonnes of 
carbon (gtC) in 2004 to 16.6 Gtcb in 2030. This means that China will be responsible for 
nearly 60 percent of the global increase in emissions over this period. 
It is important to contrast these projections to those undertaken by others, particularly 
those based upon the Special Report for Emission Scenarios prepared by the IPCC 6. The 
models using these 'scenarios' are at risk of underestimating the rapid global economic 
growth (particularly in China and certain other developing countries) that has recently 
occurred. For example, the International Energy Agency's 2006 World Energy Outlook 
estimates an annual growth rate for China of 5.5 per cent for its projections between 2004 and 
2030. Yet this is actually just over half of what was actually achieved in China during the 
period 1978 to 2004. Projections of global emissions within this lEA projection are 
potentially less than might eventuate and this underestimation puts at risk the consequential 
climate change predictions that utilize these data. For example, the lEA project that annual 
global carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel and cement production between 2004 and 
2030 will grow at 1.8 per cent per year. Sheehan et al. predict that annual global carbon 
dioxide emissions from fossil fuels and cement production between 2004 and 2030 will grow 
at 3.1 per cent per annum. More specifically, the aforementioned Sheehan et al. study projects 
China's annual carbon dioxide emissions growth to be 6.2 per cent compared to 3.3 per cent 
estimated by the lEA. Over the period, these different growth rates have significant 
consequences for total greenhouse gas emissions, greenhouse gas concentration levels and 
climate change. Should these new Chinese (and global) predictions prove to be accurate, the 
consequences for humans and non-human species are significant 7. 
6. CONCLUSION 
The importance of China to global greenhouse gas emissions and future climate change 
cannot be overstated. Due to its population and rate of economic transformation, it is already 
one of the world's greatest emitters of greenhouse gas in and there is little doubt that this will 
continue into the future. 
6 
7 
IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) (2000) IPCC Special Report on Emission Scenarios, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Within Sheehan, P., Jones, R., Jolley, A., Preston, B., Clarke, M., Durack, P., Islam, S., and Whetton, P. 
(forthcoming), 'Climate Change and the New World Economy: Implications for the Nature and Timing of 
Policy Responses', Global Environmental Change, accepted November 2007, we estimate that the 
consequences of this level of emission growth would mean 90 per cent risk of irreversible melting of the 
Greenland ice-sheet a great than 90 per cent risk of the loss of coral reefs, and 50 pet cent risk that more than 
50% of species would be at risk of extinction. 
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Four major factors affect China's ability to reduce the growth of greenhouse gas 
emissions, 1) continuing economic reforms, 2) increasing energy efficiency in a market based 
economy, 3) enforcing environmental regulations at the domestic level, and 4) continuing to 
slow population growth rates. These are significant undertakings that require firm political 
leadership. As China continues to develop economically, the ability to manage social 
aspirations will become more difficult. This in tum will place greater pressure on Chinese 
leaders and possibility restrict their ability to achieve meaningful reductions in future 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
However, general policies that might assist developing countries mitigate emissions 
include promoting pro-market reforms, deregulating energy prices, accelerating economic 
growth whilst reducing emissions growth, encouraging overseas investment, targeting 
capacity-building assistance to optimize natural synergies between climate mitigation and 
general development goals, and supporting local environmental controls, such as clean air and 
reducing deforestation. These actions are undertaken because they support development and 
poverty alleviation, environmental and energy security goals rather than as climate change 
mitigation per se. Further reductions in emissions by developing countries are possible, but 
progress along this path may be hampered by competing demands for resources. 
Development goals of increasing human capacity, investment and technology can be used 
simultaneously to leverage large-scale mitigation opportunities 8. 
Having said that, the harsh reality is that there are a number of common barriers to future 
climate mitigation for China and other developing countries can also include: 
1. a lack of reliable data impeding efforts to identify areas of possible change and track 
progress of past efforts; 
2. a lack of adequate skills in analyzing energy and emissions, identifying mitigation 
opportunities; undertaking required economic reforms, and cultivating investment 
opportunities; 
3. public ownership of energy resources reducing competition and thus efficiency; and 
4. required investment and technology transfer being impeded by a raft of concerns 
including a lack of market transparency and the non-enforcement of rule oflaw 9. 
China is not alone in facing these difficulties. It is also not alone in simultaneously being 
a developing country and large greenhouse gas emitter. The next international climate change 
protocol must not exclude large greenhouse gas emitters due to a nation's development status. 
All nations must be included in an equitable way that will achieve substantial reductions in 
emissions. This certainly includes other key developing nations such as Russia, India and 
Brazil. 
8 
9 
Pew Center on Global Climate Change (pew) (2002), Climate Change Mitigation in Developing Countries, 
Pew Center on Global Climate Change, Arlington. 
Pew Center on Global Climate Change (Pew) (2002), Climate Change Mitigation in Developing Countries, 
Pew Center on Global Climate Change, Arlington. 
Chapter 5 
OTHER KEy DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: 
RUSSIA, INDIA AND BRAZIL 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In addition to China, other developing countries are also responsible for significant 
greenhouse gas emissions1• This is largely a factor oflarge populations, low-level technology, 
and on-going industrialization. It has been recognized by some for nearly a decade that 
'carbon dioxide emissions from developing countries constitute about a half of the total world 
emissions, and their share will continue to grow larger. Their growing share of global 
emissions indicates why it is necessary to involve developing countries in collaboration on 
global climate change mitigation,2. In addition to China (discussed in the previous chapter), 
three developing/transitional countries are of particular interest to the next international 
climate change instrument due to the absolute size of current emissions, potential for future 
growth in emissions, and strategic importance in global trade. These countries are Russia, 
India and Brazil. (Other developing countries, such as South Africa and Indonesia, are also 
worthy of mention, but are not discussed within this chapter due to various constraints). The 
Russian Federation is the world's third highest emitter of carbon dioxide, while India is the 
fifth and Brazil is the nineteenth highest (see table 5.1). On a per capita basis, only Russia is a 
significant emitter, being higher than the world average. Both India and Brazil are well below 
the world average. Indeed, India's per capita emissions are nearly less than one quarter of the 
world average. This is of course a function of its very large population. 
2 
Solomon, S., Qin, D., Manning, M., Chen, Z., Marquis, M., Averyt, K, Tignor, M. and Miller, H. (eds) 
(2007), Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group 1 to the Fourth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
National Strategy Studies (NSS) (1999), Study on Russian National Strategy of Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Reduction, World Bank, Washington, p. 11. 
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Table 5.1. lEA Rankings in 2005 
Total Fossil Fuel CO2 Emissions Per capita Fossil Fuel CO2 Emissions 
Ranking Nation Emissions 
(million 
metric tonnes 
carbon 
equivalent) 
1 United States 5862.27 
2 China 5126.84 
3 Russia 1553.67 
4 Japan 1249.73 
5 India 1190.88 
6 
Germany 819.10 
7 Canada 540.43 
8 United Kingdom 539.85 
9 Korea 460.44 
10 Italy 451.20 
11 Mexico 425.88 
12 South Africa 405.60 
13 Iran 405.48 
14 France 387.13 
15 Australia 367.75 
16 Indonesia 350.07 
17 Spain 341.56 
18 Ukraine 335.14 
19 Brazil 332.36 
20 Saudi Arabia 323.17 
World 27632.26 
Source: IEA 2007. 
Nation Emissions (metric 
tonnes carbon 
equivalent) 
Qatar 45.98 
Kuwait 30.09 
Luxembourg 24.67 
Bahrain 24.47 
Netherlands Antilles 23.67 
United Arab 
Emirates 23.36 
United States 19.76 
Trinidad and Tobago 19.08 
Australia 17.97 
Canada 16.75 
Brunei Darussalam 16.70 
Gibraltar 15.00 
Saudi Arabia 13.98 
Singapore 13.71 
Oman 13.39 
Estonia 12.64 
Chinese Taipei 11.96 
Czech Republic 11.88 
Norway 11.24 
Kazakhstan 11.21 
(23) Russian 10.86 
Federation 
(67) China 3.93 
(88) Brazil 1.78 
(100) India 1.09 
World 4.30 
Despite the importance of developing countries to global emiSSlons, data on actual 
emissions for most developing countries is limited. The international body charged with the 
responsibility of co-ordinating an international response to climate change is the UNFCCC. 
Developed (or more precisely - Annex 1) countries are required to submit yearly inventories 
of greenhouse gas emission in a 'common reporting format' in order to assess the progress of 
abatement policies against the Kyoto Protocol commitments. Comparisons based on these 
data are reasonable and accurate as the methodology is standard across all estimates. 
However, such data does not exist for developing countries. Other than the Russian 
Federation, developing (or non-Annex 1) countries are not required to undertake national 
greenhouse gas emission inventories in line with UNFCCC regulations. Two estimates of 
India's greenhouse gas emissions using the UNFCCC common format have been undertaken 
(and collated by The Energy Resources Institute - TERI). The first was for the base year 1990 
and was estimated by the National Physical Laboratory as part of the Asia Least-Cost 
Greenhouse Gas Emission Program. The Ministry of Energy and Forests undertook the 
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second report for the year 1994. While broad comparisons between these two inventories are 
possible, confidence in such analysis must be limited. No estimates for Brazil using the 
UNFCCC framework have been produced. Thus comparisons of emissions for these countries 
using the UNFCCC approach are not possible. 
Third parties though do estimate emission data. The International Energy Agency (lEA) 
located within the OCED is one such example. Other organisations include the Carbon 
Dioxide Informational Analysis Center (CD lAC) located within the US Department of 
Energy and the UK-based commercial firm British Petroleum also compile statistics of carbon 
dioxide emissions. Estimates differ between the these organisations as their methodologies 
and focus on different aspects of carbon dioxide emissions are distinct. It should also be noted 
that while the estimates of these organisations are comprehensive in terms of countries 
included, estimates are not for the full suite of greenhouse gases (only carbon dioxide) nor do 
they consider emissions from sources other than the consumption of fossil fuels. This is 
significantly less data than is available for developed (Annex 1) countries reporting in the 
'common reporting format' . 
The recent experience of carbon dioxide emissions by Russia, India and Brazil all differ 
(see figure 5.1). Russia's emissions fell dramatically during the 1990s in line with the 
economic restructuring experienced during this time. India's carbon dioxide emissions have 
increased at a rapid pace, in line with its recent strong economic growth. Whilst Brazil's 
carbon dioxide emissions have also increased, they have done so at a less accelerated rate 
than India. 
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Figure 5.1. Comparison of Total CO2 Emissions (of total fuel combustion) 
The per capita emissions for Russia closely resemble the trends of its total carbon dioxide" 
emissions. However, per capita emissions growth is more than half of that of total carbon 
dioxide emissions for Brazil and just under half of that for India. This is due to the very 
strong population growth in both Brazil and India compared to very little population growth 
in Russia for the same period, 1990 to 2005 (see figure 5.2). 
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Figure 5.2. Comparison of Per Capita CO2 Emissions (of tot a! fuel combustion) . 
This chapter will separately consider the distinct circumstances of Russia, India and 
Brazil in order to better understand the manner in which each country can effectively 
participate in the next international climate control protocol. The section on Russia will 
consider its reduction of carbon dioxide emissions in light of its transition from communism 
and its subsequent economic collapse. Section Three will consider India non-intentional 
carbon dioxide emission mitigation policies, before Section Four will review Brazil's 
alternative fuel policies and the role of the Amazon in addressing climate change. The chapter 
is concluded in Section Five. 
2. RUSSIA 
Russia has significant reserves of non-renewable fuel resources. Russia has the world's 
largest proven gas reserves, the second largest coal reserves and the seventh largest fuel 
resources
3
• Greenhouse gases emitted in the Russian Federation fell dramatically through the 
1990s in line with the severe economic collapse associated with the economic re-structuring 
from a command economy to a transitional market economy. As this process has now largely 
been completed, economic activity in the Federation has increased markedly in recent years, 
as have carbon dioxide emissions. However, despite this recovery, carbon dioxide emissions 
from fuel combustion are one-third less in 2005 than in 1990. 'The contraction of Russian 
industry in the 1990s led to a sharp fall in the country's energy-related emissions of carbon 
dioxide. Emissions feel by 21 percent between 1992 and 2002. But the carbon intensity of the 
Russian economy remains high, because of inefficient technology and waste. Russia's carbon 
dioxide emissions per unit of GDP in PPP terms were 211 percent higher than in the OECD 
British Petroleum (BP) (2007), BP 2007: Statistical Review of World Energy, BP, London. 
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and 205 percent higher than in developing countries in 2002. Russia's per capita emissions 
are also among the highest in the world ,4. 
According to lEA estimates, the Russian Federation's carbon dioxide emissions fell 33 
percent to 1553 million metric tonnes of carbon equivalent between 1990 and 2005. This is 
primarily as a result of its collapsing economy. Despite this fall however, it was the world's 
third highest emitting country in 2005. Just over 50 percent of fossil fuel carbon dioxide 
emissions come from gas consumption, while around one quarter results from coal 
consumption. 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
Table 5.2. lEA estimates of CO2 emissions from Fuel Combustion 
CO2 
Emissions 
(millionmetric 
tonnes) 
2304.66 
2145.76 
1935.27 
1865.04 
1646.97 
1582.03 
1571.64 
1488.30 
1444.84 
1493.70 
1516.16 
1521.58 
1509.39 
1554.54 
1550.83 
1553.67 
Population 
148.29 
148.62 
148.69 
148.52 
148.34 
148.14 
147.74 
147.30 
146.90 
146.31 
146.30 
145.95 
145.30 
144.60 
143.85 
143.11 
Per capita 
CO2 
Emissions 
(tonnes) 
15.54 
14.44 
13.02 
12.56 
11.10 
10.68 
10.64 
10.10 
9.84 
10.21 
10.36 
10.43 
10.39 
10.75 
10.78 
10.86 
Source: lEA 2007 
Despite a similar reduction in per capita emissions, Russia's per capita emission rate of 
10.86 metric tonnes is above the global average of 4.30 metric tonnnes. 
These reductions in lEA estimates are in line with data compiled by the UNFCCC5. 
According to this data, the Russian Federation is producing 27 percent less greenhouse gas. 
emissions than it did in 1990. Therefore, according to the conventions contained in the Kyoto 
Protocol, Russia is able to sell its surplus emission reductions under emission trading systems. 
However, if Russia's emissions continue to grow as its economy recovers from its 
restructuring, future surplus emissions reductions appear unlikely and unsustainable. 
Between 1996 and 2006, Russia's oil consumption fell from 130.1 million tonnes to 
128.5 million tonnes. This is decrease of just over one percent compares to the increase in 
world consumption for the same time of 16 percent. Coal consumption in Russia decreased by 
nearly three percent from 115.7 million tonnes of oil equivalent (mtoe) to 112.5 mtoe, 
4 International Energy Agency (lEA) (2004), World Energy Outlook, lEA, Paris, p. 326 
http://unfccc.intlghg_ emissions _ data/ghg_ data_from _ unfccc/time _series _annex _ ilitems/3 842.php accessed 18 
February, 2008. 
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compared to the worldwide increase of only 31 percent for the same period. Primary energy 
consumption decreased nine percent from 647.2 mtoe to 704.9 mtoe compared to the increase 
in world consumption levels of 23 percent (see table 5.3). 
As a former command economy, the shift to a market economy has placed great stress on 
individuals, firms and governments. Vertically integrated monopolies within the utility sector 
have been restructured and privatized, but this has resulted in increases in consumer prices. 
The Russian government continues to have balance the demands of its populations to retain 
subsidies for energy and the demands by market forces to remove these subsidies. 'Reform of 
electricity and gas pricing is a critical element of energy-market restructuring. Domestic 
energy prices rose much less than average producer prices in the 1990s, depriving the energy 
sector of investment funds and encouraging continued waste. Consumers had little incentive 
to conceive energy or use it more efficiently. Cross-subsidies remain enormous; the average 
electricity price paid by industry in 2002 was 45 percent higher than that paid by households. 
In OECD Europe, average prices charged to industry are around 50 percent lower than those 
paid by households,6. (original italics) 
In order to gain EU support for entering the World Trade Organisation, the Russian 
government has committed itself to reduce these subsidies. As a result, energy prices has 
increased significantly in recent years. Between 2000 and the first quarter of 2004, real gas 
prices increased 70 percent. Further, the Russian government has also agreed to increase 
average gas prices to industry from the 'current US$27 per thousand cubic metres to between 
US$37 and US$42 in 2006 and between US$49 and US$57 in 2010,7. 
2.1. Obstacles to Emissions Mitigation 
There are a number of obstacles to improving energy efficiency in Russian industries. 
Most Russian business have large debts are unable to afford investment in cleaner or more 
efficient technology and infrastructure. There is great uncertainty over the future of these 
businesses and this also limits investment in new technologies. Many Russian businesses lack 
proper energy management at the business level and so simple and easy energy saving 
activities cannot be implemented. There is non-transparent ownership and management issues 
that also reduce the ability to invest in energy efficient technology. Disincentives also exist 
from outside of the individual business. There are no incentives for energy conservation at the 
state level and the present tax regime actually works against installing new energy-efficient 
equipment. Finally, at the national level, there is an absence of an energy efficient 
infrastructure or even the plans for the development of such an infrastructure. 'There is still 
plenty of scope for reducing energy intensity and improving the efficiency of energy use in 
specific end-uses in Russian industry. In most industrial sectors, the amount of energy used 
per dollar of value added is considerably higher than in the largest OECD countries, although 
6 
7 
International Energy Agency (lEA) (2004), World Energy Outlook, IEA, Paris, p. 291. 
International Energy Agency (IEA) (2004), World Energy Outlook, IEA, Paris, p. 293. 
Table 5.3. Energy data for Russian Federation, OEeD and World 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 percent Change 
from 1996-
2006 
Oil consumption (millions 
oftonnes) 
Russia 130.1 129.1 123.7 126.2 123.5 122.3 123.5 123.4 124.1 123.3 128.5 -1.23 
OECD 2114.4 2146.3 2151.9 2188.7 2199.8 2197.6 2190.9 2223.0 2266.9 2279.7 2259.0 6.83 
World 3347.0 3433.2 3449.0 3517.0 3556.2 3572.6 3606.6 3675.3 3813.7 3861.3 3889.8 16.23 
World (w/o China) 3173.2 3237.2 3252 3307.4 3332.6 3344.7 3359.2 3403.6 3494.8 3533.5 3540.0 11.56 
Coal consumption (million 
tonnes of oil equivalent) 
Russia 115.7 106.3 100.0 104.1 106.0 109.0 103.9 109.4 106.8 111.6 112.5 -2.77 
OECD 1077.2 1083.5 1085.0 1073.1 1122.7 1114.5 1121.1 1l48.7 1160.7 1169.7 1171.5 8.8 
World 2355.8 2340.3 2285.8 2276.6 2364.3 2384.8 2437.2 2632.8 2805.5 2957.0 3090.1 31.2 
World (w/o China) 1626.4 1640.1 1633.9 1620.4 1696.9 1703.5 1723.4 1779.7 1827.3 1861.1 1898.8 16.75 
Primary Energy 
consumption (million 
tonnes of oil equivalent) 
Russia 647.2 610.9 611.4 621.1 636.0 637.5 646.6 655.6 666.1 672.5 704.9 8.9 
OECD 5104.0 5154.1 5176.5 5247.8 5359.6 5327.7 5366.4 5421.9 5522.9 5559.9 5553.7 8.8 
World 8857.9 8929.5 8941.5 9071.1 9308.7 9368.6 9548.9 9856.5 10323.4 10624.0 10878.5 22.8 
World (w/o China) 7892.8 7968.6 8024.6 8137 8342 8368.6 8491.1 8627.8 8899.9 90573 9180.7 16.32 
Source: BP Statistical Review of Word Energy, 2007. 
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energy intensity has fallen significantly since the early 1990s as the most inefficient plants 
have closed. Higher energy intensity in Russian industry is in large part due to its relatively 
low level of energy efficiency, which in tun is due to outdated technology and waste. Over the 
years, low energy prices gave little incentive to firms to use more efficient technology and 
stamp out waste. In the iron and steel industry, for example, one tonne of output required 0.31 
toe of energy input in 2002, compared with 0.17 toe in the United States, O.l2toe in Germany 
and 0.10 toe in Japan. Russia's industrial energy intensity has, nonetheless fallen by more 
than 10 percent since 1998,1. 
As Russian economic reforms stabilize and its economy grows, it is unlikely that the 
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions recently seem will be sustained. Unless Russia 
implements new mitigation policies and receives investment assistance from wealthier 
countries, its future emissions are likely to grow and have significant deleterious impacts on 
an global efforts to reduce greenhouse gas concentration levels within the atmosphere. 
3. INDIA 
India ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1993 and 
the Kyoto Protocol in 2002. As with other developing countries though, India was not 
expected to mitigate its greenhouse gas emissions within these international instruments. Yet, 
India is the world's fifth highest greenhouse gas emitting country. Average growth in fossil 
fuels carbon dioxide emissions since 1950 has been just under 6 percent, with total emissions 
having risen by nearly 60 percent since 1990. India is the world's third largest producer of 
coal and coal consumption is its major source of carbon dioxide emissions. Presently, nearly 
three quarters of fossil fuel emissions came from coal consumption (though this is down from 
87 percent in 1950). Oil consumption accounts for nearly 20 percent of carbon dioxide 
emissions. Of equal importance in India is the effect of local pollution due to this fuel 
consumption. Nearly half a million people die each year from pollution-induced illness2• 
Whilst emissions continue to grow in India, growth in these energy-related carbon 
dioxide emissions has been reduced3 through economic restructuring, enforcement of existing 
clean air laws, and renewable energy programs over the last decade. Future strategies for 
carbon reduction include improved efficiency in both energy supply and demand, fuel 
switching from coal to gas, power transmission improvements, and a reversal of 
deforestation4. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
International Energy Agency (lEA) (2004), World Energy Outlook, lEA, Paris, p. 298. 
International Energy Agency (lEA) (2004), World Energy Outlook, lEA, Paris. 
That is to say, emissions have continued to grow, but the pace of this growth has fallen. 
Pew Centre on Global Climate Change (Pew) (2002), Climate Change Mitigation in Developing Countries, 
Pew Centre, Arlington. 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
Other Key Developing Countries: Russia, India and Brazil 
Table 5.4. lEA estimates of CO2 emissions from Fuel Combustion 
CO2 
Emissions 
(million 
metric 
tonnes) 
597.66 
636.27 
673.72 
698.92 
738.01 
796.90 
835.46 
877.94 
892.77 
968.74 
977.72 
995.82 
1028.11 
1055.79 
1146.31 
1190.88 
Population 
849.52 
866.53 
882.82 
899.33 
915.70 
932.18 
948.76 
965.43 
982.18 
999.02 
1015.92 
1032.47 
1048.64 
1064.40 
1079.72 
1094.58 
Per capita 
CO2 
Emissions 
(tonnes) 
0.70 
0.73 
0.76 
0.78 
0.81 
0.85 
0.88 
0.91 
0.91 
0.97 
0.96 
0.96 
0.98 
0.99 
1.06 
1.09 
Source: lEA 2007. 
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India's large population (now over 1 billion people) has resulted in carbon dioxide per 
capita emissions rate being well below the global average at only 1.08 metric tonnes. This 
does represent though an increase of over fifty percent since 1990 (see table 5.4). 
3.1. Recent Emission Growth 
India is the world's second most populous country and despite having a large portion of 
its population (around one-third) living below the poverty line, it is the world's fourth largest 
economy. 
During the 1990s, India's economy grew on average just over 6.5 percent per annum, 
almost doubling in size within this period. However, energy use grew slightly faster at 7 
percent per annum and demand for electricity grew at 8 percent per annum. Despite this 
growth, India's per capita electricity use is one-half of China's and one-sixth of the world's 
average. (This is primarily a factor of over 440 million people lacking access to electricity.) 
As a result, India's per capita greenhouse gas emissions are amongst the lowest in the world 
India's industrial development has been fuelled by energy derived from coal5• Coal 
accounts for 55 percent of primary energy use, oil accounts for 31 percent, gas accounts for 8 
percent, hydro for 5 percent and nuclear for 1 percent. The industrial sector produces around 
two-thirds of all energy-related carbon dioxide emissions. The transport sector produces 16 
percent, the residential sector produces 14 percent and the commercial sector 3 percent. 
5 Pew Centre on Global Climate Change (Pew) (2002), Climate Change Mitigation in Developing Countries, 
Pew Centre, Arlington. 
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India's growth has come at a high price - domestically this equates to worsening air pollution, 
and globally this equates to increased greenhouse gas emissions. 
Between 1996 and 2006, India's oil consumption increased from 81.1 million tonnes to 
120.3 million tonnes. This increase of 48 percent is far greater than the increase in world 
consumption for the same time, which was only 11 percent. Coal consumption in India 
increased by 54 percent from 154.4 million tonnes of oil equivalent (mtoe) to 237.7 mtoe, 
compared to the worldwide increase of 31 percent for the same period. Primary energy 
consumption increased 55 percent from 271.5 mtoe to 423.2 mtoe compared to the increase in 
world consumption levels of 22 percent. 
3.2. Unintentional Mitigation 
Due to various factors, it is estimated that India's present greenhouse gas emissions have 
been reduced over the past decade because of: 
• economic restructuring 
• local environmental protection 
• technological change 
• enforcement of clean air laws 
• renewable energy incentives 
The adoption of new and efficient technologies and the expansion of non-energy 
intensive industries have resulted in the gradual decline of industrial energy intensity over the 
past decade. (However, Indian industry is still highly energy intensive when compared to the 
rest of the world). 
Biomass accounts for nearly one-third of the total energy use. This should not be 
surprising, as over 440 million people in India do not have access to electricity. Biomass is 
used for cooking energy needs for nearly all rural households and nearly half of urban 
households6• 
Despite the declining carbon intensity levels in the later half of the 1990s, India's carbon 
emissions have increased by 63 percent since 1990. 'This emissions growth results primarily 
from energy use associated with economic development and heavy dependence on coal,7. 
India's fuel quality, technology standards, infrastructure and operating practices was 
improved over the past decade through market reform driven by domestic policy and 
international dynamics. Power and liquid fuel pricing now occurs within the market place 
rather than being centrally planned as in the past. Some subsidies still exist, for example, LPG 
for household cooking, but nearly two-thirds of current prices cover the actual cost. 
The coal sector is being successfully restructured through a combination of privatization, 
price reform and technological improvements. The Indian coal price is now near world price 
as subsidies have been removed. Therefore, there is not a false demand leading to higher 
carbon emissions. Technology has improved stoves, reduced gas flaring in fossil-fuel 
6 
7 
Shuckle, R. (1996), Wood Energy and Global Climate Change, World Energy News, FAO, Bangkok. 
Mashelker, R. et aI., (2002), Report of the Expert Committee on Auto Fuel Policy, Ministry of Petroleum and 
Natural Gas, Government of India, New Dehli. 
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production, improved both demand- and supply-side efficiencies and introduced modem 
renewable energy systems. These technology advances equate to 18 million less tons of 
carbon emissions each year. 
India's motor vehicle stock has also changed considerably over the past decade. There 
has been a rapid penetration of foreign brands and European emissions standards have now 
been adopted in the major cities of India. Such standards improve local air quality but also 
result in more energy efficient cars leading to reduce greenhouse gas emissions8. 'The Indian 
electricity sector has long been carbon intensive and the largest source of carbon dioxide 
emissions. In 2000, the sector emitted 115 million tons of carbon, about 42 percent of India's 
carbon emissions. Natural gas has penetrated this market in recent years and helped to reduce 
the carbon intensity of electric power generation. Improvement in the combustion efficiency 
of conventional coal technologies along with strong promotion of renewable technologies has 
made measurable contributions to mitigation. Improved combustion in coal-fired power 
plants slowed the growth of carbon emissions by 2.5 million tons between 1990 and 2000. 
The Indian government has set a goal of using renewables for 10 percent of new power 
generating capacity by 2010,9. 
Gas flaring has fallen from 29 percent of gas production in 1990 to only 6 percent in 
2000 through the support of government investment in natural gas collection and delivery 
pipelines. 
Over the past 20 years, India has developed a large renewable energy program. Over 3 
million small biomass gasification systems have been built to fuel cooking for a large 
percentage of rural households. The efficiency of wood stoves has been improved in 34 
million homes directly leading to reduced levels of deforestation. Government subsidies have 
made some solar power technologies available and similar subsidies support the installation 
of wind, small hydro, biomass and industrial waste-based electricity generation technologies. 
Given the huge domestic market in India, the small and successful introduction of these 
renewable technologies bodes well for future use. 
Deforestation rates in India are amongst the lowest in the developing world. 'Forest 
conservation measures include prohibiting the use of forest land for non-forestry purposes, 
encouraging agroforestry and private plantations to meet industrial wood needs, and 
expanding areas under protection'lO. Since 1990, over 14 million hectares of forest were 
protected by such programs. 
8 Pew Centre on Global Climate Change (Pew) (2002), Climate Change Mitigation in Developing Countries: 
9 
Brazil, China, India, Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey, Pew Centre, Arlington, p. 22. 
Pew Centre on Global Climate Change (pew) (2002), Climate Change Mitigation in Developing Countries: 
Brazil, China, India, Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey, Pew Centre, Arlington, p. 24. 
10 Pew Centre on Global Climate Change (Pew) (2002), Climate Change Mitigation in Developing Countries: 
Brazil, China, India, Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey, Pew Centre, Arlington, p. 26. 
Table 5.5. Energy data for India, OEeD and World 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 percent Change 
from 1996-
2006 
Oil consumption (millions oftonnes) 
India 81.1 86.5 92.5 100.3 106.1 107.0 1l1.3 113.1 120.2 ll9.6 120.3 48.33 
OECD 2114.4 2146.3 2151.9 2188.7 2199.8 2197.6 2190.9 2223.0 2266.9 2279.7 2259.0 6.83 
World 3347.0 3433.2 3449.0 3517.0 3556.2 3572.6 3606.6 3675.3 3813.7 3861.3 3889.8 16.23 
World (w/o China) 3173.2 3237.2 3252 3307.4 3332.6 3344.7 3359.2 3403.6 3494.8 3533.5 3540.0 11.56 
Coal consumption (million tonnes of oil 
equivalent) 
India 154.4 160.2 159.8 158.9 169.1 172.1 181.7 188.4 206.4 222.0 237.7 54.00 
OECD 1077.2 1083.5 1085.0 1073.1 1122.7 1114.5 1121.1 1148.7 1160.7 1169.7 1171.5 8.8 
World 2355.8 2340.3 2285.8 2276.6 2364.3 2384.8 2437.2 2632.8 2805.5 2957.0 3090.1 31.2 
World (w/o China) 1626.4 1640.1 1633.9 1620.4 1696.9 1703.5 1723.4 1779.7 1827.3 1861.1 1898.8 16.75 
Primary Energy consumption (million tonnes of 
oil equivalent) 
India 271.5 285.6 296.0 304.0 320.4 324.2 338.7 348.2 380.1 401.6 423.2 55.90 
OECD 5104.0 5154.1 5176.5 5247.8 5359.6 5327.7 5366.4 5421.9 5522.9 5559.9 5553.7 8.8 
World 8857.9 8929.5 8941.5 9071.1 9308.7 9368.6 9548.9 9856.5 10323.4 10624.0 10878.5 22.8 
World (w/o China) 7892.8 7968.6 8024.6 8137 8342 8368.6 8491.1 8627.8 8899.9 9057.3 9180.7 16.32 
Source: BP Statistical Review of Word Energy, 2002. 
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However, whilst all these policies have had somewhat of a positive effective on 
greenhouse gas emissions, the effect has been a secondary and unintentional outcome. The 
purpose of these policies has been to increase economic efficiency ort to reduce domestic 
pollution. More optimal emission mitigation policies must now be designed and implemented 
with the primary purpose to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in line with global expectations 
and targets. 
4. BRAZIL 
Brazil is the largest country in Latin America and consumes approximately 40 percent of 
energy consumed within the region1• Yet Brazil's per capita emission are well below the 
world average - 1.78 metric tonnes compared to 4.30 metric tonnes - due to its high reliance 
on alternative and renewable fuel sources (see table 5.6). However, due to Brazil being highly 
populated (the fifth the most populous nation in the world) and having the world's ninth 
largest economy, Brazil remains a significant greenhouse gas emitter in absolute terms. 
Brazil produced 332.36 million carbon equivalent metric tonnes of carbon dioxide from 
fuel combustion in 2005, according to estimates calculated by lEA. This was the 19th highest 
in the world. Over two-thirds of emissions come from liquid fuel use and nearly one-fifth 
comes from burning coal. 
Table 5.6. lEA Estimates of CO2 Emissions (in thousands of carbon equivalent metric 
tonnes - except per capita) 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
Source: lEA 2007. 
CO2 
Emissions 
(million 
metric 
tonnes) 
202.27 
212.33 
215~69 
224.52 
234.92 
250.50 
273.29 
288.46 
297.95 
307.59 
313.19 
319.22 
320.25 
311.15 
326.44 
332.36 
Population 
149.39 
151.86 
154.25 
156.61 
158.98 
161.38 
163.82 
166.3 
168.81 
171.34 
173.86 
176.38 
178.90 
181.41 
183.91 
186.41 
International Energy Agency (lEA) (2004), World Energy Outlook, lEA, Paris. 
Per capita 
CO2 
Emissions 
(tonnes) 
1.35 
1.40 
1.40 
1.43 
1.48 
1.55 
1.67 
1.73 
1.77 
1.80 
1.80 
1.81 
1.79 
1.72 
1.77 
1.78 
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Due to policies taken in the past that were unrelated to greenhouse gas emISSIons 
mitigation, Brazil's structure of primary energy use is based upon renewable sources resulting 
in low greenhouse gas emissions. 'This focus on renewable energy sources was a 
consequence of a policies addressed at increasing Brazilian energy independence, as the 
country had few known oil reserves and very poor coal reserves, whilst having rich renewable 
resources,2. Brazil focused on aggressive biofuel and energy efficiency programs aimed at 
reducing energy imports and diversifying energy supplies, introducing various measures to 
reduce dependence on energy imports, diversify energy supplies, reduce domestic 
environmental impacts and increase energy efficiency. Brazil also implemented a number of 
domestic policies that have had flow-on effects for mitigation of emissions. The domestic 
policies include the government sponsoring and support of ethanol and sugar-cane bagasse3 
production and use, development of a natural gas market and the use of alternative energy 
sources for power generation. However, as noted, the purpose of these domestic policies was 
primarily to reduce a reliance on imported energy rather than specifically trying to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
However, Brazil's focus on alternative energy sources has been reversed somewhat over 
the past decade. In more recent times, Brazil has experienced rapid economic growth and 
expanded industrialization causing a greater reliance on fossil fuels for energy needs leading 
to greater greenhouse gas emissions. This has led to a softening or reversal of these 
alternative energy policies. Thus, the 'characteristic of Brazil's energy system ... is changing 
as a consequence of the abrupt and deep changes in policy which are occurring. These 
changes are resulting in the substitution of the fleet of alcohol-fuelled care by gasoline-fuelled 
cars and the substitution of charcoal by coke in the iron and steel industry. There is also the 
prospect of a sharp increase in the use of natural gas and coal for electricity generation in 
substitution ofhydro,4. 
Between 1996 and 2006, Brazil's oil consumption increased from 81.3 million tonnes to 
92.1 million tonnes. This increase of 13 percent was less than the increase in world 
consumption for the same time, which was 16 percent. Coal consumption in Brazil increased 
by 16 percent from 11.3 million tonnes of oil equivalent (mtoe) to 13.1 mtoe, compared to the 
worldwide increase of only 31 percent - though if you remove China's increase in coal 
consumption then the global increase for the same period wa~ of similar proportion to that 
experienced by Brazil. Primary energy consumption increased 30 percent from 158.3 mtoe to 
206.5 mtoe compared to the increase in world consumption levels of 23 percent (see table 
5.11). 
2 
3 
4 
Poole, A, Hollanda, J. and Tolmasquim, M. (1998), Energy Conservational and Greenhouse Gas Emissions in 
Brazil, Instituto Nacional De Eficiencia Energetica, Brazilia., p. 8. 
Bagasse is the pulp that remains after the sugar cane has had its juice extracted. It can be used for paper pulp 
or more commonly for as fuel (through combustion). 
Poole, A, Hollanda, 1. and Tolmasquim, M. (1998), Energy Conservational and Greenhouse Gas Emissions in 
Brazil, Instituto Nacional De Eficiencia Energetica, Brazilia., p. 29. 
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4.1. Mitigation in Brazil 
There are two main areas of greenhouse gas emission mitigation that are central to 
analyzing Brazil's present and future contribution to climate change: power generation and 
the Amazon forest. 
Power Generation - Renewable Energy 
Brazil's alternative energy policies began in the 1950s in order to overcome reliance on 
fuel imports and take advantage of its own natural resources. Despite the effectiveness of 
hydro-power (which was the primary focus of this alternative energy policy), government 
policy shifted in the mid to late 1990s in an attempt to increase energy capacity in line with 
energy demand. While, hydroelectricity plants were able to keep pace with Brazil's growing 
demand for electricity in the past, the rapid electricity demand growth in the 1990s 
outstripped increased production resulting in power cuts, black outs and rationing programs. 
'During the 1990s, energy demand, on account ofa growing economy and a rising standard of 
living, had been consistently outstripping increments in generation capacity. In 2000, 
consumption was about 58 percent higher than it was in 1990, whilst installed generation 
capacity grew about 32 percent during the same period's. A long-term drought caused much 
of these shortages by temporarily reducing the capacity of hydroelectricity plants. For 
example, due to a severe drought between 2001 and 2002, Brazil suffered electricity 
shortages and price increases. While hydroelectricity accounted for 91 percent of all 
electricity generated in 1999 this fell to around 80 percent during the drought and has not 
increased since despite the drought ending6. This failure to recapture its previous market share 
is largely a result of persistent underinvestment in hydro-power infrastructure (which was 
exacerbated by the drought, but was pre-existing for many years). 
The on-going pressure to move away from hydro-generation remains high. Despite the 
Brazilian government's long-held support of hydro-power, dating back to the 1950s, market 
forces are now largely determining current energy policies. This shift dates back to the mid 
eighties, when Brazil's power sector went through a serious financial crisis and had to 
severely reduces the expansion of generation and interrupted the construction of many power 
plants, mostly hydro. It is unlikely therefore that 'the share of hydro in the expansion of 
generation observed in the past will occur again,7. 
Ethanol is a second renewable energy source widely used in Brazil. Policies supporting 
the ethanol industry began in 1975 following the first energy crisis. These policies included 
low-interest loans for building distilleries, ethanol purchase guarantees, price fixing and sales 
tax reductions. Sixty per cent of sugarcane produced in Brazil is used to produce ethylic 
alcohol fuel either as a form of pure substitution or as a blend with gasoline. Brazil undertook 
this substitution policy during the first energy crisis to reduce the country's dependence on oil 
imports. Unlike other countries that attempted such substitution, Brazil's the world's most (if 
not only) successful program to substitute transport fuel from non-renewable to renewable 
energy sources. 
5 
6 
7 
Energy Information Administration (ErA) (2003), Russia, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/russia.html, p. 9. 
International Energy Agency (lEA) (2004), World Energy Outlook, lEA, Paris. 
Energy Information Administration (EIA) (2003), Russia, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/russia.html, p. 
10. 
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The Brazilian government also supported the manufacturing of pure ethanol-fuelled cars. 
Purchases of such cars reflect movements in the price of sugar. When international sugar 
prices were very low from the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s, almost 90 percent of cars sold in 
Brazil were fuelled by pure ethanol. When sugar prices rose in the late 1990s and a shortage 
of ethanol fuel resulted, sales of pure ethanol cars fell to almost zero. Presently, ethanol 
fueled cars account for about 25 percent of total cars sales, or around 4-5 million cars per 
year. It is estimated that ethanol or ethanol-blended gasoline cause over 5 million tons fewer 
carbon emissions to be emitted annually8. 
Power Generation - non-Renewable 
Brazil does have substantial non-renewable fuel reserves. However, knowledge of these 
reserves is relatively recent. Brazil's previous energy policies were developed and 
implemented in ignorance of these natural reserves. Indeed, it is highly likely that had the 
Brazilian government known about these reserves, that it would not have invested and 
pursued its renewable energy policies. As a result therefore, it is further likely that Brazil's 
greenhouse gas emissions would be significantly higher today. 
In a deliberate effort to diversify Brazil's energy supply, the government has recently 
begun promoting natural gas use. Whilst the use of natural gas to generate energy in Brazil is 
quite low - only three per cent of primary energy comes from natural gas - Brazil has large 
natural gas reserves. In fact. Brazil's reserves are the fifth largest in South America, behind 
Venezuela, Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru. Power-supply has also been liberalized to increased 
c'ompetition and open new market opportunities for new gas-fired cogeneration plants. 
Brazil's natural gas consumption and production rose steadily throughout the 1990s. 'Natural 
gas production reached its highest level in 2000 at 257 billion cubic feet (bfc), but declined in 
2001 by 18 percent mainly due to an economic downturn,9. In 2001, Brazil faced severe 
power shortages and initiated a pricing system to encourage a 20 percent reduction in energy 
consumption. In addition, greater investment was made in gas-fired cogeneration plants to 
encourage a move away from the use of fuel oil in energy production. It is possible to build 
small-scale cogeneration plants (using natural gas) in very short time frames that are also very 
efficient with energy conversion of up to 85 percent. 
Brazil also has the second largest oil reserves in South America after Venezuela. Oil 
production has being rising steadily during the 1990s, averaging nearly 1.6 million bbl/d in 
2002. But consumption is still 2.2 million bb/d leaving import deficit of 0.4 bbl/d. Brazil is 
aiming for self-sufficiency through the large number of new areas for oil exploration being 
recently opened to international competition. 
The use of coal to generate electricity in Brazil is primarily limited to the domestic steel 
industry. Thus its impact on greenhouse emissions is quite modest. In 2006, coal consumption 
was 13.1 million tonnes of oil equivalent. According to the lEA, coal accounted for just over 
ten percent of carbon dioxide emissions associated with the consumption and flaring of fossil 
fuels. 
8 
9 
Energy Information Administration (EIA) (2003), Russia, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/russia.html 
Energy Information Administration (EIA) (2003), Russia, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/russia.html, p. 5. 
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The Amazon 
Brazil is an important country in terms of climate change, not necessarily because of its 
absolute emissions, but also because of the uncertainty surrounding the net effect on climate 
change of the Amazon. Brazil's current success in reducing carbon emissions has been 
primarily focused on its energy sector. Yet, land-use is responsible for twice as many 
emissions. The majority of Brazil's greenhouse gas emissions are a result ofland-use change, 
and more specifically, the deforestation of the Amazon forest. Future mitigation efforts must 
be concentrated in this area for substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions to be 
achievedlO• Uncertainty exists as to whether the Amazon is a net emitter or sink. This 
uncertainly rests primarily on the rates of deforestation (and reforestation). The most accurate 
data on deforestation is complied by the Brazilian National Institute of Space Research (INPE 
-lnstituto Nacional de Pesquisas Especiais)ll. 
The Amazon forest is the largest tropical forest in the world. It covers approximately 5.5 
million km2 and is thus larger than Europe. Sixty percent of the Amazon (around 3.5 million 
km2) is located in Brazil and makes up 40 percent of Brazil's land mass. 
Deforestation of the Amazon within Brazil is more than twice the forest lost annually to 
the world's second largest deforesting nation, Indonesia (25,540 km2 compared to 10,840 
km2). However, this large absolute loss is still only 0.5 percent of the total forest coverage 
and is thus quite modest12 • 
Most of the land clearing in the Amazon has occurred in areas of relatively open 
vegetation and this has serious implications for consideration of greenhouse gas emissions (as 
will be discussed latter). It is argued that less than 80 percent of the Amazon area would have 
been naturally forested in the absence of human intervention due to natural variations in 
vegetation coverage. The Amazon is not homogenous and it is important for analysts 
therefore to recognize 'that the region is really a mosaic of micro-environments, each with its 
own unique characteristics' 13. Whilst over half of the Amazon is covered by dense forest 
mass, the remaining forest is a mix of prairie, bush vegetation, low density forest, swamp 
forest, seasonal forest or other coverage. 
Table 5.7. Amazon Vegetation Types 
Vegetation Type 
Prairie/savanna (biomass< 5 ton/ha) 
Bush vegetation (5 < biomass < 50) 
Low-density forest (50 < biomass < 150) 
River-bank, mangrove and swamp forest 
Seasonal forest 
Dense forest mass (biomass> 150) 
Other or missing 
Percentage 
3 
16 
9 
9 
5 
55 
2 
Source: Andersen et al. 2002. 
10 
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Anderson, L., Granger, c., Reis, E., Weinhold, D. and Wunder, S. (2002), The Dynamics of Deforestation and 
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In the 1960s the first major expansion into the Amazon was supported by legislation with 
the aim of settling the Amazon and more fully incorporating it into Brazil. As a result 
migration to the forest has been primarily responsible for various destructive activities, 
including cropping, cattle-ranching and logging. 
Table 5.8. Historical Social and Economic Data for the Amazon 
Year Per capita Per capita Population Migration rates Farm Cattle herd 
income income growth (thousand) (% p.a.) area (% (million) 
(USDI985) (% p.a.) of area) 
1840 63 139 
1910 416 2.7 1217 
1920 95 -13.7 109J 6.0 
1940 147 2.3 1462 -1.00 7.1 1.0 
1950 155 0.5 1845 -0.01 6.5 0.2 
1960 193 2.2 2562 0.05 6.5 1.9 
1970 273 3.5 3603 0.06 6.5 3.3 
1980 906 12.5 5880 2.15 11.6 8.8 
Source: Andersen et al. 2002 
The debate surrounding deforestation has changed overtime. In the 1970s and 1980s the 
debate centred on the economic rationale of the deforestation and land-use (Le. cattle 
ranching). Uses of the standing forest that are non-destructive, such as sustainable non-timber 
forest product extraction, were believed to be both socially and economically superior to 
destructive uses requiring deforestation. But in the 1990s, various studies suggested that 
cattle-ranching was in fact economically viable. 'Finally, non-destructive alternatives such as 
non-timber forest product extraction, bio-prospecting, eco-tourism, and sustainable timber 
management were found to have much less economic potential than had been previously 
claimed' 14. More recently the role of the Amazon has also begun to be been considered in 
terms of global climate change 15. 
Data on deforestation is difficult to calculate. Two approaches are generally used - land 
surveys or satellite imagining. Deforestation figures based on land surveys differ to satellite 
measures as a 'land survey measure does not count abandoned land as cleared or deforested, 
while the satellite measure counts all areas that have once been cleared as deforested even if 
they show advanced forest re-growth' 16. Thus satellite data is gross deforestation, whilst land 
surveys are net deforestation. As such, estimates of deforestation based on satellite imaging 
are generally higher over time than rates based on land surveys. 
Annual deforestation (based on land surveys) during the early 1990s was below 
15,OOOkm2, but spiked to an inexplicable 29,OOOkm2 in 1995 before stabilising at more 
normal levels through the end of the 1990s. While these figures sound large, it must be noted 
that nearly all of the Amazon was untouched in 1970 with only around one percent being used 
14 
15 
16 
Anderson, L., Granger, c., Reis, E., Weinhold, D. and Wunder, S. (2002), The Dynamics of Deforestation and 
Economic Growth in the Brazilian Amazon, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 8. 
Nepstad (2007) The Amazon's Vicious Cycles, WWF International, Gland, Fearnside, P. M. (1997), 
Greenhouse gases from deforestation in Brazilian Amazonia: net committed emissions, Climatic Change, 35, 
321-360. 
Anderson, L., Granger, c., Reis, E., Weinhold, D. and Wunder, S. (2002), The Dynamics of Deforestation and 
Economic Growth in the Brazilian Amazon, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 41. 
Other Key Developing Countries: Russia, India and Brazil 81 
for crops or other planted pastures. While this has changed, the change has not been as 
dramatic as might be first thought. More recent data is yet to be available, however, a decade 
ago less than 15 percent of the Amazon had been deforested 17. 
Table 5.9. Deforestation Measures based on Satellite 
Imaginary and Land Surveys (% of total area) 
1975 1980 1985 
Land Survey 2.47 3.87 4.75 
Satellite Data 1.97 3.79 6.25 
Difference -0.50 -0.08 l.50 
1995 
5.90 
9.79 
3.89 
Source: adapted from Andersen et at. 2002. 
Nearly three quarters of all deforestation takes place within 50 km of a main road. This 
has serious consequences for modeling future deforestation. 'Some analysts believe that 
public policy in Brazil indirectly serves to increase emissions related to forestry. The major 
causes of deforestation include development of the highway transportation system, settlement 
programs, government incentives for agriculture, financing of large-scale projects such as 
hydro dams, and land speculation. More recently, some specialists have also cited the 
influence of export-orientated companies moving to the Amazon and Cerrado regions where 
they of, produce beef, and grow soybeans, all with detrimental impacts on the forests,lS. 
After a halt to this expansion during the 1990s, it appears that there are new plans to 
resume the development of the Amazon. The Avanca Brasil plan includes increased road 
paving, waterways, mining, logging, and hydroelectric initiatives. Further, the levels of 
private land that must be kept in a natural state will be relaxed. In the 1990s legislation was 
passed to 'develop a zoning system in the Amazon region that discriminated between areas 
where preservation was critical and where economic activities, under specific sustainable 
practices, could be undertaken .. .In addition, a certain share of all private property is required 
to be publicly registered as areas of permanent forest cover preservation. For the Amazon 
region this share increased from 50 percent to 80 percent in 1996,19. 
Pessimistic projections suggestion that these policies may led to up to only 5 percent of 
the Amazon remaining in pristine condition by 20202(). Others21 are more optimistic and have 
model the impact of Avanca Brasil on both economic growth and deforestation. They suggest 
that aft~r ten years of implementation, Avanca Brasil will result in simultaneous increases in 
GDP and reduced deforestation. This is primarily because much of the road building will be 
the transformation of unpaved roads to paved roads. Accumulated land clearing will fall by 
over 15,000 km2 during this period. 
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Table 5.10. Ten year impact of Avanca Brasil policies on economic growth and 
deforestation (by state) 
State Paved Unpaved Cleared area Urban Rural 
Roads Roads (change in %) GDP GDP 
Acre 84.0 -65.4 -3.1 4.0 11.5 
Amapa 148.3 -48.7 2.7 5.1 10.8 
Amazonas 21.5 -13.5 -1.9 0.1 2.1 
Goias/Tacantins 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Maranhao 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Matro Grosso 47.5 -13.3 -5.8 3.4 5.1 
Para 55.3 -34.2 -4.6 0.7 5.2 
Rondonia 4.2 -2.8 - -0.4 0.2 1.7 
Roraima 104.3 -4.0 -4.1 6.1 6.2 
Total 35.7 -13.2 -3.6 1.3 3.8 
Source: Andersen et al. 2002. 
It has been argued that reducing tropical deforestation rates (especially in the Amazon) is 
a relatively cheap way of reducing global greenhouse gas emissions compared to the 
abatement costs of reducing fossil-fuel consumption in the industrialized world22 • Such an 
approach however can be seen as disadvantageous to developed nations by denying poor 
countries the opportunities to prosper by utilizing their natural resources in much the same 
way the wealthy countries did two hundred years ago and whose current consumption 
patterns and energy needs are the main driver of greenhouse gas emissions and climate 
change. Preserving forests provides benefits to the wealthy but at a cost to the poor. 
Current understanding of the tropical forests' functions in the global eco-system is 
incomplete. Clearing too much forest may lead to catastrophic damages to the global life 
support systems However, improving the lives of many of Brazil's poor requires use of the 
Amazon and at times land clearing. It has never been fully established whether the Amazon is 
a net sink or net source of greenhouse gas emissions due to deforestation. Data for emissions 
caused by the Amazon vary from the Amazon being a net sink (absorbing carbon from the 
atmosphere) to emitting 400 million tons of carbon dioxide per annum. If the later estimates 
are correct, this would mean that deforestation emits 4 times as many greenhouse gases than 
the use offossil fuel and would make Brazil one of the world's largest emitters. 
The data on greenhouse gas emlSSIOns is thus contested. One studl3 found that 
deforestation within the Amazon emitted 270 million tC/year, while another24 found 
22 
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deforestation could cause emission between -44 to + 1 0 million tC/year. This significant 
difference between the two studies is primarily due to the 'massive carbon recomposition in 
secondary forests in the latter study' 25 . The work most cited in this discussion on Brazil is 
perhaps the most through and complete estimate currently available. Their range falls 
between these two estimates. 'The total carbon stock in Legal Amazonia declined from 74.7 
billion tons in 1970 to 72.1 billion tons in 1985, implying average annual emissions of 168 
million tC. This is a net affect rising from carbon release from the destroyed original 
vegetation (198 million tC/year) and carbon sequestration in secondary vegetation (-30 
million tC/year). Globally, annual carbon emissions amount to approximately 7.0 billion te, 
implying a contribution from Amazon deforestation of about 2.4 percent'26. Importantly, they 
consider the carbon emissions per hectare in different parts of the forest, as much of the 
clearing is of savanna not of dense forest (due to its proximity to roads and other previously 
cleared land). Simple extrapolations of carbon dioxide density can result in senous 
overestimates in emissions. 
Consideration should also be given to re-forestation. Re-forestation can have a large 
effect. 'If the approximately 350 million hectares of primary dense forest in the Brazilian 
Amazon, for example, increased its biomass with just 0.5 percent per year, then about 300 
million tC would be sequestered every year'27. This is greater than current estimate of carbon 
dioxide emitted from deforestation. 
Over four-fifths of the Amazon is still in its natural state. Obtaining a balance between 
the development needs of the local population and the importance to climate change for the 
global community lies at the centre of decisions as to its future. It is reasonable to argue 
therefore, that 'while Brazil is responsible for not wasting its natural resources without 
sufficient economic benefits to the country, the international community is responsible for 
providing incentives for Brazil to take their preferences into account. Since Brazil's Amazon 
region provides several types of services to the international community (carbon storage, 
biodiversity protection, recreational value, and existence value), it would seem most 
reasonable if these incentives take the form of payments for services rather than punishment 
for the reduction of these services,28. 
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Table 5.11. Energy data for Brazil, OEeD and World 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 percent Change from 
1996-2006 
Oil consumption 
(millions oftonnes) 
Brazil 81.3 86.8 90.0 92.5 91.6 92.9 91.6 87.8 88.4 90.1 92.1 13.28 
OECD 2114.4 2146.3 2151.9 2188.7 2199.8 2197.6 2190.9 2223.0 2266.9 2279.7 2259.0 6.83 
World 3347.0 3433.2 3449.0 3517.0 3556,2 3572.6 3606,6 3675.3 3813.7 3861.3 3889.8 16,23 
World (w/o China) 3173.2 3237.2 3252 3307.4 3332.6 3344.7 3359.2 3403.6 3494.8 3533.5 3540.0 11.56 
Coal consumption 
(million tonnes of oil 
equivalent) 
Brazil 11.3 11.5 11.4 11.9 12.5 12.2 ll.5 11.8 12.8 12.7 13.1 16.00 
OECD 1077.2 1083.5 1085.0 1073.1 1122,7 1114.5 1121.1 1148.7 1160.7 1169.7 1171.5 8.8 
World 2355.8 2340.3 2285.8 2276.6 2364.3 2384.8 2437.2 2632.8 2805.5 2957.0 3090.1 31.2 
World (w/o China) 1626.4 1640.1 1633.9 1620.4 1696,9 1703.5 1723.4 1779.7 1827.3 ' 1861.1 1898.8 16.75 
Primary Energy 
consumption (million 
tonnes of oil 
equivalent) 
Brazil 158.3 167.5 173.7 178.0 182.8 179.5 183.9 186.1 193.5 199.2 206.5 30.45 
OECD 5104,0 5154.1 5176.5 5247.8 5359.6 5327.7 5366.4 5421.9 5522.9 5559.9 5553.7 8.8 
World 8857.9 8929.5 8941.5 9071.1 9308.7 9368.6 9548.9 9856.5 10323.4 10624.0 10878.5 22.8 
World {w/o China~ 7892.8 7968.6 8024;6 8137 8342 8368.6 8491.1 8627.8 8899.9 9057.3 9180.7 16.32 
Source: BP Statistical Review of Word Energy, 2007. 
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This impetus for supporting Brazil preservation is further strengthen by the ethical 
consideration that as most wealthy countries have cleared about 95 percent of their own 
primary forests and enjoyed the associated economic benefits, it is not appropriate that a 
country such as Brazil should cease (or limit) deforestation without some recompense. 
Like other developing countries, Brazil's ability to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions 
will require international cooperation. While Brazil is home to forty percent of the Amazon, 
the importance of this forest to future climate change makes it a global resource. Brazil 
therefore requires additional assistance to manage it sustainability without disadvantaging its 
own citizens whose own efforts to increase their standard of living depend on utilizing it is 
less sustainable ways. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Developing countries are currently responsible for emitting significant amounts of 
greenhouse gas emissions. Further, it is expected that developing countries will emit an 
increasingly proportion of emissions in the future as their economies and populations 
continue to grow. It is also important therefore to consider the project growth of emissions 
from these countries. The International Energy Agency! has projected energy use (and 
subsequently carbon dioxide emissions) for most developing countries2 • 
The lEA projects that the Russian economy will grow four percent per annum on average 
between 2004 and 2010 before reducing to an average 2.8 percent per annum during 2010 to 
2030. This growth will triple income per capita over this period. Russia's energy demand is 
expected to increase at the average rate of 1.3 percent per annum between 2002 and 2030. 
Gas will continue to be the dominant fuel in the generation of electricity. It will grow on 
average 2.3 percent per annum to 2030. 
The lEA project that India's primary energy supply will increase 2.3 percent per annum 
between 2002 and 2030, the economy will increase 4.7 percent per annum during the same 
period, and energy consumption will increase 2.1 percent per annum. Average per capita 
energy consumption will increase by around a third to 479 kilograms of oil equivalent (kgoe) 
(which is still well below the average for all developing countries which average 810 kgoe). 
As the economy continues to modernise, the relative importance of biomass and waste as fuel 
sources will decline from 54 percent in 2002 to 36 percent in 2030 in favour of coal and oil. 
This modernization is reflected in estimates of energy intensity improvement of 2.3 percent 
per annum (historical energy intensity improvements between 1990 and 2002 was around two 
percent per annum). The residential sector will account for nearly half of total consumption 
(of which biomass will still account for two-thirds of this consumption). This suggests a 
widening gap between the energy consumption patterns of the residential sector and the 
commercial sector in terms of energy efficiency and fuel mix. Within this lEA scenario, 
carbon dioxide emissions will more than double by 2030. It is estimated that emissions will 
2 
International Energy Agency (lEA) (2004), World Energy Outlook, lEA, Paris. 
It may be that these projections underestimate considerably the emissions of some of these countries, such as 
India. See, for example, Sheehan, P., Jones, R., Jolley, A., Preston, B., Clarke, M., Durack, P., Islam, S., and 
Whetton, P. (forthcoming), 'Climate Change and the New World Economy: Implications for the Nature and 
Timing of Policy Responses', Global Environmental Change, accepted November 2007. This is also discussed 
in the previous chapter. 
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increase by 2.9 percent compared to 2.3 percent annual growth in primary energy demand and 
4.7 percent annual growth in GDP. This is primarily due to the coal being so important within 
the Indian fuel mix. 
The lEA have projected population growth of 0.8 percent per annum, lifting Brazil's 
population from 175 million to 220 million by 2030. Economic growth is predicted to 
increases on average three percent per annum for this same period. As a result, Brazil's 
primary energy demand will increase 2.5 percent per annum between 2002 and 2030. This 
demand is expected to be tempered by an improvement in energy intensity of 0.5 percent per 
year as its economic structure approaches that of DECD countries. Energy-related carbon 
dioxide emissions are expected to more than double between 2002 and 2030 despite the 
continuing wide use of hydropower and biomass fuels. 
Therefore, consideration of developing countries must be included in post-Kyoto 
international instruments to ensure effective stabilization of greenhouse gas concentration 
levels. 
Data on the full suite of emissions does not exist for developing countries and as such 
analysis is reliant on greenhouse gas emission data estimated by third parties. Whilst 
reasonably robust, these limitations remain however an important impediment to full and 
proper analysis of the impact of developing countries on global emissions. It also complicates 
and limits the detailed negotiation of international instruments in setting binding emission 
targets that include all countries. 
Greenhouse gas emission is presently not a public policy priority in most developing 
countries. More urgent issues include achieving higher economic growth, reducing the 
incidence and severity of poverty, and improving social outcomes such as health and 
education. Mitigation of emissions that has occurred has been a secondary (unplanned) 
outcome of other events. For example, Russia's dramatic falling emissions were a result of a 
collapsing economy resulting from the transition from a command to a market economy. 
Brazil's low emissions rates have been achieved through a strong alternative energy policy 
preference though this was developed, not to reduce greenhouse emissions, but to rather 
reduce reliance on fuel imports. India's mitigation policies are primarily focused on reducing 
local pollution (that kills 500,000 per year) rather than reducing emissions that cause global 
climate change. While these secondary outcomes are positive, greater mitigation could be 
achieved if reducing mitigation become a primarily goal within the public policies of 
developing countries. 
For this to occur, developing countries must be convinced of the need to reduce 
emissions and be offered incentives to do so. These incentives must address a range of 
pressing needs, such as poverty, disadvantage and insecurity. Developing countries must be 
involved in addressing climate change, but they must be involved in such a way that their 
development is not hindered or delayed. 
Developed countries have had the benefit of achieving high-income levels without 
serious constraint on their destruction of the global environment in doing so. As a result, 
developing countries no longer have this luxury available to them. The global community 
must address climate change with unity, but unity will only occur if new development 
strategies are devised that consider the real needs of the present poor with the needs of the 
future. 
These development strategies must be based upon the experiences of developed countries 
and particularly their recent technology and industry structural changes. Policies that support 
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an accelerated uptake of new technologies and industrial structure is part of the response that 
will allow global emissions to fall and therefore must underpin the next international climate 
change protocol. 
Chapter 6 
THE IMPACT OF THE KNOWLEDGE 
ECONOMY ON EMISSIONS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapters have noted the impact on total global greenhouse gas emissions by 
developing countries. These observations were made to strengthen the argument that 
developing countries must be included in the next international climate change protocol. 
Indeed, the argument presented in this book is that all countries, wealthy and poor, must 
equitably mitigate greenhouse gas emissions in order to properly address climate change. 
However, it is also recognized that developing countries experience, by their very definition, 
high levels of poverty. 
Poverty is characterized by premature death, preventable illnesses, limited access to clean 
water and sanitation, economic insecurity, and often illiteracy. Using the most common 
measure of poverty over one billion of the world's population live in poverty existing on less 
than US$1 a day (more than 2 billion live on less than US$2 a day)l. The international 
community, as espoused by the Millennium Development Goals, has committed to halving 
poverty within the next decade (interestingly the previous decade 1997-2006 was the United 
Nation's first Decade for the Eradication of Poverty), while others - most notably Jeffrey 
Sachs2 - has called for the world to end poverty completely within the next two decades. 
Poverty and development are intrinsically linked. Indeed they can be considered two 
sides of the same coin. Those that have not experienced development experience poverty. It is 
through the process of development that poverty is reduced. Development seeks to improve 
the lives of the poor. The reality of poverty should not be romanticized. It is harsh and 
inhumane. Children die unnecessarily, hunger is constant and basic needs go unmet. Those 
experiencing poverty lack freedom to determine their own lives and once in poverty it is often 
difficult for them to escape. If poverty is to end, it will require co-operation and good will at 
the international, national and local level. The international community has pledged to reduce 
poverty by half before 2015. Indeed, there has been a significant reduction in poverty 
2 
World Bank (2007), World Development Indicators, World Bank, Washington. 
Sachs, 1. (2005), The End of Poverty, Penguin, London. 
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particularly in China and other parts of Asia, though the experience of poverty in Africa, 
especially sub-Saharan Africa, has worsened3• 
Developing countries, must be allowed (and assisted and encouraged) to improve the 
lives of the poor and this will involve economic expansion. However, post-industrial history 
indicates that economic expansion is accompanied by growth in greenhouse gas emissions as 
growing economies consume energy and energy consumption produces greenhouse gas 
emissions. There is therefore a nexus between climate change and development. Securing 
improvements in the standard of living of the world's poor requires increased economic 
growth. But herein lies the paradox of this climate change - development nexus. Economic 
growth drives energy demand and energy consumption. Overwhelmingly, this energy is 
derived from the burning of fossil fuels for both electricity generation and transport, resulting 
in high levels of greenhouse gas emissions. -Economic growth therefore increases greenhouse 
gas emissions. Increased economic growth is good for the poor. Increased greenhouse gas 
emissions are bad for the global community (especially the poor). Thus achieving 
development will come at the cost of climate change. However, addressing climate change 
cannot equate to consigning the poor to continued premature death, illiteracy, sub-standard 
housing, preventable illness, etc. 
Overcoming this climate change - development nexus is therefore necessary and so there 
may be some usefulness in looking at the very recent experience in developed countries to 
suspend this nexus. This chapter will consider the impact on emissions within developed 
countries of changes both within technology and industrial structure. The purpose of 
considering this recent experience is to present a potential path forward for developing (and 
developed) countries to simultaneously participate in the next international climate change 
protocol through greenhouse gas emission mitigation plus to also continue striving to improve 
the lives of the poor. 
The next section of this chapter discusses the rise of the knowledge economy and 
presents two views of how this might impact on greenhouse gas emissions: optimistic and 
pessimistic. Section Three reviews the technological impact on emissions and emission 
intensities. Section Four considers how industrial structural changes brought about by the 
knowledge economy impacts on emissions. The joint impact of both technological change 
and industrial structural change on emissions are discussed in Section Five, before a specific 
case study of Australia's experience is considered in Section Six. This chapter is then 
concluded in Section Seven. 
2. THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 
The simultaneous rise of globalization and knowledge-intensive economic activities in 
the 1990s has resulted in a world economy now characterized by 'knowledge' as the major 
factor in production. It has become common to refer to the new set of activities, structures and 
arrangements emerging through that process of change as the knowledge economy4. The 
3 
4 
Kingsbury, D., McKay, J., Hunt, J., McGillivray, M. and Clarke, M. (2008), International Development, 
Palgrave-McMillian, London. 
see Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 1996, Employment and Growth in the 
Knowledge-Based Economy, OECD, Paris. 
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central tenet of the knowledge economy is the significance of knowledge to the global 
economic process. The knowledge economy is characterized by dual effect of industry 
structure change (primarily from manufacturing to service sectors), and an increase in 
knowledge-intensive activities5• 
Knowledge can now be quickly and cheaply delivered to where it is needed, be 
transformed as required and be made effective in machines and other production and service 
delivery processes. The degree of incorporation of knowledge into global economic activity is 
so significant, that it has caused structural and qualitative changes in how the world economy 
operates6• 
However, this is not a guaranteed solution for reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the 
future. Indeed, there is no clear indication of what the net effect of the knowledge economy 
will be on overall energy use. The historical trend of falling greenhouse gas emissions per 
unit of GOP has been observed in OECD countries since 1970, but there has been no absolute 
decline in greenhouse gas emissions from most DECO countries7• There are five possible 
effects that the rise of the knowledge economy may have on energy demand. These are: 
5 
6 
• Income effects - the rise of the knowledge economy will increase economic growth 
leading to higher incomes and thus increase demand for energy. As individual's 
incomes increase, so to does their consumption (but even if they do not consume, 
they must save their increased income and this in turn leads to increased investment). 
Increased consumption (or investment) requires increased production of goods and 
services and energy consumption is required to fuel this increased economic activity. 
• Price effects - the rise of the knowledge economy will affect productivity in different 
sectors leading to price changes and therefore change patterns of energy use. As 
different sectors within the economy increase or decrease in size, so to will returns to 
capital within these sectors. What once was profitable, will become less so, and what 
once was less profitable will become profitable. As rates of return differ, so too will 
economic activity within these sectors and therefore energy patterns will also change. 
• Production effects - the rise of the knowledge economy will increase GOP (primarily 
through the service sector) therefore energy intensities will fall. As less energy is 
required to produce services (and goods) within the knowledge economy, economic 
expansion within this economy will reduce total energy intensities across the entire 
economy. 
• . Efficiency gains effects - the rise of the knowledge economy will reduce energy 
demand through efficiency in business technologies such as web-based commerce. 
As the knowledge economy expands, so to will production and distribution 
efficiencies. These efficiencies will in tum reduce energy consumption, as less 
Chichilnisky, G. (1998), 'The Knowledge Revolution', The Journal of International Trade and Economic 
Development, 7(1); 39-54; and Xue, L. and Sheehan, P. 2002, 'China's Development Strategy', in B. Grewal 
et al. (eds), China's Future in the Knowledge Economy: Engaging the New World, Centre for Strategic 
Economic Studies, Victoria University, Melbourne and Tsinghua University Press, Beijing. 
Grewal, B. and Kumnick, M. (eds) (2002), Engaging the New World Order: Responses to the Knowledge 
Economy, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne; and Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (DEeD) 1996, Employment and Growth in the Knowledge-Based Economy, DECD, Paris. 
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energy will be required to produce the same outcome. This may include more 
efficient use of transport, or more efficient use of supply chain management, etc. 
• Fuel mix effects - the rise of knowledge economy will increase electricity use in 
overall energy demand leading to changes in the total fuel mix. As the knowledge 
economy has as its central pillar computerized technology, demand for electricity 
more than other energy types will increase. Electricity can be produced efficiently 
and with lower emissions than other energy types (depending on the infrastructure) 
and if electricity use becomes the dominant form of energy consumed within an 
economy, greenhouse gas emissions may decrease (if the infrastructure that produces 
electricity is old or relies on brown coal though, increased electricity demand may 
increase greenhouse gas emissions). 
Theoretical considerations of this impact of the knowledge economy fall into two broad 
camps, optimistic and pessimistic. The optimistic view is that the knowledge economy will 
allow greater economic output with less physical input and energy use will fall (and so to will 
greenhouse gas emissions). The pessimistic view is that whilst the knowledge economy may 
result in overall increased economic output, absolute greenhouse gas emissions will not 
reduce nor will there be a significant reduction in environmental inputs required for economic 
production. 
2~1. Optimistic View 
Within the optimistic view, the knowledge economy is seen as revolutionary. Knowledge 
has replaced land and capital as the main driver of economic growth. Since World War II 
economic growth has been resource-intensive and growth in industrial economies required 
extensive use of natural resources and particularly fossil fuels to supply the requisite energy 
needs. Economic growth meant producing more with more resources. Within the knowledge 
economy, economic growth is knowledge-intensive. This reduces resource use. 'This 
revolution brings the hope of a society in which economic progress need not mean 
increasingly extensive use of the earth's resources,B. The knowledge revolution will result in 
more being produced with less. This is because knowledge is a new type of input - it is non-
physical or weightless9 . Economic growth is no longer dependant on finite resources. As 
such, it 'is simply wrong to believe that nature sets physical limits to economic growth - that 
is, to prosperity and the production and consumption of goods and services on which it is 
based' 10. If more is produced with less, energy efficiency ratios fall relatively, leading to total 
energy use falling resulting in reduced greenhouse gas emissions. 'At this critical juncture, 
the knowledge revolution could offer an alternative model of human economic and social 
7 
B 
9 
10 
UNFcee (2007), 'GREENHOUSE GAS total with LULUCF', accessed at http://unfccc.int/greenhouse 
gas_emissions _data/greenhouse gas _ data_from _ unfccc/time _series _ annex_ ilitems/3814. php accessed on 
December 3, 2007. 
Chichilnisky, G. (1998), 'The Knowledge Revolution', The Journal of International Trade and Economic 
Development, 7(1): 39-54, p. 40. 
Quah, D. 2001, The Weightless Economy in Economic Development', in M. Pohjola (ed) Information 
Technology, Productivity and Economic Growth, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Sagoff: M. (1997), 'Do We Consume Too Much', The Allantic Monthly, 276 (6), 80-96, p. 83. 
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progress, one base less on the use of fossil fuel and environmental resources and more on 
human knowledge and the systems which disseminate and use it. A world where economic 
progress means achieving more with less, rather than doing more with more' 11 . 
Other optimistic predictions of the knowledge revolution include: 1) increase in equality 
as knowledge can be shared as a public good rather than hoarded as a private good (as 
occurred in the agricultural and industrial economies); 2) changes in how efficiency is 
understood, as efficiency within the knowledge economy is related to egalitarian ownership 
and access to knowledge (re-enforcing the above egalitarian tendencies); and 3) humans will 
be prioritized in economic policy over land or capital 12 • 
Developing countries are also likely to benefit from the knowledge economy according to 
the optimistic position. Since the process of development began in earnest following W orId 
War II, developing economies have specialized in the resources and resource-intensive 
products predominantly for the benefit of developed economies13 • The knowledge revolution 
offers the opportunity for developing economies to achieve growth other than the resource-
intensive kind. Developing countries will be able to develop more quickly (with less resource-
and energy-use) by moving directly from agricultural/resource economies to knowledge 
societies without an intermediate period of heavy (and dirty) industrialization. Such countries 
therefore have the opportunity to 'leap-frog' into a more prosperous future. 
2.2. Pessimistic View 
The alternative position on the impact of the knowledge economy is more pessimistic. 
This pessimism is focused on the supposed environmental effects of the knowledge economy 
(which encompasses energy use and subsequent greenhouse gas emissions). The debate 
around the benefits (or lack thereof) of the knowledge economy is hampered by the 
difficulties of defining knowledge and the problem of measuring knowledge. 
This more pessimistic view is that the knowledge economy will not have significant 
positive environmental consequences for a number of reasons. Firstly, not all knowledge is 
relevant to the environment. Secondly, some knowledge will worsen environmental quality 
by increasing the ability of anthropogenic stripping of resources. 'There is every sign that 
growth of critical environmental problems such as the loss of biodiversity, land degradation, 
climatic alteration and toxification of the biosphere have been strongly positively correlated 
with the growth of knowledge' 14. And thirdly, even if technology improves over time, there is 
little guarantee that this will off-set the changes in population and economic activity (which 
are the two other drivers of environmental impactl5 . 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Chichilnisky, G. (1998), 'The Knowledge Revolution', The Journal of International Trade and Economic 
Development, 7(1): 39-54, p. 46. 
Chichilnisky, G. (1998), 'The Knowledge Revolution', The Journal of International Trade and Economic 
Development, 7(1): 39-54. 
International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (1994), World Resources: People and the Environment, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford and; Chichilnksy, G. (1995/6), 'The Economic Value of the Earth's Resources', 
Trends in Ecology and Evolution, 135-40. 
Ehrlich, P., Wolff, G., Daily, G., Hughes, l, Daily, S., Dalton, M. and Goulder, L. (1999), 'Knowledge and 
the Environment', Ecological Economics, 30: 267-284, p. 270. 
see Ehrlich, P. and Holdren, J. (1971), 'Impact of Population Growth', Science, 171: 1212-1217. 
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Within the knowledge economy, the (separate though accompanying) shift in industry 
structure from the manufacturing sector to the service sector will also not necessarily result in 
a decrease in the total physical resources or environmental impacts caused by economic 
activity either. Some level of physical resource consumption is required for economic 
activity. Despite any increase in knowledge, a number of resources central to economic 
production do not have either substitutes or conceivable substitutes. Further, there are a 
number of manufactured goods in which there is also a lack of service-type substitutes 16. 'All 
production of economic goods and services - even if it involves nothing more than 
manipulation of information - requires the use of energy. And no means of providing energy 
is or can be free of resource consumption and environmental impact (although, of course, 
some means are better than others). There are ultimate (thermodynamic) as well as practical 
(economic) limits to how much the energy use connected with a given service can be reduced, 
and to how much the raw resource use and environmental impact of providing this energy can 
be reduced' 17. 
As such, it is unclear whether the rise of the knowledge economy has had a positive or 
negative net impact on the environment. The pessimistic view holds that it has not nor will in 
the future 18 • This view is based on historical records, as past advances in knowledge have 
often been detrimental to the environment. Thus it is reasonable to be pessimistic and 
skeptical as to the extent to which the knowledge economy will actually positively impact on 
climate change through reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
. The debate around the impact of the rise of the knowledge economy is thus clearly 
unresolved. As discussed, the knowledge economy is characterized by simultaneous shift in 
industrial structure from manufacturing to service sectors as well as increases in knowledge-
intensive activities. The impact ofthe knowledge economy on energy use and greenhouse gas 
emissions needs further analysis. Technological change has been widely studied but the 
question of changing economic structure has been largely ignored. Thus the question of the 
impact of continuing structural change associated with the rise of the knowledge economy is 
of central importance, and is one that has not yet been the subject of serious study. It is 
possible to estimate the separate effects each of these outcomes have on energy use through a 
number of techniques. 
3. TECHNOLOGICAL IMPACTS ON EMISSIONS 
AND EMISSIONS INTENSITIES 
Technology will impact on climate change, but the nature of this change is not clear. One 
method to analyse this impact is through the study of (implied or stated) carbon emission 
factors. As technological progress impacts upon both the relationship between economic 
activities giving rise to greenhouse gas emissions and the actual level of emissions, carbon 
16 
17 
18 
Cohen, S. and Zysmann, J. (1987), Manufacturing Matters: The Myth of the Post-Industrial Economy, Basic 
Books, New York. 
Ehrlich, P., Wolff, G., Daily, G., Hughes, J., Daily, S., Dalton, M. and Goulder, L. (1999), 'Knowledge and 
the Environment', Ecological Economics, 30: 267-284, p. 270-1. 
Dewick, P., Green, K. and Miozzo, M. (2002), Technological Change, Industry Structure and the Economy, 
Manchester School of Management, UMIST, Manchester. 
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emission factors can be analysed to capture this relationship. Carbon emissions factors can 
thus be analysed for changes both over time and between countries to investigate how 
technological progress may impact on climate change as carbon emissions factors (implied or 
stated) provide an analytical link between economic activities and emissions estimates. 
Methodologies to estimate the full suite of greenhouse gas emissions within these 
economic sectors change from country to country. The default methodology developed by the 
IPCC and ratified by the UNFCCC is based on specific consumption/production level carbon 
emissions factors. These carbon emission factors are generally based upon global averages 
(Tier 1) which are not as accurate as inventories estimated by carbon emission factors based 
upon country averages (Tier2) or site specific data (Tier 3). For example, Tier 1 methodology 
for non-carbon dioxide gas emission estimates by applying carbon emission factors to fuel 
statistics that are organized by sector. In reality, the emissions from these gases depend on the 
fuel type used, combustion technology, operating conditions, control technology, and on 
maintenance and age of the equipment. As the Tier 1 methodology ignores these refinements 
greenhouse gas emissions may be under- or over- stated but will become increasingly 
overstated as increasingly efficient technology reduces real carbon emission factors in various 
sectors and fields. 
Within the UNFCCC default methodology, carbon emission factors are central to the 
estimation of national greenhouse gas emissions inventories. Emission factors are multiplied 
by either production or consumption data to estimate emissions. Within country specific 
methodologies, which are now widely favoured by developed (annex 1) countries, implied 
carbon emission factors are estimated by dividing emissions by the relevant consumption or 
production data. 
In this way, carbon emission factors (either stated or implied) provide a link between 
consumption or production data within an economic sector and the greenhouse gas emissions 
estimates associated with various economic sectors. Carbon emissions factors can thus be 
analyzed for changes both over time and between countries to investigate how technological 
progress may impact on climate change. The lower the carbon emission factor, the more 
efficient the production. Technological change over time would intuitively decrease carbon 
emission factors. Emission intensity analysis is the ratio of emission to production per unit. 
Reducing this emission ratio is reliant on reducing carbon emission factors through 
technology improvements. Therefore, unlike total greenhouse gas emission analysis, the 
changing economic structure does not impact on this analysis. Technology is likely to have 
impacts in all sectors, but more likely to have larger impacts in energy, industry and waste. 
As the carbon emission factors for the agriculture and land-use sectors are predominantly 
determined by nature, opportunities for significant reductions in carbon emission factors are 
limited. It must be highlighted though that even if greenhouse gas emissions intensity levels 
do fall, total greenhouse gas emissions may continue to increase. Whilst production may 
become more efficient in terms of greenhouse gas emission outputs (falling carbon emission 
factors), increased production may outstrip these improvements and result in higher total 
greenhouse gas emissions levels. Therefore it is always important to remember that total 
greenhouse gas emission levels, not greenhouse gas emission intensity, determine climate 
change. 
As carbon emissions factors (implied or stated) provide an analytical link between 
economic activities and emissions estimates, movements and levels of these factors can be 
analysed to provide insights into technological change. Carbon emission factors can be 
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affected by technological change in such ways as lowering emISSIOns per output of 
consumption/production or changes in fuel mixes. Table 6.1 indicates the possible impact 
technological change may have both economic activities and carbon emission factors. 
Table 6.1. Summary Estimates of Knowledge Economy Impacts 
Sector Data Requirements Possible Impact of Knowledge Economy on 
Economic Activities Carbon Emission Factor 
Energy 
Production of primary fuels 
Imports, exports, stocks and bunkers 
of primary and secondary fuels 
Industrial Process 
Production data 
Agriculture 
No of specified animals 
Rice harvest areas by type of farming 
method 
Area of burned savannas 
Area of burned agricultural residues 
Soil types 
Land-use and Forestry 
Data on tree plantations (by type) 
Land converted (by type) 
Waste 
. Levels of waste produced by population 
DOC produced 
Industrial output by various sectors 
Mild Strong 
Mild Strong 
Mild Strong 
Low Low 
Low Mild 
Low Low 
Low Low 
Low Low 
Low Low 
Low Low 
Low Mild 
Low Mild 
Mild Strong 
Table 6.2. Emissions and Contribution to Emissions by Sector Europe 
1990 1995 2000 2005 
Gg CO2 eqv Gg C02 eqv Gg CO2 eqv Gg CO2 eqv 
Energy 3,262,733 3,184,639 3,242,678 3,357,392 
Industrial Processes 374,971 372,937 331,084 331,868 
Solvents 10,166 9,037 8,920 8,019 
Agriculture 434,327 413,086 412,580 386,252 
Land-Use Change and Forestry 
(LUCF) -217,412 -284,811 -287,720 -315,182 
Waste 175,641 169,105 139,319 109,104 
Total Emissions with LUCF 4,040,425 3,863,993 3,846,862 3,877,452 
% of Total Emissions with LUCF 
Energy 80.75 82.42 84.29 86.59 
Industrial Processes 9.28 9.65 8.61 8.56 
Solvents 0.25 0.23 0.23 0.21 
Agriculture 10.75 10.69 10.73 9.96 
Land-Use Change and Forestry 
(LUCF) -5.38 -7.37 -7.48 -8.13 
Waste 4.35 4.38 3.62 2.81 
Source: UNFCCC 2007. 
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It is interesting to note that the impact of technological change is greatest within the 
Energy and Industrial Processes sectors, which also are responsible for the overwhelming 
majority of total emissions (see table 6.2). 
3.1. Analyzing Carbon Emission Factors 
As mentioned, a significant number of calculations across the five economic sectors are 
made to estimate the national inventory of greenhouse gas emissions. As might be expected, a 
smaller number of consumption/production activities have a larger impact on the total 
emission levels than other activities. At a sectoral level, for example, economic activities 
within the Energy sector account for well over 85 percent of all carbon dioxide emissions. 
Over a fifteen-year period (1990-2005) this trend has increased slightly. The next largest 
contributors to carbon dioxide emissions are the Agricultural and Industrial Process sectors 
accounting for ten percent of carbon dioxide emissions each. 
Given the greater impact of technology on certain sectors, it is useful to analyze carbon 
dioxide emissions within the sub-sectors of Energy and Industrial Processes. Within the 
Energy sector, the contribution of emissions is more evenly spread across the main sub-
sectors. The energy industries sub-sector contributes around one third of all emissions whilst 
the "manufacturing, industries and construction" sub-sector, "transport" sub-sector and "other 
sectors" sub-sector each contribute around 20 percent of total emissions. The contribution 
within the Industrial Processes sector is less even distributed. The "mineral products" 
account for around three-quarters of emissions, the "metal production" sub-sector contributes 
about 15 percent, whilst the "chemical industry" sub-sector accounts for less than ten percent. 
This level of disaggregation is important has it allows identification of both the drivers of 
consumption/production of economic activities and the impact of technology on these 
economic activities that make significant contribution to a nation's national inventory of 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
Table 6.3. Fuel Consumption of Liquid Fuels - Energy Section 
1990 1995 2000 2005 
CO2 Emissions 
Gg UK 208,591 198,446 184,465 189,521 
Australia 88,184 92,909 101,343 113,173 
USA 2,124,043 2,175,341 2,428,629 2,607,686 
Consumption 
TJ UK 2,877,918 2,747,471 2,568,856 2,631,816 
Australia 1,323,945 1,391,815 1,521,083 1,667,065 
USA 33,755,78 34,895,974 39,095,603 41,390,907 
9 
CEF 
tonnes/TJ UK 72.48 72.23 71.81 72.01 
Australia 66.61 66.75 66.63 67.89 
USA 62.92 62.34 62.12 63.00 
Source: UNFCCC 2007 
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The (implied) carbon emission factors of liquid, gaseous, biomass and solid fuels within 
the Energy section have been selected for analysis as they represent a very large proportion of 
total carbon dioxide emissions. Tables 6.3, 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6 summarize movements in carbon 
dioxide emissions, consumption levels, carbon emission factors and output intensity levels for 
the United Kingdom, Australia and the United States for various type of fuel consumption 
within the Energy sector over an eleven year period, 1990-2005. This data is complied from 
these nations' annual reports to the UNFCCC using the common reporting format. 
Table 6.4. Fuel Consumption of Gaseous Fuels - Energy Section 
1990 1995 2000 2005 
CO2 Emissions 
Gg UK 108,856 148,309 203,588 200,293 
Australia 32,918 39,005 44,171 51,764 
USA 1,017,671 1,177,164 1,236,136 1,177,533 
Consumption 
TJ UK 1,890,082 2,574,833 3,535,140 3,486,056 
Australia 649,106 759,828 873,241 989,217 
USA 20,429,097 23,649,002 24,869,227 23,723,833 
CEF 
tonnes/TJ UK 57.59 57.62 57.59 57.46 
Australia 50.71 51.33 50.58 52.33 
USA 49.81 49.78 49.71 49.63 
Source: UNFCCC 2007. 
Table 6.5. Fuel Consumption of Solid Fuels - Energy Section 
1990 1995 2000 2005 
CO2 Emissions 
Gg UK 248,855 177,727 140,247 145,528 
Australia 132,603 156,489 176,292 193,794 
USA 1,699,344 1,810,414 2,060,757 2,107,979 
Consumption 
TJ UK 2,532,121 1,829,940 1,426,166 1,486,925 
Australia 1,456,777 1,699,794 1,940,694 2,130,043 
USA 19,135,234 20,290,423 23,081,737 23,705,275 
CEF 
tonnes/TJ UK 98.23 97.12 98.34 97.87 
Australia 91.03 92.06 90.84 90.44 
USA 88.81 89.23 89.28 88.92 
Source: UNFCCC 2007. 
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Table 6.6. Fuel Consumption of Biomass Fuels - Energy Section 
CO2 Emissions 
Gg 
Consumption 
TJ 
CEF 
tonnes/TJ 
Source: UNFCCC 2007. 
UK 
Australia 
USA 
UK 
Australia 
USA 
UK 
Australia 
USA 
1990 1995 
n/a nla 
nla nla 
n/a n/a 
31,604 57,218 
179,220 200,040 
2,404,647 2,623,258 
94.30 91.37 
83.82 92.20 
91.22 90.26 
2000 2005 
nla n/a 
nla nla 
n/a n/a 
62,361 80,451 
223,673 195,654 
2,543,776 2,358,987 
105.40 114.43 
85.21 90.44 
89.75 87.53 
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The most striking aspect of the carbon emISSIOns factors is their relative lack of 
movement over this period. This would suggest that either technology has not had an impact 
on fuel consumption or that the methodologies used to estimate greenhouse gas emissions (or 
specifically carbon dioxide in this instance) emanating from this economic consumption has 
excluded technological improvements from their estimations. If the latter was the case then it 
is possible those emissions have been overstated and that the impact of technology has been 
overlooked. This potentially underlines the call for technology transfer to developing 
countries to assist with emission mitigation (but also to facilitate poverty alleviating 
development). Technological impact on emission reduction must therefore be given greater 
prommence. 
4. INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE AND EMISSIONS 
Changes to industrial structure and climate change will also occur as a result of the rise of 
the knowledge economy. Shifts in industrial structure may have an effect on greenhouse gas 
emissions and thus climate change. Due to the manner in which shifts within industrial 
structure and levels of greenhouse gas emissions estimates are measured, they are both 
primarily functions of economic activity. However, due to the differences in how each 
defined the various economic sectors, it is not possible to directly link these two concepts 
through the standard national accounts. By developing a concordance though that links the 
two distinct descriptions of economic activities upon which industrial structure and 
greenhouse gas emissions estimates are based, it is possible to develop analytical frameworks 
to analyze these impacts. 
However, this lack of direct concordance between data that describes changes in 
industrial structure and data used in estimating greenhouse gas emissions, means analysis of 
these two issues is less than straightforward. Despite this lack of direct concordance, 
industrial structure and greenhouse gas emissions are linked. To conceptualize this link it is 
useful to view it in the following continuum. 
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GDP 
Industry Value Added 
Production 
Energy (Fuel Consumption) 
GHG Gas Emissions 
The top half of this continuum is concerned with an approach to understand industrial 
structural change, whilst the bottom half is concerned with an approach to understand 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
1 GDP Industrial Structure Industry Value Added Production r 
Energy (Fuel Consumption) Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
GHG Gas Emissions 
Shifts within industrial structures and levels of greenhouse gas emISSIOns are both 
primarily functions of economic activity. Industrial structural change is best analyzed within 
the system of standard national accounts. A common form of these accounts is GDP. Gross 
domestic product is the total value of final goods and services at market prices (corrected for 
duplications in fuel, raw materials, and semi-finished products), produced in an economy 
during a specific period (usually a year). It excludes income earned by domestic residents 
from overseas investments but includes income earned in the domestic economy by noo-
nationals. GDP does not deduct the value of expenditure on capital goods for replacement 
purposes. Greenhouse gas emissions are reported (by developed countries) within the 
UNFCCC common reporting format. The common reporting format was developed so that 
developed countries could report and compare levels of greenhouse gas emissions within a 
single format. 
Both industrial structure (expressed through GDP) and greenhouse gas emissions are 
essentially measures of economic activity. Yet due to the manner in which both of these 
measures are constructed and how economic sectors are defined, a direct concordance 
between them does not exist. Therefore, it is not possible to directly link these two sets of 
measures. The calculation of greenhouse gas emissions is based on seven economic sectors: 
1) energy; 
2) industrial process; 
3) solvent and other product use; 
4) agriculture; 
5) land-use change and forestry; 
6) waste; and 
7) other. 
This disaggregation of economic sectors does not directly link to the International 
Standard Industrial Classification (lSI C) upon which nations' standard national accounts 
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(such as GDP) are calculated and reported. Within the ISle, economic activity is 
disaggregated into 17 sectors: 
1) agriculture, hunting and forestry; 
2) fishing; 
3) mining and quarrying; 
4) manufacturing; 
5) electricity, gas and water; 
6) construction; 
7) wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal and 
household goods; 
8) hotels and restaurants; 
9) transport, storage and communication; 
10) financial intermediation; 
11) real estate, renting and business activities; 
12) public administration and defence; compulsory social security; 
13) education; 
14) health and social work; 
15) other community, social and personal services; 
16) private households with employed persons; and 
17) extra-territorial organizations and bodies. 
It is possible to aggregate the various ISle economic sectors that correspond to the 
economic activities upon which the greenhouse gas emissions estimates are made. This 
correspondence is not complete and leakage between sectors does occur. However, the link is 
strong enough to consider this a reasonable approach. This suggested framework (called the 
Gross Emissions Product) could therefore be used to calculate emission intensity levels and 
link those economic sectors primarily responsible for emissions if structural change is 
occurring. 
4.1. The Gross Emissions Product (GEP) Framework 
Various versions of GEP can be calculated. A full version (GEP-full) incorporates all the 
ISle divisions and subdivisions that correspond to the economic activities used to estimate 
greenhouse gas emissions reported in the common reporting format. A more refined version 
(GEP-refined) incorporates only the ISle division and subdivision that correspond to the 
economic activities used to estimate greenhouse gas emissions within the common reporting 
format Energy and Industrial Processes sectors. The very large majority of greenhouse gas 
emissions result directly from these two sectors. In addition, the economic activities within 
the common reporting format defined Energy and Industrial Processes sectors can be more 
strongly linked to economic activities within the ISle regime. However, as can be seen in 
Table 6.7, the differences between GEP-full and GEP-refined are not significant. 
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Table 6.7. Comparison of Full GEP and Refmed GEP 
Full GEP List ofISIC Codes 
0111 P - Growing of Cereals and Other Crops 
n.e.c. 
012 - Farming of animals 
o 1I2p - Growing of vegetables, horticultural 
specialists and nursery products 
0113 P - Growing if fruit, nuts and beverage 
02 - Subdivision 02: Forestry, Logging and 
Related Service Activities 
101 - Mining and agglomeration of hard coal 
111 - Extraction of crude petroleum and 
natural gas 
15 - Subdivision 15: Manufacture of Food 
Products and Beverages 
16 - Subdivision 16: Manufacture of 
Tobacco Products 
21- Subdivision 21: Manufacture of Paper 
and Paper Products 
22 - Subdivision 22 Publishing, Printing and 
Reproduction of Recorded Media 
232 - Manufacture of Refined Petroleum 
Products 
24 - Subdivision 24: Manufacture of 
, Chemicals and Chemical Products 
26 - Subdivision 26: Manufacture of other 
Non-metallic Mineral Products 
27 - Subdivision 27: Manufacture of Basic 
Metals 
401 - Production, collection and distribution 
of electricity 
402 - Manufacture of gas; distribution of 
gaseous fuels 
60 - Subdivision 60: Land Transport; 
Transport via Pipelines 
61 - Subdivision 61: Water Transport 
62 - Subdivision 61 : Air Transport 
90 - Subdivision 90: Sewage and Refuse 
Disposal, Sanitation and Similar Activities 
Source: author's own work. 
Refined GEP list of ISlC Codes 
101 - Mining and agglomeration of hard coal 
111 - Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas 
15 - Subdivision 15: Manufacture of Food Products 
and Beverages 
16 - Subdivision 16: Manufacture of Tobacco 
Products 
21- Subdivision 21: Manufacture of Paper and Paper 
Products 
22 - Subdivision 22 Publishing, Printing and 
Reproduction of Recorded Media 
232 - Manufacture of Refined Petroleum Products 
24 - Subdivision 24: Manufacture of Chemicals and 
Chemical Products 
26 - Subdivision 26: Manufacture of other Non-
metallic Mineral Products 
27 - Subdivision 27: Manufacture of Basic Metals 
401 - Production, collection and distribution of 
electricity 
402 - Manufacture of gas; distribution of gaseous fuels 
60 - Subdivision 60: Land Transport; Transport via 
Pipelines 
61 - Subdivision 61 : Water Transport 
62 - Subdivision 61: Air Transport 
To derive the GEP two sets of data is required. The first is greenhouse gas emissions 
reported within the common reporting format. The second is data on standard national 
accounts. Within this chapter GEP intensity is calculated for five European countries; 1) 
France; 2) the United Kingdom; 3) the Netherlands; 4) Spain; 5) Denmark. The European 
Energy Agency (EEA) collates data on greenhouse gas emissions reported within the 
common reporting format. The common reporting format is designed to allow developed 
countries (Annex 1 Parties) to measure their greenhouse gas emissions in order to assist them 
in meeting their commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. It does this by facilitating the 
process of considering annual national greenhouse gas inventories included in national 
communications, including the preparation of technical analysis and synthesis documentation. 
The Impact of the Knowledge Economy on Emissions 103 
By having all countries reporting in the same format, transparency, consistency, 
comparability, completeness and accuracy of inventories is possible. 
The data on the standard national accounts has been collated by the OECD and is 
reported within the STAN database. The estimations of GEP are based on data from the 
OCED STAN database for Industrial Analysis. This data 'provides analysts and researchers 
with a comprehensive tool for analyzing industrial performance at a relatively detailed level 
of activity. It includes annual measures of output, labour input, investment and international 
trade that allows users to construct a wide range of indicators to focus on areas such as 
productivity growth, competitiveness and general structural change. Through the use of a 
standard industry list, comparisons can be made across countries. The industry list provides 
sufficient detail to enable users to highlight high-technology sectors and is compatible with 
those used in related OECD databases. STAN is primarily based on member countries annual 
National Accounts by activity tables and uses data from other sources, such as national 
industrial surveys/censuses, to estimate any missing data ... This new version of STAN is 
based on the International Standard Industrial Classification of Economic Activities, Revision 
3,19. 
Information on various aspects of nations' economies are contained within the STAN 
database. For this analysis Value Added data is used. 'Gross Value added for a particular 
industry represents its contribution to national GDP. It is sometimes referred to as GDP by 
industry .... In general, it is calculated as the difference between Production and Intermediate 
inputs. Value added comprises Labour costs, Consumption of fixed capital, taxes less 
subsidies ... and Net operating surplus and mixed income,20. 
Due to a number of limitations with the STAN database2\ a third version of GEP has 
been developed - GEP-STAN. As the disaggregation of GDP within STAN is limited, a 
number of additional divisions and sub-sectors have been included. GEP-ST AN therefore 
consists of: 
19 
20 
21 
Subdivision 01: Agriculture, Hunting and Related Service Activities 
Subdivision 02: Forestry, Logging and Related Services 
Subdivision 05: Fishing, Operation of Fish Hatcheries and Fish Farms, Service Activities 
Incidental to Fishing 
Subdivision 10: Mining of Coal and Lignite; Extraction of Peat 
Subdivision 11: Extraction of Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas; Service Activities 
Incidental to Oil and Gas Extraction Excluding Surveying 
Subdivision 12: Mining of Uranium and Thorium Ores 
Subdivision 15: Manufacture of Food Products and Beverages 
Subdivision 16: Manufacture of Tobacco Products 
Subdivision 21: Manufacture of Paper and Paper Products 
Subdivision 22: Publishing, Printing and Reproduction of Recorded Media 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2005), The GEeD STAN database for 
Industrial Analysis, OECD, Paris, p.l. 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2005), The OECD STAN database for 
Industrial Analysis, OECD, Paris, p. 6. 
The level of disaggregation required to calculate the full-GEP or refined-GEP is not available within the 
STAN database. It is available however within country specific national accounts but these are more difficult 
to access. 
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Subdivision 26: Manufacture of Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products 
Subdivision 27: Manufacture of Basic Metals 
Subdivision 28: Machinery and Equipment 
Subdivision 40: Electricity, Gas, Steam and Hot Water Supply 
Subdivision 41: Collection, Purification and Distribution of Water 
Subdivision 60: Land Transport; Transport via Pipelines 
Subdivision 61: Water Transport 
Subdivision 62: Air Transport 
Subdivision 63: Supporting and Auxiliary Transport Activities; Activities of Travel 
Agencies 
Subdivision 90: Sewage and Refuse Disposal, Sanitation and Similar Activities 
Subdivision 91: Activities of membership Organsiations n.e.c. 
Subdivision 92: Recreational, Cultural and Sporting Activities 
Subdivision 93: Other Service Activities 
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Figure 6.1. Comparison ofGEP-STAN as share of Total GDP. 
The majority of emissions corne from a minority of economic of economic sectors. By 
identifYing these sectors, it is possible to identify industrial structure in terms of emissions. 
Figure 6.1 shows the GEP-STAN compared to total GDP for a number of EU countries for 
over the last decade on the previous century. This falling ratio suggests that non-major 
emitting economic sectors (predominately the service sector) are becoming increasingly 
important in these economies (other than a Denmark's last movement). This suggests that 
industrial change has occurred away from manufacturing towards the service sector). This 
shift does impact on greenhouse gas emission levels as emission are lower in the service 
sector than in the manufacturing sector. 
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5. ANALYSIS OF ENERGY USE: TAKING ACCOUNT OF TECHNOLOGY 
AND INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE 
Both analytic methods discussed above reviewed the impact of the knowledge economy 
on technological change and industry structural change in isolation. However, it is useful to 
consider both changes concurrently. It is possible to do so by using decomposition techniques 
developed by the International Energy Agencl2. 
Energy use is an indicator of both technology change and industry structure. Decomposed 
data on energy use and total value added for the manufacturing, agriculture, forestry and 
fishing, mining, construction, services, transport, and residential sectors has been collated by 
the International Energy Agency for Australia, France, Japan, UK and the USA over the 
period 1974-199523 • It is possible to use this data to estimate changes to energy use due to 
changes in technology and changes in industry structure over this time. 
5.1. Energy Use and Value Added 
Actual energy use across these countries has not increased significantly since 1974. This 
is particularly the case when compared to increased recorded in total value added. The 
average increase in actual energy use over the period 1974-1995 was 20 percent compared to 
the average increase in total value added of 41 percent (or 0.9 percent per annum and 1.9 
percent per annum respectively). 
The largest increase in actual energy use was 39.5 percent recorded by Australia 
compared to the smallest increase of only 1.7 percent recorded by the United Kingdom. The 
largest increase in total value added was 52.1 percent recorded by Japan and the smallest 
increase was 28.9 percent achieved by the United Kingdom. 
Table 6.8. Comparison of Actual Energy Use and Total Value Added 
1974 1995 % change 
Australia 
Energy Used 2234 3696 39.5 
Value Added 161 292 44.8 
France 
Energy Used 4999 5898 15.2 
Value Added 633 970 34.7 
Japan 
Energy Used 10706 16286 34.2 
Value Added 1139 2378 52.1 
UK 
Energy Used 5631 5734 1.7 
Value Added 571 804 28.9 
1974 1995 % change 
USA 
Energy Used 47259 53380 11.4 
Value Added 4079 7881 48.2 
22 
23 
International Energy Agency (lEA) (2004), CO] Emissions from Fuel Combustion, 1971-2002, OEeD, Paris. 
More recent data is difficult to obtain. However, it is assumed that the analysis remains true for more recent 
periods. 
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It is possible to compare actual energy used to energy use that may have occurred if 
either the intensity ratios (based on technology) were fixed at 1974 rates or if the industry 
structure ratios were fixed at 1974 levels. The major impact on energy use appears to be 
technological change rather than changes within industry structure. 
5.2. Technology (Intensity) 
As might be expected, all countries would have increased energy use if they were still 
using 1974 technologies in these sectors (see table 6.9). The average energy use for the period 
would be 46 percent higher if 1974 technologies were still be used in the current periods. This 
can also be interpreted as energy savings bought about by technological change. The highest 
level of energy use savings due to improved technology was 70 percent achieved by the 
United States. The smallest energy use savings was 20 percent in Australia. Should have 
technology remained unchanged since 1974, the average increase in energy use across all 
countries would have been 47 percent with a range from 37 percent (United Kingdom) to 50 
percent (Japan) 
Australia 
The total (predicted) energy use based on unchanged intensity ratios (unchanged 
technology) increased. Increases in predicted energy use in the manufacturing, transport and 
residential sectors outweighed the reductions in predicted energy use in the mining, 
construction and service sectors. Predicted energy use with fixed 1974 intensity ratios fell for 
these sectors (mining, construction and service sectors) as the current intensity levels 
(technological change) actually increased overtime. (The agricultural, forestry and fishing 
sector remained largely unchanged over time). 
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Figure 6.2. Comparison of Energy Use using Various Scenarios. 
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Table 6.9. Comparison of Actual Energy Use and Energy Use with unchanged 
Technology 
1974 1995 % change Savings 
Australia 
Actual Energy Used 2234 3696 39.5 
Predicted Use (fixed intensity) 2234 4439 49.6 20.1 
France 
Actual Energy Used 4999 5898 15.2 
Predicted Use (fixed intensity) 4999 9299 46.2 57.6 
Japan 
Actual Energy Used 10706 16286 34.2 
Predicted Use (fixed intensity) 10706 21528 50.2 32.1 
UK 
Actual Energy Used 5631 5734 1.7 
Predicted Use (fixed intensity) 5631 9043 37.7 57.7 
USA 
Actual Energy Used 47259 53380 11.4 
Predicted Use (fixed intensity) 47259 90681 47.8 69.8 
Source: author's own calculations. 
France 
The increase in the total (predicted) energy use in France was quite significant and 
reflected rises in all sectors other than the service sector. Predicted energy use with fixed 
1974 intensity ratios fell for the service sector as the current intensity levels (technological 
change) actually increased overtime. 
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Figure 6.3. Comparison of Actual Energy Use and Energy Use with Unchanged Technology 
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Japan 
The manufacturing, service and residential sectors all recorded increases in predicted 
energy use and these increases outweighed any falls in predicted energy use recorded in the 
agricultural, forestry and fishing, mining and transport sector (though the mining sector 
initially showed a rise in predicted energy use). Predicted energy use with fixed 1974 
intensity ratios fell for these sectors (agricultural, forestry and fishing, mining, and transport 
sectors) as the current intensity levels (technological change) actually increased overtime. The 
construction sector remained largely unchanged. 
UK 
Only the transport sector recorded a fall in predicted energy use, resulting in a large 
increase in the total (predicted) energy use. -Predicted energy use with fixed 1974 intensity 
ratios fell for the transport sector as the current intensity levels (technological change) 
actually increased overtime. 
USA 
Only the construction sector recorded a fall in predicted energy use, resulting in a large 
increase in the total (predicted) energy use. Predicted energy use with fixed 1974 intensity 
ratios fell for the construction sectors as the current intensity levels (technological change) 
actually increased overtime. 
5.3. Industrial Structure (Intensity) 
Table 6.10. Comparison of Actual Energy Use and Energy Use with unchanged 
Industrial Structure 
1974 1995 % change Savings 
Australia 
Actual Energy Used 2234 3696 39.5 
Predicted Use (fixed structure) 2234 3488 35.9 -5.6 
France 
Actual Energy Used 4999 5898 15.2 
Predicted Use (fixed structure) 4999 5162 3.1 -12.4 
Japan 
Actual Energy Used 10706 16286 34.2 
Predicted Use (fixed structure) 10706 17858 40.0 9.6 
UK 
Actual Energy Used 5631 5734 1.7 
Predicted Use (fixed structure) 5631 5474 -2.8 -4.5 
USA 
Actual Energy Used 47259 53380 11.4 
Predicted Use (fixed structure) 47259 54653 13.5 2.3 
Source: author's own calculations. 
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The analysis of how changes in industry structure have affected energy use is not as 
uniform. If total energy use was estimated using current value added adjusted to reflect the 
1974 industry structure, some countries would have used more energy (Japan, USA) and 
some countries would have used less energy (Australia, France, United Kingdom). 
As a group of countries, the net effect on energy use by adjusting current total value 
added to reflect the 1974 industry structure is a fall in energy use of just over 1 percent. This 
is quite negligible and suggests that changes in industrial structure have not been generally 
responsible for changes in energy use over this period. France recorded the greatest predicted 
fall in energy use (12 percent), whilst Japan recorded an increase of 1 percent if industry 
structure was held constant at 1974 rates. 
Australia 
Total (predicted) energy use would have fallen if 1974 industrial structures had remained 
unchanged. This is primarily caused by substantial fall in the predicted energy use in the 
transport and residential sector and smaller falls in the mining and services sector 
overcompensating for substantial increases in predicted energy use in the manufacturing 
sector and a minor increase in the construction sector. (Net change in actual versus predicted 
energy use in the agricultural, forestry and fishing sector was sporadic). 
France 
Despite increases in the manufacturing, agricultural, forestry and fishing, mining and 
construction sectors, the small fall in the service sector coupled with the larger falls in the 
transport and residential sectors resulted in the total (predicted) energy use being substantially 
lower than actual energy use in France over the period 1974-1995. 
Japan 
Japan's total (predicted) energy use would have been slightly higher if the 1974 structure 
remained unchanged. The analysis showed large increases in predicted energy use on the 
agricultural, forestry and fishing, mining construction and transport sectors. These were only 
slightly offset by falls in the residential and service sectors. (There was little change in the 
manufacturing sector between actual energy use and predicted energy use based on 1974 
industrial structures). 
UK 
The total (predicted) energy use fall slightly by during the late 1980s and 1990s (in 
reverse to the trend saw between the mid 1970s and mid 1980s). Despite significant increases 
in the manufacturing, mining construction and transport sectors, the fall in total (predicted) 
energy use was caused by significant reductions in predicted energy use in the residential 
sector. (The agricultural, forestry and fishing and service sectors remain almost unchanged). 
USA 
There is very little overall change between actual energy use and total (predicted) energy 
use. Predicted energy use increase in the manufacturing, agricultural, forestry and fishing, 
mining and construction sectors, but fall in the service, transport and residential sectors. 
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Figure 6.4. Comparison of Actual Energy Use and Energy Use with unchanged Industrial Structure. 
Energy use in a number of developed countries has increased moderately over the 22-
year period, 1974-1995. This increase has been roughly half of that recorded in value added. 
By estimating energy use by fixing either technology or industry structure at 1974 levels, it is 
possible to determine the impact both of these factors have on energy use. It was found that 
change in technology has much greater affect on energy use than change in industry structure. 
This result suggests that greater public policy emphasis should be placed on improving 
technology in order to reduce energy use and hence greenhouse gas emissions. 
These results fall between the optimistic and pessimistic views. The knowledge economy 
is having some impact on energy use, especially at the relative level (intensities are falling), 
but at the absolute level energy use (and thus greenhouse gas emissions) are increasing. A 
further analysis at the dis aggregated level may be useful to further understand the impact of 
the knowledge economy (both through technological change and shifts in industry structure) 
on energy use. 
6. ANALYSIS OF ENERGY USE CHANGE WITHIN THE AUSTRALIAN 
MANUFACTURING SECTOR: TAKING ACCOUNT OF TECHNOLOGY 
AND INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE 
The Australian manufacturing sector increased its energy use between 1974-1995 by 20 
percent and increased its value added by 25 percent. The manufacturing sector has the 
following seven sub-sectors: 
• Paper and Allied products 
• Chemical and Allied products 
• Stone, Clay and Glass 
• Ferrous metals 
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• Non-ferrous metals 
• Food and Kindred products 
• Other manufacturing 
Both structural change and change in technology have had effects on energy use in the 
Australian manufacturing sector. 
Had technology remained unchanged at 1974 levels, energy use would have increased 18 
percent. Whereas, if the internal industry structure had have remained unchanged, energy use 
would have fallen by 13 percent. These results differ from the aggregate results discussed 
above (for the group of developed countries). 
6.1. Technology (Intensity) 
Actual energy use within the Australian manufacturing sector increased 20 percent 
between 1974 and 1995. If technology had not changed since 1974, total (predicted) energy 
use would have increased 49 percent for this same period. If technological change had not 
occurred and technology was left at 1974 levels, energy use would have been 21 percent 
higher within the manufacturing sector than actually occurred. 
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Figure 6.5. Comparison of Energy Use using Various Scenarios. 
There are significant differences within the various manufacturing sub-sectors in terms of 
the impact of technology on energy use. The largest saving in energy use was 64 percent 
within the ferrous metals sub-sector suggesting that technology within this sector has 
improved energy use efficiency substantially over time. Large savings in energy use due to 
technology were also observed in the chemical and allied products, and stone, clay and glass 
sub-sectors. Little change in energy use through technological change was observed in the 
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paper and allied products, non-ferrous metals, and other manufacturing sub-sectors. 
Interestingly, energy use in the food and other kindred products sub-sector would have fallen 
had technology been fixed at 1974 levels, suggesting that technological change has actually 
worsened energy use efficiency within this sub-sector. 
Table 6.11. Comparison of Actual Energy Use and Energy use with unchanged 
Technology 
1974 1995 % change Savings 
Paper and allied products 
Actual Energy Used 37.57 47.02 20.0 
Predicted Use (fixed intensity) 37.57 49.82 24.5 5.9 
Chemicals and allied products 
Actual Energy Used 79.69 113.14 29.5 
Predicted Use (fixed intensity) 79.69 136.42 41.5 20.5 
Stone, Clay and Glass 
Actual Energy Used 91.35 89.14 -2.4 
Predicted Use (fixed intensity) 91.35 114.03 19.8 27.9 
Ferrous metals 
Actual Energy Used 270.01 190.38 -41.8 
Predicted Use (fixed intensity) 270.01 313.106 13.7 64.4 
Non-ferrous metals 
Actual Energy Used 117.54 292.41 59.8 
Predicted Use (fixed intensity) 117.54 292.97 59.8 0.1 
Food and kindred products 
Actual Energy Used 110.86 158.58 30.0 
Predicted Use (fixed intensity) 110.86 156.31 29.0 -1.4 
Other manufacturing 
Actual Energy Used 64.99 78.81 17.5 
Predicted Use (fixed intensity) 64.99 79.57 18.3 0.9 
Source: author's own calculations. 
6.2. INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (INTENSITY) 
If industry structural change had not occurred and industry structure was fixed at 1974 
ratios, 15 percent less energy use would have occurred within the manufacturing sector. This 
suggests that within the manufacturing sector, shifts between sub-sectors have caused greater 
energy use than would have been used if the 1974 sub-sector industry structures had 
remained. This occurred because of a shift since 1974 within the manufacturing sector from 
relatively energy efficient sub-sectors to relatively inefficient sub-sectors. 
The ramification of this is that shifts between sub-sectors are just as important to energy 
use as shifts between sectors and energy use is largely dependant on the economic activity 
occurring at the sub-sector level more so than at the aggregate level. This is an important 
effect that should be incorporated into public policies focusing on energy use and greenhouse 
gas emISSIOns. 
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Table 6.12. Structure Ratios within the Australian Manufacturing Sector 
1974 1980 1985 1990 1995 
Paper and Allied products 0.0266 0.0257 0.0259 0.0248 0.0266 
Chemicals and Allied products 0.0584 0.0640 0.0675 0.0682 0.0753 
Stone, Clay and Glass 0.0552 0.0553 0.0536 0.0554 0.0519 
Ferrous metals 0.0522 0.0521 0.0459 0.0474 0.0456 
Non-ferrous metals 0.0334 0.0406 0.0581 0.0690 0.0627 
Food and kindred products 0.1708 0.1822 0.1798 0.1772 0.1814 
Other manufacturing 0.6034 0.5800 0.5691 0.5580 0.5565 
Source: author's own calculations. 
A shift to the non-ferrous metals sub-sector resulted in 46 percent more energy use and a 
shift to the chemicals and allied products sub-sector caused in increase in energy use of 22 
percent. A shift away from the ferrous metals sub-sector resulted in energy use savings of 14 
percent while the shifts to and from the other sub-sectors did not have much overall impact on 
energy use. 
Table 6.13. Comparison of Actual Energy Use and Energy use with unchanged 
Industrial Structure 
1974 1995 % change Savings 
Paper and allied products 
Actual Energy Used 37.57 47.02 20.0 
Predicted Use (fixed structure) 37.57 47.07 20.1 0.1 
Chemicals and allied products 
Actual Energy Used 79.69 113.14 29.5 
Predicted Use (fixed structure) 79.69 87.74 9.1 -22.4 
Stone, Clay and Glass 
Actual Energy Used 91.35 89.14 -2.4 
Predicted Use (fixed structure) 91.35 94.8 3.6 6.3 
Ferrous metals 
Actual Energy Used 270.01 190.38 -41.8 
Predicted U see fixed structure) 270.01 217.96 -23.8 14.4 
Non-ferrous metals 
Actual Energy Used 117.54 292.41 59.8 
Predicted Use (fixed structure) 117.54 155.74 24.5 -46.7 
Food and kindred products 
Actual Energy Used 110.86 158.58 30.0 
Predicted Use (fixed structure) 110.86 149.31 25.7 -5.8 
Other manufacturing 
Actual Energy Used 64.99 78.81 17.5 
Predicted Use (fixed structure) 64.99 85.45 23.9 8.4 
Source: author's own calculations. 
Additional information gained be gained by undertaking analysis of the impacts of 
technological change and industry structure change at the sub-sector level. Within the 
Australian manufacturing sector, technological change since 1974 improved energy use in all 
but one sub-sector, whereas shifts in industry structures had both negative and positive effects 
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on energy use depending on whether the shift was to or away from relatively energy 
efficiency or inefficient sub-sectors. Understanding these impacts at the sub-sector level can 
be more important to public policy than understanding the aggregate impacts of both 
technology change and industry structure change. 
7. CONCLUSION 
The knowledge economy does affect energy use and thus greenhouse gas emissions but 
does so predominately through technological improvements rather than through industry 
structure. This is result occurs because any energy use savings generated through the shift 
from the manufacturing sector to the generally more energy efficient service sector are 
cancelled by (small) simultaneous shifts to high greenhouse gas emitting transport and 
residential sectors24• Further, shifts within sectors (at the sub-sector level) are also important 
determinants of the effect of industry structure as sub·sector energy intensity levels greatly 
differently. Thus, the impact falls between the optimistic and pessimistic views. 
Clearly though, technology is the key determinant in reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
as improved technologies have reduced emissions across nearly all sectors and sub·sectors. 
However, the relative positive effect of technology has not (and is unlikely to) fully account 
for the overall total emission levels drawn by increases in economic activity across the whole 
economy. 
Energy use has increased moderately over the 22-year period, 1974·1995. This increase 
has been roughly half of that recorded in value added. By estimating energy use by fixing 
either technology or industry structure at 1974 levels, it is possible to determine the impact 
both of these factors have on energy use. It was found that changes in technology have much 
greater affect on energy use than changes in industry structure. This result suggests that 
greater public policy emphasis should be placed on improving technology in order to reduce 
energy use and hence greenhouse gas emissions. 
This result initially appears counter-intuitive as one of the optimistic outcomes widely 
associated with a structural shift in the economy towards the tertiary sector caused by the rise 
of the knowledge economy has been a predicted fall in energy use. However, it might be 
expected that this shift towards the tertiary sector may also be accompanied by an increase in 
transport costs as services in the tertiary sector may increase travel requirements. For 
example, Australia, France and the USA all recorded significant increases in energy used in 
the transport sector over time (the failure of this trend to be recorded in the UK and Japan 
may be explained by the higher population concentration in these two countries). 
Specific technological advances in various sectors may provide various opportunities for 
all countries to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. Technology can impact on these 
spheres and future public policies can be modified by learning from others. Within the next 
international climate change protocol, emissions mitigation technology will need to be shared 
between developed and developing nations. The next chapter, the final of the book, articulates 
the specific conditions for the next international climate change protocol and highlights the 
24 Dewick, P., Green, K. and Miozzo, M. (2002), Technological Change, Industry Structure and the Economy, 
Manchester School of Management, UMIST, Manchester. 
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role that technology will play in assisting all countries to achieve the stringent per capita 
emissions targets necessary to minimize climate change in the future. 
Chapter 7 
POST-KYOTO: A PROPOSAL FOR THE NEXT 
INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE PROTOCOL 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This book has four distinct sections. The first three chapters reviewed the current 
literature and science surrounding climate change. Together, these chapters laid the 
foundation for the argument that an inclusive global response to climate change was required 
and that all countries - both wealthy and poor - must now assume responsibility for 
significantly reducing greenhouse gas emissions into the future. The second section of this 
book further supported this argument by highlighting the responsibility developing countries 
have for current greenhouse gas emissions and their potential for future emissions. Four 
countries were considered: China, Russia, India and Brazil. The third section of this book, a 
single chapter, focused on the rise of the knowledge economy and how technology (but also 
industrial structural shifts) can reduce emissions. The purpose of this chapter was to indicate 
that mitigating emissions in the future is possible and that both developed and developing 
countries can continue to expand their economies in order to improve the lives of the poor as 
well as maintain living standard of those who are non-poor. This final section of the book 
now puts forward a proposal for the next international climate change protocol, including 
specifying mandated greenhouse gas emission targets. 
As has been indicated earlier in the book, the basis of the international instrument being 
presented here is a global per capita emissions cap with a convergence data of 2050. In short, 
a per capita cap and converge approach is the only equitable manner in which the allocation 
of (increasingly scare) greenhouse gas emissions can be equitably assigned and allocated. 
This is of course a contentious proposal and an approach that currently sits outside the 'road-
map' for post-Kyoto negotiations agreed to in Bali, Indonesia in December 2007. Its major 
point of departure from the current negotiation framework is the inclusion of developing 
countries in reducing emissions. As demonstrated in earlier chapters though, their exclusion 
from mandated emission levels undermines any serious attempt to reduce global emissions. 
This final chapter is set out as following. Section Two will report on why the next 
international climate change protocol should consider consumed greenhouse gas emissions 
rather than produced greenhouse gas emissions, as is currently the case within the Kyoto 
Protocol. Section Three highlights why the per capita approach has been selected over 
118 Matthew Clarke 
alternative approaches such as the absolute cap approach or emission intensity approach. The 
underlining principles of the per capita approach being proposed in this book are then 
reviewed in Section Four, before the actual global per capita targets are discussed in Section 
Five. The chapter is then concluded in Section Six. 
2. EMISSIONS FROM CONSUMPTION OR PRODUCTION 
The targets for greenhouse gas emissions contained in the UNFCCC, signed at the 1992 
Rio Earth Summit and formalized in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol had a long gestation period 
dating back to the First World Climate Conference held in 1979, which called for cooperation 
between countries to prevent climate change from worsening l . These targets are based on 
emissions from all economic activities undertaken in a given country. This basis is widely 
referred to as the production approach as it emphasizes economic activities produced in a 
given country. However, this approach may disadvantage those countries whose comparative 
advantage lies in producing energy intensive activities2• 
Production of emissions versus consumption of emissions may be particularly important 
for countries that specialize in the export of energy intensive products or have higher ratios of 
greenhouse gas emissions embodied in exports relative to that embodied in imports3• These 
issues are also highly relevant to ongoing negotiations concerning the achievement of 
emissions reductions in the post-Kyoto period. 
The OCED has recently completed a study reviewing and empirically testing some of 
these issues4 . The study focussed on 24 countries (including China, India, Russia and Brzail) 
that were responsible for eight percent of global emissions and global GDP. The purpose of 
this research was to illustrate the potential importance of emissions in the import and export 
of goods. This research considered the greenhouse gas emissions embodied in major traded 
goods of selected countries against the emissions embodied in goods consumed within these 
particular countries. 
To estimate the consumption of greenhouse gas emissions, it is first necessary to trace 
back goods to the origin of production and consider the materials and production processes 
used. Not all countries produce goods in the same manner and some production may be less 
emission efficient, in the sense that the production of a unit of a particular good may be 
higher in one country than another. Therefore, country specific analysis of production was 
necessary. This OECD research developed an analytical framework, based on input-output 
2 
4 
Information Unit on Climate Change (1979), The First World Climate Conference, UNEP, Geneva. 
see for example, Common, M. and Salma, U. (1992), 'Accounting for Australian Carbon Dioxide Emissions', 
Economic Record, 68: 31-42; Wyckoff, A. and Roop, 1. (1994), 'The Embodiment of Carbon in Imports of 
Manufactured Products', Energy Policy, March.; Steering Committee of the Climate Change Study (1995), 
Climate Change Science, Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering, Canberra.; DFAT 
and ABARE (1995), Global Climate Change, DFAT, Canberra; Sturgess, R. (1995), Climate Change: 
Interpreting and Measuring Emission Targets, Treasury Research Paper No.9, The Commonwealth Treasury, 
Canberra; and Murata, A., Kato, K. and Kurokawa, K. (1996), An Estimation of Environmental Impacts of the 
Trade in Industrial Products', Proceedings on the Joint IEWIJSER International Conference on Energy, 
Economy and the Environment, Osaka 25-27 June. 
DFAT and ABARE (1995), Global Climate Change, DFAT, Canberra. 
Ahmad, N. and Wyckoff, A. (2003), Carbon Dioxide Emissions Embodied in International Trade of Goods, 
STI Working Paper 2003115, OCED, Paris. 
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tables, to measure direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuel-use in 
producing exports to compare that with the direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions from 
fossil fuel-use in imports consumed. 
It should be noted though that at the global level, greenhouse gas emissions derived from 
global domestic consumption must equal greenhouse gas emissions derived from global 
domestic production, but at the national level there can be significant difference due to trade 
of goods and services containing embodied emissions and these difference can impact on the 
whether certain countries will achieve or exceed emission targets. The primary finding of this 
study is that there was a significant difference between emissions associated with domestic 
production and those emissions associated with domestic consumption. For many individual 
countries, the difference between emissions from consumption and emissions form 
production differed by up to 10 percent. This difference between consumption and production 
estimates is quite significant for some countries as it equates to the difference in emissions 
called for by the Kyoto Protocol. Therefore, some countries could meet their Kyoto targets 
simply by assessing their emissions based on consumption rather than production. Of course, 
the reverse side of this is that many countries who may be on meeting their Kyoto targets 
would not be if they had to consider consumed emissions rather than produced emissions. 
This is because they are 'exporting' emissions to other countries. 
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Source: Ahmad and Wyckoff 2003. 
Figure 7.1. Trade balance in CO2 emissions - percentage of domestic production. 
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Table 7.1. Comparison of CO2 Emissions from Domestic Production versus Domestic 
Production for selected countries in selected years 
Country Year Domestic production Domestic Difference 
MtC02 consum~tion Mt CO2 MtC02 
Australia 1995 279 263 16 
Canada 1997 493 439 54 
Czech Republic 1995 126 100 25 
Denmark 1997 58 57 1 
Finland 1995 56 54 2 
France 1995 355 408 -54 
Germany 1995 866 927 -61 
Greece 1994 73 76 -3 
Hungary 1998 57 57 0 
Italy 1992 398 445 -47 
Japan 1995 1100 1287 -187 
Korea 1995 364 402 -38 
Netherlands 1995 174 155 20 
New Zealand 1996 25 27 -2 
Norway 1997 35 34 1 
Poland 1995 328 286 42 
Spain 1995 235 252 -17 
Sweden 1998 53 60 -7 
LInited Kingdom 1995 536 549 -13 
United States 1997 5421 5684 -263 
OtherOECD 1995 814 856 -41 
Brazil 1996 258 266 -8 
China 1997 3068 2708 360 
India 1993 672 623 50 
Russia 1998 1440 1208 232 
TotalOECD 1995 11474 12025 -552 
Source: Ahmad and Wyckoff 2003. 
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Figure 7.2. Emissions embodied in imported goods - percentage of domestic production. 
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The following countries consume more carbon dioxide emissions domestically than they 
produce domestically: 
• France 
• Germany 
• Greece 
• Italy 
• Japan 
• Korea 
• New Zealand 
• Spain 
• Sweden 
• United Kingdom 
• United States 
• Brazil 
• ' other' OECD countries 
These countries thus benefit from mechanisms that set reduction targets based on 
production levels. 
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Source: Ahmad and Wyckoff 2003. 
Figure 7.3 . Emissions embodied in exported goods - percentage of domestic production. 
Emissions from production and consumption differ for a number of reasons, 
predominantly to do with a 'variety of factors including a trade surplus, methods of electricity 
production and an industrial structure oriented towards the production and export of carbon 
intensive goods. Nevertheless, the largest net outflow of emissions embodied in exports 
bound for OECD countries came from China and to a lesser extent Russia. In these countries, 
emissions from production exceeded those from consumption by over 10 percent and 15 
percent respectively. Combined, these differences between production and consumption in 
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China and Russia exceed the emissions in 1990 of all but four of the countries listed in 
Annex I of the Kyoto Protocol'5. 
The following countries produce more carbon dioxide emissions domestically than they 
consume domestically: 
• Australia 
• Canada 
• Czech Republic 
• Denmark (only marginally) 
• Finland (only marginally) 
• the Netherlands 
• Norway (only marginally) 
• Poland 
• China 
• India 
• Russia. 
These countries are therefore penalized by mechanisms that set reduction targets based on 
production levels. 
According to the DECD report 'size of carbon dioxide emissions embodied in gross 
flows of imports and exports is significant, both in relative terms and absolute terms. 
Emissions associated with imports or exports are usually above 10 percent of domestic 
production, and often above 20 percent. Indeed for Denmark, Finland, France, the 
Netherlands, Korea, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden, emissions embodied in imports are 
over 30 percent of domestic production. Therefore relatively small changes in response to 
changed competitive conditions or relative prices could imply significant changes to the net 
balances ,6. 
Estimates for various 5-yer periods (between 1990 and 1999) of carbon dioxide emissions 
from domestic production and domestic consumption have been made for Australia, Canada, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, United Kingdom, and United States. 
During these periods, Australia and Canada were the only two countries whom who net 
producers of carbon dioxide emissions. Australia produced 82.7 Mt more carbon dioxide 
emissions than it consumed. Likewise, Canada produced 195.5 MT more carbon dioxide 
emissions than it consumed. Germany, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the 
United States were all net consumers of carbon dioxide emissions, consuming more than they 
produced. In absolute terms, the largest net consumer was the United States, consuming 
1423.6 Mt more carbon dioxide emissions than it produced. (The difference between 
production and consumption for Denmark and Norway were negligible.) 
5 
6 
Ahmad, N. and Wyckoff, A. (2003), Carbon Dioxide Emissions Embodied in International Trade o/Goods, 
STI Working Paper 2003115, aCED, Paris, p. 8. 
Ahmad, N. and Wyckoff, A. (2003), Carbon Dioxide Emissions Embodied in International Trade o/Goods, 
STI Working Paper 2003115, aCED, Paris, p. 8. 
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Australia 
Canada 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Japan 
Norway 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Table 7.2. Comparisons of Total CO2 Emissions 
Production 
1415.6 
2431.3 
4295.8 
299.2 
1778.7 
1181.7 
5483.1 
176.1 
2669.2 
26733.7 
Consumption 
1332.9 
2235.8 
4635.3 
296.6 
2032.1 
1305.4 
6314.9 
170.5 
2737.8 
28157.3 
Difference 
82.7 
195.5 
-339.5 
2.6 
-253.4 
-123.7 
-831.8 
5.6 
-6806 
-1423.6 
The OECD analysis suggests that the magnitude of traded emissions based on domestic 
production giving rise to greenhouse gas emissions may be significantly distorting, both 
within the developed countries and between developing and advanced countries. A move to 
global consumption targets rather than production targets could shift the relativity between 
countries such as Australia and countries such as Canada, Japan and France by about 20 per 
cent. Many issues remain to be further explored, however before the implications of this form 
of analysis can be clearly spelt out. The next international climate change protocol must 
therefore be based upon emissions consumed (not produced) in allocating per capita emission 
targets. 
Certainly, it is quite possible that production based targets and (and exclusion from 
mandated emission targets of developing countries) may have some adverse implications for 
the control of greenhouse gas emissions under the Kyoto Protocol. This may be either 
because this approach allowed some countries to achieve their emission targets by reducing 
production and increasing net imports of energy intensive products, while allowing domestic 
consumption of such products to continue to increase, or because efficient producers of 
energy intensive products are forced to reduce the level or rate of growth of their output, 
allowing a greater share of world demand to be met by producers using less environmentally 
friendly methods of production. 
These disincentives exist largely because of the we now have a 'full' 7 world in the sense 
that the world has become increasingly burdened with more human beings and more physical 
goods being created via the physical transformation of natural capital to human-made capitalS. 
Within a full world, the marginal costs of economic growth are likely to be substantially 
higher than in an 'empty' world. Thus, in a full world, we can expect the marginal costs of 
economic expansion to more rapidly approach the associated marginal benefits. Therefore, if 
economic expansion continues, the costs will quickly exceed the benefits, and in the context 
7 
8 
According to the Global Footprint Network (2006), the ecological footprint of the world was 50% of the 
world's biocapacity in 1961. In 1987, the ecological footprint of the world caught up with the world's 
biocapacity. The world was, in effect, '100% full'. It is therefore clear that the conditions under which 
developed countries engaged in a rapid initial phase of economic expansion differed greatly to the conditions 
now confronted by developing countries. 
see Daly, H. (1991), Steady-State Economics: Second Edition with New Essays, Washington DC: Island Press; 
Daly, H. (1996), Beyond Growth: The Economics of Sustainable Development, Boston: Beacon Press; and 
Daly, H. (1999), Ecological Economics and the Ecology of Economics, Aldershot: Edward Elgar. 
124 Matthew Clarke 
of this discussion, the marginal costs are greenhouse gas emissions that negatively impact 
upon the world's climate. 
Within the literature, there is growing support for what is generally termed the pollution 
haven hypothesis. Since trade in a globalized world is governed by the principle of absolute 
advantage - a consequence of the free international mobility of capital9 - many transnational 
corporations have progressively shifted their operations to countries with low wages, low 
corporate tax rates, feeble workplace laws, and deficient environmental regulations10 . 
Virtually all such nations have a low per capita GDP. Not surprisingly, it has been claimed 
that many poor countries have become a haven for polluting industries and for firms generally 
seeking to enjoy a competitive advantage from the lower associated cost of production (in 
terms of this discussion - the production of greenhouse gas emissions). Thus developing 
countries therefore become increasingly attractive to firms seeking to avoid emissions 
controls in their home country even though the goods now being produced 'off-shore' are still 
being consumed in the wealthy country. These host countries might therefore be termed as 
emissions haven. Therefore, one of the major consequences from the shift in location of 
'dirty, low wage' production is the rapid increase in the production of greenhouse gas 
emissions in poorer nations. Conversely, there is a significant relative decline in the total 
emissions produced in wealthier countries. However, consumption of greenhouse gas 
emissions may not differ over time with wealthy countries continuing to consume more 
emissions than poorer countries despite the shift in production location. 
, In as much as industrial flight has boosted the volume of economic activity in the poorer 
'host' nations, it has almost certainly forced them to bear a disproportionately large burden of 
the social and environmental costs of regional, if not global, GDP growth and therefore 
growth of greenhouse gas emissions. 
The pollution haven hypothesis has not gone uncontested. In the relevant literature, the 
majority of studies support the position that differences in labour costs account for numerous 
instances of industrial flightll. However, the position in relation to environmental regulations 
is not as clear. Whilst initial studies conducted in the late-1980s and 1990s concluded that 
environmental stringency had very little impact on the choice of production location 12, more 
9 
10 
11 
12 
see Daly, H. and Cobb, J. (1989), For the Common Good: Redirecting the' Economy Toward Community, the 
~ Environment, and a Sustainable Future, Boston: Beacon Press; Daly, H. (1996), Beyond Growth: The 
Economics of Sustainable Development, Boston: Beacon Press; and Lawn, P. (2000), Toward Sustainable 
Development: An Ecological Economics Approach, Boca Raton: CRC Press. 
The use of the term 'pollution haven' clearly has connotations that go well beyond transnational corporations 
simply avoiding the cost of pollution abatement. It is an expression used more broadly to describe any instance 
involving the relocation of capital induced by cost savings arising from disparate regulations between 
countries. 
see Leonard, H. (1998), Pollution and the Struggle for the World Product: Multinational Corporations, 
Environment, and International Comparative Advantage, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Hodge, I. 
(1995), Environmental Economics, London: MacMillan Press; and Ratnayake, R. and Wydeveld, M. (1998), 
The Multinational Corporation and the Environment: Testing the Pollution Haven Hypothesis, Department of 
Economics Working Paper Series No. 179, University of Auckland, 
see Dean, J. (1992), 'Trade and the environment: a survey of the literature', in P. Low (ed.), International 
Trade and the Environment, Washington DC: World Bank; Pearce, D. and Warford, J. (1993), World Without 
End: Economics, Environment, and Sustainable Development, New York: Oxford University Press; Jaffe, A., 
Peterson, S., Portney, P. and Stavins, R. (1995), 'Environmental regulation and the competitiveness of US 
manufacturing: what does the evidence tell us?', Journal of Economic Literature, 33: 132-163; and Garrod, B. 
(1998), 'Are economic globalization and sustainable development compatible? Business strategy and the role 
of the multinational enterprise', International Journal of Sustainable Development, 1: 43·62, 
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recent studies now show that disparate environmental regulations do result in capital flight to 
countries with weaker environmental standards l3 . The shift in the conclusions is explained 
through improvements in the availability of data and the models used to test the pollution 
haven hypothesis. The current Kyoto Protocol encourages this flight as developing nations are 
not subject to binding targets. However, if all nations are included in the next international 
climate change protocol, the ability of wealthy countries to seek emission havens will be 
lessoned. 
Having determined that the focus of any allocation of permissible emissions should be 
based upon consumption of embodied greenhouse gas emissions rather than the production of 
them, it is necessary to justify the selection of the per capita approach as the instrument of 
allocation. 
3. PER CAPITA CAPS, ABSOLUTE CAPS AND INTENSITY CAPS 
Controlling and regulating greenhouse gas emissions is now an important international 
policy objective. As the potential effects of climate change are so serious, greenhouse gas 
emission abatement is central to the long-term maintenance of human well-being. Due to the 
seriousness of the impending climate change problem, comprehensive participation by all 
nations is required in controlling greenhouse gas emissions. Therefore, determining the 
appropriate approach is essentially a pragmatic decision based on encouraging the greatest 
adherence and success. Greenhouse gas emissions can be limited by either imposing an 
absolute cap on the quantity of emissions allowed or by regulating the intensity of emissions 
relative to some other measure of input or output (usually GDP - which is the assumed 
measure in the following discussion). Each approach has relative advantages and 
disadvantages but the final choice of approach must be considered in terms of attracting the 
highest level of support by all nations. Absolute caps have been adopted at the international 
level, most notably in the Kyoto Protocol, whereas some individual countries, such as the 
United States, have favoured intensity caps. 
If decision makers can exhibit perfect foresight, there is no difference between absolute-
and intensity-based caps. By knowing future GDP, an absolute cap determines intensity 
levels. Conversely, assuming that future GDP is always known, intensity caps also determine 
absolute caps. Yet, such absolute foresight is not a characteristic of the real world. Thus, the 
difference between absolute- and intensity-based approaches is that of the uncertainty 
associated with intensity levels 
13 
see Wilson, I., Otsuki, T. and Sewadeh, M. (2002), Dirty Exports and Environmental Regulation: Do 
Standards Matter to Trade?, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2806, Washington DC: World 
Bank; Cole, M. (2004), 'US environmental load displacement: examining consumption, regulations, and the 
role of NAFTA', Ecological Economics, 48(4): 430-450; Grether, I-M., Mathys, N. and de Melo, J. (2006), 
Unraveling the World-Wide Pollution Haven Effect, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4047, 
Washington DC: World Bank; MacDermott, R. (2006), 'Trade agreements and the environment: an industry 
level study for NAFTA', Global Economy Journal, 6(3); Akbostanci, E., Ipek Tuny, G. and Tiiriit-A~ik, E. 
(2007), Pollution haven hypothesis and the role of dirty industries in Turkey's exports', Environment and 
Development Economics, 12: 297-322; and Levinson, A. and Taylor, M. (forthcoming), 'Unmasking the 
pollution haven effect', International Economic Review. 
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Table 7.3. Advantages and Disadvantages 
Disadvantage 
Intensity 
Total emissions not fixed 
Further data requirement acquisition and review 
Relationship between emissions and GDP needs 
to be known to set target 
Stringency depends on more factors than for 
absolute targets 
Stringency difficult to compare between 
countries 
Advantage Provides flexibility of GDP is higher than 
expected 
Can prevent "hot air" in case of economic 
decline 
Absolute 
Rigid if economy and emissions 
develop at unexpected levels 
possibility resulting in either 
"hot air" or "high burdens" 
Stringency depends on many 
factors 
Total emissions are fixed 
Limited number of decision 
required in setting the target 
Source: Adapted from Hahne and Harnisch 2003. 
Accepting an absolute-based cap also requires accepting an expected and fully known 
reduction of emissions. However, the basis of allocation is less evident. Alternatively, an 
intensity-based cap does allow for a means of allocation, but there is less certainly 
surrounding the total reduction of emissions. Estimating an intensity target requires 
predictions to be made regarding future levels of economic activity (of GDP). However, such 
predictions are very uncertain. The uncertainly of this parameter has consequences for 
planned greenhouse gas emission abatement. 
Assuming these targets are binding, the difference between real GOP and predicted GOP 
will have a major impact on a country's abatement costs. 'If GDP growth is greater than 
expected, an absolute cap will require more abatement and incur higher cost than an intensity 
cap; however, if GDP growth is lower than expected, it is the intensity cap that will require 
greater abatement and incur higher cost,14. Uncertainty therefore determines abatement costs. 
Whether the absolute cap or intensity cap approach is more demanding is dependent on the 
difference between predicted GOP outcomes and actual GOP outcomes. 
Given this dependence on uncertainty of GOP, the important question is which approach 
will be most attractive to the international community? If countries are not willing to 
undertake meaningful abatement (with associated costs), neither approach is satisfactory. 
Both absolute caps and intensity caps can have increased costs if actual GDP differs markedly 
from expectations. It is the political will to accept these abatement costs which ultimately 
determines the acceptance of greenhouse gas emission caps. Uncertainty of GOP lowers this 
will by increasing the potential costs. 
An (superior) compromise between absolute caps and intensity approaches is a per capita 
approach. The per capita approach overcomes the two major shortcomings of these other 
approaches. Firstly, there is significantly less uncertainty regarding the driving parameter of 
the per capita approach than with the intensity approach. Unlike projections of GOP growth, 
population growth projections are more accurate as fertility time lags and constraints can be 
more modeled with greater certainty. It is difficult for countries to hoard population growth or 
14 Ellerman, A. and Wing, I. (2003), Absolute vs. Intensity-Based Emission Caps", mimeo, MIT, Cambridge 
MA., p. 3-4. 
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enforce greater fertility of its population (which is different to seeking to reduce fertility using 
public policy). Secondly, with the relative certainly of population growth, the per capita 
approach becomes a proxy absolute cap that can be allocated ethically and fairly between 
countries. 
4. THE NEXT INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE PROPOSAL 
The next international climate change protocol should be based upon the binding per 
capita consumption of greenhouse gas emission caps for all countries. In addition to the 
preceding discussion, the design of this approach is underpinned by the following principles: 
15 
a. Science Must Determine New Targets. The reductions in emissions required of 
Annex 1 countries under the Kyoto Protocol were on average five percent below that 
of 1990 emissions. Whilst laudable in the first instance, such emissions targets are 
not sufficient if greenhouse gas emission concentration levels are to be kept at below 
two-times that of pre-industrial levels in order to limit temperature increases to less 
than 2°C. Science must now determine emission targets, not political expediency. In 
order to keep greenhouse gas emission concentration levels below 450 ppm carbon 
dioxide equivalent, it is estimated that emissions must be 85 percent below 2000 
levels by 2050. This is a significant reduction and is far more substantial than those 
contained within the Kyoto Protocol. However, the consequences of not making 
these reductions are catastrophic (refer back to Chapter 2 for a review of the 
scientific literature). Developing countries will of course be most vulnerable to the 
resulting climate change but developed countries will also be affected by the 
consequences of changing climate1s. Developed countries and developing countries 
must work together to achieve these ambitious but necessary reductions in 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
b. Inclusion of Developing Nations. It is now time for the response to climate change to 
be truly global. Whilst the Kyoto Protocol was successful in identitying climate 
change as an important issue requiring an urgent response, the next international 
climate change protocol cannot only include on Annex 1 countries and exclude all 
other countries simply because of their development status. To be viable and 
comprehensive, the next international protocol must include all nations - large 
emitters and small. This is not to say though that developing countries can no longer 
seek economic expansion in order to improve the lives of their poor. Rather, 
economic expansion must be pursued but in such a way that allows significant 
reductions in emissions. This will naturally involve the transfer of technology from 
developed to developing countries. Such a transfer is common and much of the 
recent development in countries such as China and India, has been as a direct result 
of the transfer of technology and investment from developed countries. The inclusion 
of developing countries also does not equate with asking these countries to pay for 
Floods in Bangladesh and droughts in Sudan are discussed as examples in Matthew, R. (2007), 'Climate 
Change and Human Security', in F. DiMento and P. Doughman (eds) Climate Change: What it Meansfor Our 
Children, and Our Grandchildren, MIT Press, Cambridge MA. 
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the wealth of developed countries. Whilst developed countries have been historically 
responsible for the bulk of emissions and might be considered as having a "carbon 
debt", developing countries have more recently benefited economically and socially 
from the economic expansion experienced by these developed countries in the past 
through the aforementioned technology transfer and benefit. It is therefore not 
practical to disentangle responsibility for past emissions when determining the future 
allocations of limited emission rights. 
c. Considerations of Different Country-Specific Circumstances. Emissions are 
dependant on many factors, though economic activity is the most significant. Having 
said though, issues such as population density, geography, natural resources and past 
energy investments also impact on a country's emissions. Some of these issues were 
considered when determining g the Kyoto Protocol targets. Australia for example 
was able to negotiate differentiated quantified emission limitations and reduction 
objectives that in effect allowed it to increase its emissions by 8 percent over its 1990 
levels. However, achievement of the Kyoto Protocol targets had to be made within a 
very short-term timeframe. Significant time must be given to all nations within the 
next international climate change protocol to converge on mandated per capita 
targets to allow new public policies to take affect. It may be that some countries will 
need to invest in more efficient energy production infrastructure but will require time 
for pre-existing infrastructure to be replaced. Whilst each country could make special 
pleas for dispensation from these per capita targets, it is more equitable to allow them 
time to undertake the necessary changes to ensure they meet them without undue 
hardship. Interim targets that consider these circumstances should therefore be 
negotiated within country specific implementation plans to achieve the final 
convergence in 2050 within the proviso that global greenhouse gas emissions peak 
no later than 2015 and begin to fall immediately thereafter16. 
d. Technological Exchange It will not be possible for developing and developed 
countries to achieve the required emissions targets without the exchange of 
technological expertise. Policy makers need to recognize that the application of new 
technologies and the diffusion of existing efficient technologies will be the central 
driver of major change in the emissions path. Access to these technologies, especially 
more efficient energy technologies, will be vital for developing countries. 
Technological advances in all spheres of economic life will assist in achieving these 
new targets, however the impact of this technology is dependant upon its wide take-
up. Economies of scale will reduce the cost of this technology but also make its use 
even more efficient. Technology in the industry, energy, and transport sectors, 
carbon capture and storage activities, alternative sources of energy exist but are not 
yet being implemented in any critical mass17. Consideration to the incorporation of 
technology transfer within official development assistance transfers now must be 
given so to give proper recognition of the importance this transfer has in working to 
This is in line with the recommendation contained within Gamaut, R. (2008), Garnaut Climate Change 
Review: Interim Report to the Commonwealth, State and Territory Governments of Australia, at 
www.gamautreview.org.au accessed March 15,2008. 
I am grateful to Mr Ainsley Jolley for his instructive description of these technologies. A series of Working 
Papers explaining these technologies are available through Victoria University'S Centre for Strategic 
Economic Studies: http://www.cfses.comlpublishlpapers_climate.htm 
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minimize climate change. Given the speed of global structural change it is necessary 
to incorporate a realistic view of its potential impact on future emissions in any new 
emissions regime. If developing countries need to respond, in terms of development 
strategies, to knowledge economy trends, this may provide one window on more 
sustainable patterns of development. 
e. Using Carbon Sinks to Supplement Emission Rights The vast majority of this book 
has focused on the emission of greenhouse gases. However, one aspect that has only 
been lightly discussed is the role of protecting, maintaining and expanding carbon 
sinks. The discussion of Brazil made note of the uncertain role the Amazon has in 
terms of being a carbon emitter or carbon sink. Developing countries have a natural 
advantage in capturing carbon largely through their vegetation. Developing countries 
should be encouraged to protect and expand these carbon sinks in the next 
international climate change protocol. As they were excluded from any emission 
targets within the Kyoto Protocol, efforts to reduce logging in countries such as 
Papua New Guinea, Indonesia and the Solomon Island have had little international 
supportl8 . However, the recognition that carbon sinks is a cost-efficient way to 
reduce emissions will become increasingly important if developing countries are 
included in the next international climate change protocol. Countries that are able to 
reduce greenhouse emissions by protecting, maintaining and expanding their natural 
carbon sinks should be able to supplement their own emission rights by the same 
amount. Partnerships between developing and developed countries would of course 
allow these supplements to be shared. 
f. Use of Market Based or Market Conforming Policy Instruments. People respond to 
incentivesl9, and if incentives are in place people will change their behaviours and 
commit to achieving new targets. Whilst the Kyoto Protocol included the Clean 
Development Mechanism to support the achievement of its targets, it was not as 
effective or efficient has it may have been. The next international climate control 
protocol should be mindful ofthe power of the market in assisting in the allocation of 
permissible emission rights. Whilst not a central plank of the proposed approach 
developed in this book, the trade of emission rights allocated on a per capita basis 
certainly could arise within such an instrument. Rather than setting a price for each 
cubic metre of greenhouse gas, the absolute cap of total emissions in the year 2050 
that underscores the per capita allocation will be sufficient for the market place to 
determine its own price. Pragmatic considerations of who is able to buy and sell 
emissions rights must be determined. Whilst rights to emit are allocated on a per 
capita basis, it is more reasonable to expect that nations more so than individuals will 
be able to auction or sell unused emissions. The specific detail of how the trade of 
The Australian Government has recently announced plans to support Asia-Pacific nations to protect and 
expand their forests by reducing logging. It has committed $200 million over five years as part of its 'Global 
Initiative on Forests and Climate'. More specifically, the Australian and Papua New Guinean governments 
sign the Papua New Guinea - Australia Forest Carbon Partnership in March. 207. This program seeks to save 
PNG rainforests by enabling the sale of carbon credits in any future national, regional or global emissions 
trading schemes. 
This the basis of the market economy, but is also clearly articulated in Easterly, W. (2002), The Elusive Quest 
for Growth, MIT Press, Cambridge MA. 
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permissible emissions might occur should be developed separately to, but certainly in 
cognizance of, this proposed design of the next international climate change protocol. 
Upon these principles an ethical allocation of permissible future emissions must be 
determined and become the basis for the next international climate change protocol. 
Determining what the permissible level of greenhouse gas emissions is a relatively 
straightforward logarithm. It is no longer possible to avoid climate change - it is already 
occurring. The optimal outcome now is to minimize its affect and limit temperature increases 
to 2°C by keeping greenhouse gas emission concentration levels below 450 ppm carbon 
dioxide equivalent. To achieve this target, it is necessary for emissions in 2050 to be 85 
percent below 2000 levels. Scientific models have determined these emission targets, but 
scientific models cannot determine how these permissible emissions can be allocated. The 
principle of the Kyoto Protocol was to allocate future emissions on past emission levels. Thus 
Annex 1 countries were required to reduce (though in some cases, such as Norway, Australia 
and Iceland, countries allowed to increase their emissions or keep them unchanged, as was the 
case for New Zealand, Russian Federation and Ukraine) their emissions to levels dependant 
on their 1990 level of emissions. Thus countries with high 1990 emissions were allowed to 
continue emitting relatively high levels of greenhouse gases compared to countries with low 
1990 emission levels. There are clear advantages under this Kyoto model for countries that 
were greenhouse gas inefficient. The next international climate change protocol cannot 
though allocate (increasingly scarce) emission rights in such an ad hoc basis. An ethical 
allocation of emission rights is required. The position presented in this book is that each and 
every individual has the same right to emit greenhouse gas emissions as any other. It would 
be unethical to allow someone in one country to have the right to emit more than someone is 
another country. Therefore, it is proposed that within the next international climate change 
protocol that emission rights are allocated on a per capita basis. Whilst some may suggest that 
this will encourage countries to increase their populations, such an argument is flawed in two 
ways. Firstly, governments cannot easily manipulate fertility rates. Whilst China had some 
success in reducing fertility, the example of Romania under Ceau~escu in increasing fertility 
indicates the level of political control required to enforce such policies. It is unlikely therefore 
that governments would be able to excert such influence over fertility for national advantage. 
Secondly, fertility has biological constraints around which there are real limits and lags. 
Indeed, it is likely that if countries wished to quickly increase their population this would 
require migration from other countries, which would led to a zero sum game for total 
emissions. Indeed, given that countries will be reducing emissions, an increase in population 
would be counter intuitive to this goal. 
5. THE PER CAPITA ApPROACH 
A converging per capita approach based on consumption of emissions successfully 
addresses the issues above and needs to form part of the current post-Kyoto negotiations. This 
converging per capita approach will succeed in achieving the significant reductions in 
greenhouse gas emissions required to minimize climate change by including all nations, allow 
significant time for countries to adapt to the new emission regime given specific 
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circumstances faced by different nations, prioritizing technology as an enabler of emission 
reduction, allocating emission rights in an ethical manner, and allow market forces to support 
but not dictate mitigation activities. 
Currently a positive relationship exists between economic activity and carbon dioxide 
emissions per capita (see figure 7.4io. As countries' economies grow, so to do their carbon 
dioxide emissions. This relationship must necessarily be suspended in the future if emissions 
are to be reduced significantly whilst economic expansion is simultaneously being pursued, 
especially in developing countries. Indeed, there is some evidence to suggest that the 
relationship between economic activity and greenhouse gas emission is weakening. In recent 
times, the increase in GOP PPP (2000 prices) per capita has increased at a faster rate than 
carbon dioxide emissions per capita. The number of countries emitting more than 10 metric 
tonnes of carbon dioxide per capita in 2005 was only one more than in 1985, whilst the 
number of countries recording GDP PPP (2000 prices) per capita greater than $20,000 
doubled from 11 in 1985 to 22 in 2005 (See table 7.4). This suggests a significant 
improvement in efficiency and technology over time. 
40.-------------------------------------------------------------
35 +-------------------------------------------------------------
.. 
30 +-------------------------------------------------------------
• 
•• 2&+----------------------------------.~-------------------------
2D+---------------------------------~--------------------------
.. .. 
• .. 
15+-----------------------------~------------------------------I 
....... 
10 +---------------------,_.,.,...".. . ........... -------------------------------------
.. ,. .. 
5+---------,r*--------------------------------------------------. ". . 
o ••• 
c 
.. 
50000 
Source: author's own calculations based on lEA (2007) data. 
Figure 7.4. Comparison of CO2 emissions per capita and GDP PPP (2000 prices) per capita for selected 
developed and developing countries. 
20 The initial selection of countries was largely data driven in that there needed to be accurate CO2 emission data 
and GDP PPP per (2000 prices) data for both 1985 and 2005. A random selection of the roughly 140 countries 
with this data was then made resulting in these countries. 
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Table 7.4. Comparison of CO2 emissions per capita (tonnes) and GDP PPP (2000 prices) 
per capita for selected developed and developing countries 
CO2 pc GOP PPP pc CO2 pc GOP PPP pc 
1985 1985 2005 2005 
Nation Nation 
Ethiopia 0.033 764 Ethiopia 0.037 938 
Oem. People's 
Republic of Korea 0.395 2492 Honduras 0.413 1646 
India 0.559 1358 Chile 1.683 3050 
Honduras 1.638 2737 India 1.088 3071 
China 1.730 1202 China 3.930 6011 
Gabon 2.321 7247 Gabon 2.250 6203 
Bulgaria 2.518 6039 Portugal 2.849 8036 
Romania 3.061 7562 Argentina 3.327 8062 
South Africa 4.000 9469 Gibraltar 4.667 9884 
Chile 5.204 4516 Cyprus 5.764 10696 
Poland 6.661 7711 New Zealand 6.369 12405 
Oem. People's 
Argentina 6.969 9661 Republic of Korea 6.751 12703 
Trinidad and Tobago 7.440 8110 Hungmy 7.324 12863 
Slovak Republic 7.400 9686 Sweden 7.332 13610 
Saudi Arabia 7.406 14173 Japan 7.353 13977 
Netherlands Antilles 6.602 11111 Norway 7.374 14222 
Hungary 6.708 10747 Iceland 7.375 15443 
Czech Republic 7.720 13280 Ireland 8.011 17809 
Portugal 7.853 10613 Romania 8.060 18395 
Bahrain 9.209 11854 South Africa 9.315 19027 
Cyprus 9.619 11741 Saudi Arabia 9.412 20342 
Gibraltar 9.494 13000 Bulgaria 9.675 21667 
Brunei Darussalam 9.280 28136 Trinidad and Tobago 9.790 22000 
United Arab Emirates 9.901 29551 United Kingdom 10.045 22715 
New Zealand 10.079 18012 Netherlands 10.298 23280 
Kuwait 10.543 14661 Finland 10.992 26309 
Germany 10.606 18678 Slovak Republic 11.407 27190 
Japan 12.076 18725 Denmark 11.850 28049 
United Kingdom 11.858 17878 Poland 11.978 28222 
Finland 13.175 19253 Germany 13.173 29105 
Netherlands 13.875 19561 Australia 13 .848 29337 
Sweden 15.476 21044 Canada 15.177 30002 
Australia 16.382 20113 Czech Republic 16.295 30129 
Denmark 19.545 21722 Brunei Darussalam 17.391 30338 
Canada 19.339 21986 United States 19.037 30693 
Iceland 23.951 22708 Bahrain 19.070 33400 
Ireland 22.520 12347 Kuwait 24.346 34039 
United States 24.268 25202 United Arab Emirates 26.268 37063 
Qatar 27.081 32889 Luxembourg 26.270 38556 
Norway 27.778 25017 Netherlands Antilles 27.389 39061 
Luxembourg 34.972 25676 Qatar 33.538 56261 
Source: author's own calculations based on lEA (2007) data. 
Despite this weakening between carbon dioxide emissions and economic output over the 
past two decades, much more rapid improvement will need to be made in terms of per capita 
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carbon dioxide emissions over the next three decades if total emissions in 2050 are to be 85 
percent less than 2000 levels. In 2000, the world emitted 27632 million metric tonnes of 
carbon dioxide from the consumption and flaring of fossil fuels, around 4.29 metric tonnes 
per capita. Based on population projections of the United Nations21 , this figure will need to 
reduce over 90 percent to 0.35 metric tonnes of carbon dioxide emissions per capita22 . The 
reason for the greater reduction (from 85 percent of total carbon dioxide in emissions 2000 to 
over 90 percent of 2000 per capita emissions) is due to population growth over this period. 
Presently, the only countries (within the sample above) that have such low per capita 
emission rates are Ethiopia and Honduras. Significant efficiency improvements will be 
required therefore for all remaining countries to reach such a target. For some countries such 
as the United States, Australia and Germany, the cuts in 2000 per capita emissions will need 
to be between 97 and 98 percent. 
40 ,---------------------------------------------------------------
35 ,---------------------------------------------------------------
30 +-----~~------------------------------------------------------
25 ~~~~~----~~~--------------------------------------------
20 +---------~~~~~~------~ ------------------------------------
o 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-~-~-~-~-~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Source: author' s own calculations. 
Figure 7.5. Projected Improvements to Reach Uniform Per Capita Emissions Target by 2050. 
This horizon point graph indicates the significant and sustained reduction over the next 
five decades required for countries to reach a uniform per capita emissions target that would 
result in just 15 percent of carbon dioxide emissions in 2050. The intensity of this reduction is 
21 
22 
The United Nations estimates future population levels against four scenarios: low; medium; and high variants; 
as well as constant fertility projections. For this exercise, the constant fertility projection was considered. Full 
population forecasts are contained within " 13660: Population Total (UN Population Division ' s Annual 
Estimates and Projections". 
This is of course consumption of C02 emissions. Reporting requirements currently are based upon production 
and so there will be some shifts for countries as they estimate their consumption of C02 emissions compared 
to their production, but at the global level this will be a zero-sum game. Also, it is impOltant to note that these 
per capita emissions levels are solely based upon CO2 emissions from the consumption and flaring of fossil 
fuels and do not take into account other fOlTI1S of CO2 emission or other greenhouse gas emissions. Given the 
lack of reliable data for the full suite of greenhouse gas emissions for developing and developed countries, it is 
not possible to estimate the 2050 cap for this, however this estimate provides a reasonable and robust 
indication of the size of reduction required across all sectors of the economy and for all greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
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best illustrated by comparing the shifts in carbon dioxide per capita emissions between 1985 
and 2005 of these same countries. Whilst some countries did record falls in their carbon 
dioxide per capita emissions, a number of countries, including China, South Africa, Germany, 
and India increased their per capita emissions. In percentage terms, Norway recorded the 
largest reduction in carbon dioxide per capita emissions over this period, followed by Iceland, 
Ireland and Luxembourg. 
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Figure 7.6. Comparison of Per Capita CO2 Emission rates between 1980 and 2005. 
Whi lst this might provide a very pessimistic outlook for the likely achievement of the 
improvements that are required over the next fifty years in terms of reaching a uniform per 
capita emissions rate significantly less than that of 2000, the international community was not 
purposely seeking to reduce its per capita carbon dioxide emissions during this time. Further, 
the technological advances that has occurred more recently provides additional optimism for 
this mammoth but necessary task ahead. 
Without seeking to exhaustively list new technologies that have the potential to produce 
significant greenhouse gas emission reductions, it is worth noting that some optimism can be 
safely held23 . Within the transport sector (including passenger vehicles, trucks, buses, trains, 
etc.), for example, there have been recent advances in various alternative fuels , including 
biofuels and hydrogen-based fuel. There have also been advances in engine design, including 
hybrid engines and fuel cells, to increase energy efficiency. Technological efficiencies in 
materials used in the transport sector are also proving to have important potential for reduced 
emissions. Indeed, the longer-term goal (post 2050) is to have a zero emissions transport 
sector. Technological advances in other sectors may also reduce emissions. Various 
alternative fuels, including fusion power, solar, wind, hydro, hydrogen, biomass, geothermal , 
and ocean energy all offer potential emission reductions for example in the energy sector. 
23 
see the series of Working Papers by Ainsley Jolley explaining these technologies available through Victoria 
University 's Centre for Strategic Economic Studies: http: //www.cfses.com/publish/papers_climate.htm . Also 
see Makhijani, A. (2007), Carbon-Free and Nuclear-Free, RDR Books, Michigan. 
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Improvements in the production processes across a range of industries also have important 
emission reduction possibilities, including advanced process integration, ultra-high-efficiency 
motors, the use of superconducting electronics, resource recovery and utilization, and new 
production technologies for steel. Technology advances can also reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions in the waste sector and agricultural sector, including improved waste recovery and 
manure management. The transfer of all these technologies to developing countries must also 
be addressed to ensure that their potential to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is fully 
achieved. 
Presently there are lags in commercializing existing technology, but these lags may be 
shortened as public policy supports adoption of these technologies. Indeed, there is also now 
increasing motivation to reduce emissions as the scientific evidence of climate change is now 
overwhelming and the possibility of irreversible and abrupt climate change is quite imminent. 
People respond to incentives and the incentive to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions is 
continued human existence as we currently enjoy it. A new international climate change 
protocol that mandates these stringent targets is necessary and unavoidable. Failure to achieve 
these ambitious targets will be catastrophic. 
6. CONCLUSION 
The Kyoto Protocol became operational in February, 2005 with all its attendant 
implications and consequences. Yet, already the international community is beginning to 
negotiate the post-Kyoto instruments required to continuing addressing climate change 
beyond 2012 when the protocol expires. The targets for greenhouse gas emissions reductions 
will be much more onerous in the next international instrument. Certainly the adherence to 
and the achievement of the Kyoto Protocol targets remain important, however, there are a 
number of weaknesses in this approach that must not be replicated when designing the next 
international climate change protocol. 
This book has highlighted the weakness of the Kyoto Protocol approach and advanced an 
alternative that addresses these weaknesses. Firstly, all countries must be included in future 
mitigation programs. While developed countries have historically been responsible for the 
large majority of emissions and are still the largest emitter of greenhouse gases, the 
developing world - by sheer force of its population and recent modernization - will become 
the major emitters in the near future. Scientific knowledge must determine the future targets 
and whilst it is too late to avoid climate change, it is possible to minimize it so that 
temperature increases are less than 2°C. This requires dramatic and robust cuts to current 
emission levels. The question then turns on how to allocate the increasingly scarce emission 
rights. An equitable approach is to allocate these emission rights on a per capita basis. No one 
has an inherent right to emit more than any other person. Further these emissions must be 
based on consumption of emissions rather than their production. It is acknowledged that 
different countries have different geographies, energy infrastructure and access to natural 
resources. Countries therefore must be allowed within the timeframes given be able to make 
new investments and change public policy to achieve the reduction targets. A convergence 
date of 2050 will allow country-specific implementation plans that can address these distinct 
circumstances. Technology will playa large role in achieving these emission reductions and 
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developed countries must be encouraged to transfer technology to developing countries to 
support them in their efforts to continue expanding their economies to improve the lives of 
the poor whilst at the same time reducing per capita emissions. Countries should be allowed 
to supplement these per capita allocations through the provision and maintenance of carbon 
sinks. Finally, market forces should support this allocation of emission rights and trading of 
permissible emissions is a viable supplement to this approach. 
The international community began earnestly negotiating the post-Kyoto framework in 
Bali, Indonesia in December 2007. The principles agreed to at that meeting are a continuation 
of the Kyoto approach. This approach will not be sufficient to deliver the greenhouse gas 
emission reductions necessary to minimize climate change. This book has argued for a new 
approach based on universal per capita emissions targets that are capped and converge in 
2050. This approach is not on the current road-map, but unless the international community 
steers away from Kyoto, our climate is destined to crash. The next international climate 
change protocol must be designed afresh, and it is hoped this book will inform that process. 
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